This is an address to the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University by Kevin Rudd, Oct 8, 2014.

It's good to be back in China.

很高兴能够再次造访中国。 

It's good to be back in Shanghai where nearly thirty years ago I once served as Acting Australian Consul-General in the days when there were only a handful of countries with consular missions in China's commercial capital.

很高兴能够再次造访上海。近三十年前我曾代理澳大利亚驻上海总领事。那时，还没几个国家在这个中国的商业中心设立总领事馆。 

It is good to be back at Fudan University, a celebrated member of China's Ivy League, where I sent my own son Nicholas to study Chinese just a decade ago.

很高兴能够再次造访复旦大学 ——这所著名的“中国常春藤盟校”（九校联盟之一）。十年前，我的儿子尼古拉斯就在此学习中文。 

All these years later, I am now affiliated with the American Ivy League having taken up a position as Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School.

十年后的今天，我则在大洋彼岸，成为了美国常春藤盟校 ——哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院的高级研究员。 

My policy research project at the Belfer Center is "Alternative Futures for US China Relations -2014 to 2023." 

我在哈佛肯尼迪政府学院贝尔福中心的政策研究项目题为“未来十年中美关系的可能未来”。 

I undertook this project because of President Xi Jinping's advocacy of the concept of "A New Type of Great Power Relationship" as a means of avoiding long-term conflict between an emerging great power and an established great power.

我研究此项目缘起习近平主席所提“新型大国关系”之概念，意指如何避免守成大国与新兴大国之间的长期矛盾。 

I wanted to explore what such a concept could mean for the future of the US-China relationship, given that this relationship will shape much of the future of the Asian hemisphere we all share.

有鉴于中美关系对于我们亚太地区的共同未来有决定性的影响，深入了解“新型大国关系”的概念对于中美关系的未来意味着什么则显得至关重要。 

I have also become increasingly concerned at the increasingly negative trajectory of the relationship over much of the last twelve months.

同时，我对过去十二个月来中美关系的持续降温愈加感到担忧。

Which is why I have decided to dedicate much of my time this year to 

analyzing China's and America's national capabilities and intentions for the decade ahead.

也正因如此，我将今年的工作重心放在了分析未来十年中美两国的国家实力与国家意图上。 

And to think about whether there is sufficient commonality of Chinese and American values and interests to craft a common narrative for a shared future.

并在此基础上，思考中美两国是否在价值与利益方面有充分的共通性来为彼此共同的未来构建双方的共同叙事。 

Or whether such commonality simply does not exist.

抑或这一共通性根本不存在。 

In which case both the relationship's and the region's future is more likely to be shaped by events and by reactions to those events.

这意味着无论是两国关系还是亚太地区的未来都将会是以事件应对为导向，而缺乏宏观制度设计。 

And in an environment increasingly charged with strategic competition, crisis and possible conflict. 

那么，会有越来越多的战略竞争，危机隐患，还有可能的冲突。 

Within this framework, last week in Washington I delivered an address launching the Zbignew Bryzinski Institute at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

在此框架下，上周我在位于华盛顿的美国战略与国际问题研究中心的兹

比格涅夫.布热津斯基地缘战略研究所成立仪式上发表了演讲。 I entitled the address “East Asia's Strategic and Economic Future: Chinese Perspectives and American Responses".

演讲题为“东亚的战略与经济未来：中国视角和美国应对”。 

Its purpose was to describe to the best extent I was able the world and the 

region as seen through Chinese eyes.

目的在于尽我所能阐释中国对于地区和世界的相关认知和理解。 

Of course I cannot pretend to be objective on these matters.

我自然无法在如此阐释上保持客观。 

I am not Chinese.

毕竟我非老中。I am a westerner, although one who has dedicated a large part of his life to the study of China.

纵然我一生致力研究中国，我仍乃西方老陆。 And the country of which I was until recently Prime Minister remains of course a long-standing ally of the United States.

