21ccom editor’s note: this article is the transcript of Prof. Yu Tiejun’s speech delivered at 21ccom’s salon for young scholars on March 15, and is revised by the author.

Yu Tiejun (Associate Professors of the Institute of International & Strategic Studies (IISS), Peking University (PKU)): Thank you moderator, and thanks a lot for 21ccom's invitation. As we have discussed in the last round of speeches, it seems that war is not the mainstream solution to the current international political issues. It is, of course, better not to start a war, and I don't think war is a solution, either. This year marks the 120th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 as well as the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I. I think the important lesson World War I teaches us is that, even though no country really wants to start the war, the war eventually broke out. Why? The reason may lie in the many judgment errors made by the leaders at crisis stages. Therefore, crisis handling and management are especially important. I believe that neither China nor Japan deliberately wants to solve the Diaoyu Islands issue or other bilateral issues through war, but the possibility of conflict still exists. Why did I say that? We can imagine a scenario like this: as Jianping just said, our law enforcement is currently not as strict as Japan's on Diaoyu Islands. But as we normalizing our maritime police vessel cruise, we will have to enforce law and arrest those who want to land on the islands, or at least take some actions if not arrest them. Now both sides are sending police vessels to the islands with alleged intention of cruising, but they also intend to prevent the other side from approaching the islands. We can imagine that, if someone lands on the islands, or an accident happens when aircrafts are patrolling the area - because unlike maritime police vessels, aircrafts are not as easy to control and are likely to collide – what should we do if that happens? My personal judgment is that, considering the complex background of Sino-Japanese relations, especially the current complex situation influence by various factors like historical issues, psychological problems, and the current balance of power etc, once such an accident happens, it will escalate in a very short period of time. China is especially unable to take the consequences of the confrontation or even being in a disadvantageous position. Therefore, my topic today is crisis management, which is the most important and most urgent task in the handling of Sino-Japanese relations. 

I have just roughly stated the reason why crisis management is the most important task in the handling of Sino-Japanese relations. Richard Bush, Director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings Institution (and former Director of the American Institute in Taiwan), published a book in 2010 named “The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations”, which is very well written. I think he is really experienced and insightful. After spent so many years in the policymaking community, he is able to conceive many possible scenarios before things happen. Although his focus and research are about Sino-US relations, he is able to conceive possible frictions between China and Japan. He thinks that there will very likely be many problems in Sino-Japanese relations, so he conceives many possible scenarios in Sino-Japanese relations. I think his book is very valuable.

Why do I say Sino-Japanese relations are under a critical situation? As a researcher of international security, I believe that there are basically three factors that contribute to international crises: the first is that vital interests of a country are threatened, the second is that the threat is likely to result in major conflicts and wars, the third is that policymakers often need to make decisions and take actions within a short a period of time. All of the three factors exist in Sino-Japanese relations. Thus, in my opinion, although there are many issues we need to handle in Sino-Japanese relations, at the present stage, we should first cool down the complex relations and make them controllable. The primary issue is to keep the crisis at a lower level, so that the two sides can effectively communicate with each other if problems appear. I have attended some academic symposiums, but it seems that scholars pay no special attention to this issue. Either they don’t believe the issue exists, or they don’t take it seriously. This is the first scenario I conceive. The other is, what should we do if bad things really happen? What are the countermeasures? I feel that we are unable to give detailed countermeasures, which makes me quite worried. In the second half of last year, I attended a dialogue on Sino-Japanese maritime security organized by a Japanese consortium. This is a successful dialogue, during which both sides could communicate on issues like crisis management and trust-building measures, though they never conceded the sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands. But dialogues like this are scarce. Crisis management is important enough to be discussed over and over. Now there is almost no channel between the two sides to sit down and discuss the issue in a rational manner. This situation is very dangerous.

I also want to talk about the current problems particularly noteworthy in the crisis management of Sino-Japanese relations. The first problem is that China needs to strengthen the awareness of the Sino-Japanese crisis management, and pursue limited objectives on the Diaoyu Islands issue. Aiming to achieve the two a-hundred-year’s grand strategic goal, China should focus on the domestic issues. As I have said in my response to Jianping, China has achieved its set goal over the Diaoyu Islands issue at the present stage, which is to declare to the world that the Diaoyu Islands are inherent territory of China and there is a dispute on territory over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan. If we are not intended and prepared to seize the islands by force, both China and Japan will not win from military conflicts resulted from accidental events, so do any other countries. Even small-scale military conflict will make the existing security dilemma between China and Japan continue to deteriorate. In fact, in my opinion, China and Japan has now entered into the initial stage of arms race, which is similar to cold peace.

The second problem is that the current focus of Sino-Japanese crisis management is to take measures to prevent further deterioration of bilateral relations and maintain the stability of the crisis. We should of course resolutely resist and harsh criticize the Yasukuni Shrine issue, but I think Abe has already strategically failed at this move, therefore we should be more focused on the issue of Sino-Japanese crisis management and do not make it spiral. If it continues to spiral, it will be more and more difficult to manage the crisis, and either side may ultimately resort to force rather than diplomatic channels. If this happens, the consequences will be very difficult to predict.

The third problem is that for the current Sino-Japanese crisis management, I think we should strive to improve the crisis management system and form a default set of rules recognized by both governments. Either side can patrol the islands, yet a mutual agreement can reduce military conflicts caused by accidents. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union came to an agreement to reduce conflicts at sea in 1972, which benefited both countries tremendously. Crew from both sides stuck relevant provisions on ships and looked for handling method for a particular situation.

The fourth problem is that the most successful crisis management, which is to find the root cause of the crisis and work hard to eliminate it, requires a long-term exploration. We lack the experience of that. A zero-sum game should be avoided by all means in the course of crisis management. The idea of "crushing the other side by all means and humiliating it, so that it completely admits defeat" will definitely not lead to a successful crisis management. This is basic understanding that concluded by experts from both sides after so many years of Cold War. Crisis management is to "manage" rather than completely defeat the opponent. To completely defeat the opponent is war or a zero-sum game, which means to solve the problem by struggling against the enemy. It’s a practice avoid solving the problem. 

China's crisis management system still needs to be strengthened. The National Security Commission of the Communist Party of China was just established, and a system is yet to be built. We should also carefully observe the practices of crisis management of China, the US, Japan and other countries in all aspects. This concludes my speech, thank you!

The above article is reprinted from 21ccom: http://www.21ccom.net/articles/qqsw/zlwj/article_20140414104366.html