而且不久前我任总理的澳大利亚，至今仍与美国保持长期同盟关系。 Nonetheless I believe it is important for our friends in Washington to understand something of the reality that is seen through the prism of the

perceptions and priorities of the Chinese leadership，rather than simply taking as a given a world seen only though American eyes.即便如此，我仍坚信，对于美国的朋友而言，透彻地通过现实来理解中

国领导层对世界的认知以及优先考虑的事项，而非单纯地只以美方视角的固化定式想当然，是非常重要的。 Today in Shanghai, I propose to do the reverse.今天，在上海，我将反其道而行之。 To describe China as currently seen from America.试图从美国的角度来阐释中国。

And to do so as frankly as possible.

并希冀以最大限度来开诚布公。 Once again I am obviously not an American.然我也非老美。 I therefore speak with no authority.我的发言并不代表任何官方立场。 I simply seek to describe my observations of the deep views of the US foreign 

policy elite, without necessarily seeking to defend them.

我仅希望深入阐明我所观察到的美国外交政策精英阶层的看法，并无意为他们的立场辩护。 And I do all this with a view to helping provide something of a third-party 

reality check on how each side actually views the aspirations and the policies 

of the other.我所秉持的理念是能够为中美双方提供相对客观现实的第三方观察，并就双方对彼此的愿景和政策实际上持有什么样的态度进行阐述。

Because I also believe it is impossible to craft any common narrative for the future unless it is firmly based on the realpolitik of current perceptions of one another.

我认为，若缺乏对彼此现实政治认知，则双方的共同叙事难以构建。 

And perceptions, of course, ultimately shape policy.

如是认知，终将影响政策。 

American Values美国的价值 

China, among other states, invariably bridles against the repeated assertion of the universality of American values, an assertion that runs fundamentally against the Chinese belief that each country has its own values.

中国与很多国家一样，对美国不断强调其普世价值观一贯不满。中国认为，每个国家都有其本土价值；而美国所强调的普世价值，从根本上与中国的信仰相悖。 

And it is a matter of political sovereignty for that country to choose whatever political system best reflects those values, irrespective of whether they happen to conform with one's own. 

一国选择最能体现该国价值的政治体制是其政治主权，无论该政治体制是否完全契合该国的价值体系。 

This view is reflected in the most basic doctrinal statements of Chinese foreign policy, the most important of which is the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence."

这个观点也反映在了中国最基本的外交政策方针，即“和平共处五项原则”上。 

These include principles of "mutual respect" and "noninterference in the domestic affairs of another country."

其中包括“互相尊重”，以及“互不干涉内政”。 

It is therefore impossible to understand American attitudes to China, the region and the world without understanding the long-standing centrality of liberal democratic values of opportunity, freedom and democracy to the American political tradition.

因此，不去理解自由主义民主价值中的机遇、自由与民主在美国政治传统中长久的核心地位的话，也就无法理解美国对中国、区域，以及世界的态度。 

Critically, these values have been seen from the beginning of the American republic as not just American values, but values for all of humankind. 

值得注意的是，这些价值在美利坚合众国初创之时就被视作全人类的，而非美国独有的，共同价值。 

They were grounded in the sentiments of 150 years of settlement from the early seventeenth century.

这些价值扎根于自 17世纪初开始的长达 150年的殖民地时期的情操之中。 

Generations of dissenters travelled to America in pursuit of political and religious freedoms they did not enjoy in a Europe wracked by the wars of religion and the princely autocracies that fought them.

一代又一代的政治异见者远渡重洋到美国，追求他们在欧洲无法享有的政治与宗教的自由，追求被宗教战争毁坏和君主独裁统治压制的自由。 

These freedoms were finally and formally secured by the definitive political act that was the American revolution.

而领导美国革命的决定性政治纲领最终正式地保障了这些自由。 

They have constituted the central narrative of American politics and the American nation in the 240 years since.

它们因此建构了尔后 240年的美国政治和美利坚民族的核心叙事。

They have also become the animating force of the American identity.

它们也自此成为了美利坚民族特性中生生不息的力量。 

In the American tradition, these freedoms are seen as the "city on the hill."在美国传统中，这些自由被视作是“岭上之都”的神谕。 They constitute what the Americans see as the moral basis of what would 

later be called "American exceptionalism."这些自由也构成了被美国人民视为“美国例外主义”的道德基准。 For the nineteenth century this would, in the American perception, become 

the magnetic force that would attract tens of millions of migrants from the 

Old World to this "city on the hill" in the new.在美国的理解看来，19世纪，对“岭上之都”的向往像一块磁铁一样吸引了数以千万计的移民离开了旧世界的故乡，踏上了前往新世界的旅程。 

These freedoms also became a galvanizing force in the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery.这些自由也成为了美国南北战争和废奴运动中激励人心的力量。

In other words, democratic freedoms were for America itself, not for political or military export to the rest of the world, other than as the exemplar state.

换言之，那时的民主自由是美利坚的民主自由。美国并没有向世界输出政治理念或派驻军事力量的意愿 ——其意愿至多只是希望成为一个典范国家罢了。 

It was not until the twentieth century that a reluctant America would be drawn into foreign entanglements and European wars, but not so much as the defence of a political ideal but rather the defence of its national interests in its freedom of navigation.

直至二十世纪，美国被迫陷入国际事务与欧洲战事的泥沼中 ——但那也更多是出于在航运自由方面对国家利益的保护，而非出于对政治信仰的守卫。 

Woodrow Wilson's attempts to entrench American ideals in a liberal internationalist order for the world in a League of Nations were shunned by an isolationist American congress.

一战后，伍德罗.威尔逊希望将美国价值植入彼时的自由主义国际秩序的意图，被当时奉行孤立主义的美国国会否决了。 

And then a generation later, again a reluctant America finally committed to another global war, again because its interests were attacked in the Pacific while Hitler declared war from across the Atlantic. 

三十年之后，历史重演，美国依然不情愿参战，直至其国家利益在太平

洋地区受到损害，且同时希特勒在大西洋向美国宣战。 

It was only during the course of the Second World War that the defence of American values were finally elevated to a global cause in the American mind in a global war against German and Japanese fascism.

实际上，直到二战联合抗争德日法西斯主义的时候，美国人才把捍卫美国价值的范围扩大到全世界。 

The American people bought war bonds to finance the American war effort in defence of Roosevelt's "four freedoms:" freedom of speech," freedom of worship," freedom from want" and "freedom from fear."

美国人民在罗斯福的号召下，在二战期间购买军事公债应援战事，为捍卫“四个自由”，即“言论自由”，“宗教信仰自由”，“不虞匮乏的自由”，以及“免除恐惧的自由”。 

The United States, emerging from a deep tradition of isolationism that had by and large dominated American politics since the Revolution then sought to construct a post-war order which incorporated these values.

那时开始，美利坚合众国从自美国革命以来便在美国政坛扎根的孤立主义传统中走了出来，进而在建立战后世界秩序的努力中整合了上述美国价值。And through a combination of the United Nations, international law and American power, saw its mission as the global articulation and defence of these liberal democratic values as central to its core mission.

而在联合国，国际法和美国强权的共同作用下，美国开始将国际协作视作其使命，继而将捍卫自由民主的价值视作这一使命核心内容。 

This mission became immediately animated by the challenge of Soviet communism and American conclusions about the rise of communist China.

这一使命在二战后美国面对苏联的挑战，以及对一个红产主义中国崛起时，马上被激活。 

With the Sino-Soviet split, the abandonment of a global ideological mission on the part of the Communist Party of China, and a decade later the collapse of the Soviet Union, many in America prematurely concluded "the end of history" and the final triumph of a liberal democratic capitalist model.

随着中苏交恶，中共放弃意识形态输出，以及十年后的苏联解体，许多美国人过早地做出了“历史终结”的结论，并认为这是自由民主资本主义最终胜利。 

In fact it was not the end of history.

然而，历史并未终结。 

Militant Islamism had a different view of history. 

激进伊斯兰主义对历史有着不同的看法。 

The return of Russian nationalism as a counter-force to European liberalism represents a different response again.

俄罗斯民族主义的回归对欧洲自由主义的抵制也是一个对历史终结论断的不同反应。 

As does China's advocacy of its own "China Model" or the "Beijing Consensus."

“中国模式”或者“北京共识”也有着同样的意义。 

Nonetheless America's sense of its own liberal democratic exceptionalism continues as a strong, unifying narrative of America's role in the world today.

即便如此，自由民主的美国例外主义依然继续着美国在国际社会中强大而具有凝聚力的叙事。 

America's critics will legitimately point to the copious examples of American hypocrisy from the Monroe Doctrine to the Middle East where democratically elected governments were often removed by force if they were seen as incompatible with American interests. 

美国的批评者有理有据地指出，从门罗主义到中东局势不难看出美国的

伪善 ——往往是一旦局势与美国国家利益相悖，民选政府依然可被以非民主的方式强行更替 ——诸如此类的例证与美国价值无疑是相悖的。 

Just as it is equally legitimate to argue that for much of its 150 year history as a global superpower, the US has been the most benign superpower in history, compared with every other superpower or great power since the Persian Empire 2500 years ago.

但同样有理有据的是，过去 150年里，美国作为超级大国，可说是自2500年前波斯帝国以降，最温和的了。 

By and large, with the exception of Teddy Roosevelt's taste for adventurism, America never sought a colonial empire, despite its undisputed power to have obtained one.

总体而言，除了泰迪.罗斯福浅尝辄止的冒险主义之外，美国从未有过建立殖民主义帝国的诉求，即便美国拥有毋庸置疑的能力去这么做。 

In fact, against this measure, the only comparable great power in history to the United States was China, which also, at varying times in its long history, also had the capacity to establish a vast overseas colonial empire, but chose not to.

纵观历史，在这点上唯一能与美国相媲美的国家，只有中国 ——在几个朝代都有能力建立巨大的殖民帝国的情况下，中国没有选择这么做。

Of course both have been involved in extensive border wars in their history.

当然历史上两国都经历过数次边境战争。 

But neither sought to subjugate distant foreign lands for the purposes of national self-aggrandizement or economic exploitation.但两国都没有为了寻求国家扩张或经济掠夺而去吞并外国领土。 This commonality in the American and Chinese experience is little discussed.这一中美历史中展现出的共同性很少被讨论。 It should be.这是十分值得关注的。 But we cannot ignore the core difference that the United States today, by 

reason of its historical circumstances since European settlement, continues to exhibit not just a set of liberal democratic ideals for itself, but also for the world at large.

但我们不能忽视一个核心差异在于，因上述自欧洲殖民时期至今所形成

的历史原因，美国在今天仍持续对内对外宣扬着自由民主的理念。 Although the vigor with which these ideals may be prosecuted abroad will always vary, depending on the continuing tussle between the contending 

forces of isolationism and retrenchment on the one hand, and the moral 

purpose and responsibilities of global leadership on the other.

然而美国国内持续不断的孤立主义和削减开支的主张，以及对于美国作为全球领导者的责任归属与道德目的的争论，直接导致了对这些美国理想在美国本土之外推广过程中出现的起伏。 

The core point concerning this exceptionalist, liberal democratic tradition of American domestic politics and foreign policy cannot simply be written away through some form of polite diplomatic agreement, irrespective of how much this may be deemed by others to be desirable.

无论他人如何渴望，美国例外主义和自由民主传统在美国国内与外交政策的核心地位，无法由一纸外交协定抹去。 

It is an elemental part of the American identity.

这是美国身份构成的根本之一。 

To seek to do so would be the equivalent of trying to purge Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism from modern Chinese political consciousness or national identity.

试图抹去美国自由民主的理念就如同希望在现代中国政治观念或国家特性中抹去儒、释、道的影响。 

In both cases it is indelible. 

都不可能。 

Yet the core difference remains that Confucianism is not designed as a value for export to the world.

但此中区别在于，儒家理念并不具有向世界输出价值的特性。 

Whereas American liberal democracy, either by way of active evangelization, or simply by passive example, is precisely that.

而美国的自由民主，无论是经主动传道他国，抑或被动展示自我，实际上是极具输出性的。 

The truth, therefore, is that any common narrative between a rising China and a still powerful United States, will need to intelligently negotiate these complex ideational shoals, grounded in turn in deep questions of identity.

因此，事实上，一个崛起的中国和一个仍然强大的美国之间想要构建任何共同叙事，就需要双方运用各自的智慧，在深入探讨国家特性的基础上，就这些繁复的观念进行磋商合意。 

It is a recurring, deep problem in the relationship. And it can't simply be wished away.

这是两国关系中一个反复出现的深层问题。而且不会因我们希望它不存在而自动消失。

American Experience of China美国的中国经历 

If then these are American values, what then of American historical 

experiences of China that have shaped current American perceptions?如上简述美国的价值之后，我们不禁要问：什么样的历史经历（尤其与中国的交互）助构了美国如今的国家意图。 

The US was signatory to the infamous unequal treaties with the China of the late Qing.

美国曾是与晚清政府签订臭名昭著不平等条约的国家之一。 The US was also party to the Eight Power Alliance which marched on Beijing in 1900 following the Boxer Rising.

也曾是在 1900年前后义和团运动兴起时入侵北京的八国联军一份子。 

Although the US did not insist on the full payment of reparations by the Qing government under the so-called Boxer Protocol.然而，美国没有依据所谓的《辛丑条约》向清政府要求全额赔偿。

Instead it contributed funds to the building of Tsinghua University, Yanjing University and the Peking Union Medical College, which has caused Chinese elites over the last century to view the Americans as imperialists of a different hue.

反之，美国以庚子赔款助建了清华大学、燕京大学以及北京协和医学院。可以说，在 20世纪中国精英的眼中，美国并非与其他帝国主义国家为一丘之貉。 

China also became in the American mind of the late 19th and early 20th centuries a rich field of Christian mission as American and European missionaries dedicated themselves to the "saving of millions of Chinese souls."

中国在 19世纪末和 20世纪初的美国人眼中亦被视作是基督教传教的沃土。彼时来自美国和欧洲的传教士纷纷投身于“救赎千百万中国人的灵魂”的事业中。 

As the Japanese invasion of China unfolded during the 1930s, the US increasingly identified with Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Government in Nanking.

上世纪三十年代，随着日军侵华的行动日渐猖獗，美国对由蒋介石领导的南京国民政府的认同感也愈加增强。Chiang's later much publicized conversion to Christianity also helped consolidate American public support for the Nationalist cause.

蒋介石基督教信仰的公开化也进一步巩固了美国民众对国民政府的支持。 

Once the United States declared war on Japan in 1941, the US maintained air supplies to Chiang's wartime capital in Chongqing across "the Hump."

自 1941年对日宣战起，美国便持续通过“驼峰航线”为战时陪都重庆输送物资。 

Chiang through his attendance at the Cairo Conference in 1943 also came to be seen both by the Americans and the British as a core part of the global alliance against fascism.

而 1943年蒋介石出席开罗会议之后，美英两国就把中国视为抗击法西斯主义的重要盟国之一。 

During the second civil war between 1945 and 49, the US provided significant material support for the KMT against what was then a numerically vastly inferior Red Army force.

在 1945-49年的第二次国共内战期间，美国为国民党提供了巨量物资用以对抗其时在人数上极不占优的红军。Although a small number of American volunteers sided with the Communist forces under Mao, the US unequivocally backed Chiang through until his flight to Taiwan in 1949.

直到 1949年蒋介石迁台之前，美国都一直旗帜鲜明地支持着国民党，即便这期间有过少数美国志愿者站到了毛泽东领导的红军一边。 

For the next thirty years, the debate raged across the US foreign policy establishment as to who had "lost China."

此后三十年间，有关谁“失去了中国”的争论在美国外交政策讨论中持续不断。 

US and Chinese forces engaged each other directly in the Korean War, and in the following decades indirectly in Vietnam.

中美两军在朝鲜战争期间直接冲突，之后在越南战争中意间接碰撞。 

In the meantime the US dug in with the defence of Taiwan at all costs, right through until Nixon's opening to Communist China in 1972, although the Taiwan factor remains alive to this day.

与此同时，直到尼克松 1972年访华之前，美国一直都在不遗余力地投身台湾防卫，尽管台湾问题直到今日仍悬而未决。From Soviet ally and ideological foe, the US view of China changed radically to de facto strategic partner in common cause against the Soviet Union in the final decades of the Cold War.

美国对华态度在冷战的最后十年剧变 ——从曾经的苏联盟国和意识形态的敌对方，迅速转变为事实上的共同针对苏联的战略伙伴。 

After 1989, US concerns about human rights in Communist China rose to the fore, as the Soviet threat receded and then collapsed.

1989年后，随着苏联威胁式微，直至后来苏联解体，美国对于中共的人权问题的担忧被重新提上日程。 

From America's perspective, China during the 1990's slowly emerged from being seen as a human rights problem to being seen as a major economic opportunity.

而美国对中国的态度的重心，从 90年代起，又逐渐从对人权问题的担忧，转向了对巨大的市场机遇的垂涎。 

America's support for China's prosecution of a policy of domestic economic reform and opening to the outside world during this period, culminating in US support for China's accession to the WTO in 2001, sustaining this pattern of engagement with China which placed economic cooperation at the center of the relationship. 

在这一时期，美国一直对中国改革开放和融入全球市场表现出欢迎态度。随着 2001年美国支持中国加入世界贸易组织，中美关系一度保持以经济合作为核心。 

During the last decade, the rapidly escalating growth and size of the Chinese economy began to place new strains on the relationship in critical areas of intellectual property protection, anti-dumping and accusations of currency manipulation.

过去十年，随着中国经济体量的飞速增长，两国关系在诸如保护知识产权，反倾销，以及关于操纵汇率的指控等敏感问题上呈现紧张态势。 

In other words, the economic dynamic of the relationship, while mutually beneficial, was also beginning to generate its own tensions.

换句话说，推动两国关系向良好态势发展的互利互惠的经济纽带也呈现一定程度的紧张。 

At the same time, the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a strategic threat to China, followed by China's gradual normalization of its relationship with post-Soviet Russia, underlined the absence of any new compelling strategic rationale to underpin the US-China relationship capable of replacing the anti-Soviet logic of 1972.

与此同时，当作为中美两国的共同威胁的苏联解体，以及中俄关系正常化之后，中美两国曾经的共同战略基础便不复存在。

In America's experience, since the global financial crisis, China has further 

evolved.

在美国看来，全球金融危机之后，中国有了长足的进步。 

From being seen as a responsible economic partner in the critical days of the deliberations of the G20 to avoid global financial and economic collapse.

这是从二十国集团商议如何在全球金融危机的大环境下避免全面的经济崩盘议题时，中国所展现出的一个负责任的的经济伙伴的形象中所得出的结论。 

To being seen increasingly as a global economic competitor as China's economy begins to replace the US as the largest economy in the world.

鉴于中国将有可能取代美国成为世界第一大经济体，其逐渐被视作是美国全球范围内最大的经济竞争对手。 

As well as a country which begins now to challenge the established patterns of the post-45 security order in Asia, in addition to broader global institutional norms (most recently reflected in the current debate on the international status of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.)

同时对美国而言，中国也成为了挑战亚洲地区战后安全秩序，乃至全球制度规范的国家。一个最近的例证便是关于亚洲基础设施投资银行国际地位的讨论。

China, therefore, in America's experience over the last 150 years, has evolved 

from being seen as a field of missionary endeavor, to a country which America lost to Communism, to one which they joined in common cause against the Soviet Union, to one which in turn is now seen to be challenging American uni-polar supremacy across a range of fronts, while all along representing a set of ideational norms in large part at variance with the universal claims of American liberal democratic values.

至此，中国在美国过去 150年的经验中的转变呈现出了这样一个脉络：从一个传教士眼中的传教沃土，到美国败给共产主义的典型国家，从曾经对抗苏联的同伴，到今天成为在世界秩序的诸多层面挑战美国单极，在意识形态领域的诸多方面冲击美国的自由民主价值的崛起力量。 

American Perceptions美国对世界的理解 

So what of current US perceptions of China?

那么当下美国对中国的理解又是怎样的呢？ 

Again I emphasize I do not speak for anybody in America.

如前所述，我的如下言论并不代表任何美国人。Just as my speech last week in Washington did not seek in any way to reflect official Chinese views.

正如此前我在华盛顿的演讲并没有试图代表中国的官方立场一样。 

These are simply my observations where I seek to describe the zeitgeist of the foreign policy community in both countries.

我所表达的，仅仅是我观察到的两国在外交政策方面的思潮。 

And while I am professionally trained as a diplomat, I sometimes fear that insufficient strategic candor in both directions (ie between Washington and Beijing) in the past may inhibit the ability to craft a common strategic narrative for the future.

作为一个受过职业训练的外交官，我时常对过去两国间在战略上不够坦诚的现状可能会阻碍未来两国建构战略共同叙事感到担忧。 

Assuming of course that such a narrative is possible for the future given the complexities of a shared historical experience, conflicting national historiographies, different philosophical traditions, the significant gap that currently exists between the two countries values and interests, and what I fear to be a widening gap in perceptions of each other's longer-term intentionalities. 

鉴于中美复杂的共同历史经验、相斥的国家历史背景、不同的哲学传统

源流，巨大的价值利益分歧，以及我所担心的两国之间持续扩大的对彼此长期国家意图的误判，我依然相信，中美对于双方和全球未来的共同叙事可以建立。 

At the core of US perceptions is a deep admiration for what China has achieved over the last 35 years.

实际上，在美国对中国认知的核心，其对中国在过去 35年间所取得的成绩是高度赞赏的。 

US elite opinion was by and large skeptical that China could pull off the economic transformation you have since Deng Xiaoping changed the nation's strategic course.

总体来讲，过去美国各界精英，对邓小平领导下的中国经济转型能够成功持怀疑态度。 

The fact that the market is now anchored as a core principle of Chinese economic policy for a country under Communist Party control has staggered most Americans for its sheer audacity.

而事实是，现而今市场已经成为了中国共产党经济政策的稳定核心 ——这另诸多美国精英大跌眼镜。 

The fact that hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty commands great respect. 

诚然，让数以亿记中国人摆脱贫困是值得尊敬的壮举。 

But there is also an American view that China does not appreciate the fact that the US has welcomed, rather than blocked, China's full participation in the international community and the institutional arrangements of the global economy.

但，与此同时，美国也认为对于美国全面欢迎（而非阻隔）中国参与国际事务和全球经济，中国没有表现出应有的感激与承认。 

The US for ideological reasons could have vetoed the PRC occupying the China's seat on the UNSC and in the wider UN system.

事实上，美国完全可以出于意识形态上的考量，在由中华人民共和国政府于联合国安理会，及更广泛的联合国系统中，代表中国事务的议题上投反对票。 

It did not.

美国并未这样做。 

Despite the fact that at the time China only a few years before had been at the ideological zenith of the Cultural Revolution.

即便在此短短几年之前，中国的意识形态狂热在文化大革命里达到了顶峰。

The US could have blocked Chinese accession to the WTO.美国同样可以阻碍中国加入世界贸易组织。 It did not.美国也未这样做。 Although many criticized China's market economy status at the time.尽管当时存在大量对中国市场经济状况的不满意见。 In fact, rather than blocking Chinese WTO accession, in American eyes they 

did all they could to advance it, despite the difficulties of the decade in which 

it was negotiated.事实上，在美国人看来，尽管在中国入世的十年谈判里显得困难重重，但美国没有意图阻碍中国入世 ——相反地，美国为中国入世竭尽全力给予帮助。 

And it is an empirical fact that Chinese net exports and rapid increases in foreign direct investment have been major drivers of China's rapid economic growth.

而实证表明，中国的净出口和迅猛增加的外资投入的确是中国经济快速增长的主要驱动力。The US could also have avoided creating the G20 Summit, including China at the top table of global economic governance.

美国也可以选择不创建二十国峰会来吸纳中国成为全球经济事务的核心政策制定者之一。 It did not.美国还是没有这样做。 It welcomed China.

美国欢迎中国。 Just as all G20 members have welcomed China's constructive contribution to this process both during and following the global crisis.

一如所有二十国集团成员欢迎中国在全球金融危机之中以及之后的建设

性贡献。 US foreign policy elites feel that they have done everything possible to welcome China into every domain of the global order and its governance.

美国外交政策的精英阶层认为，美国已经做了所有他们能做的事情，来欢迎中国在各个方面融入全球秩序和参与其实质管理。Of course my Chinese friends respond by saying that the US in doing all the above has only been doing so for its own national interests, rather than acting altruistically for China.

当然，我的中国朋友的回答是，美国所做的一切仅仅是为了美国自己的国家利益，而非为了中国所做的利他主义无私行为。 

Having observed some of these US decision-making processes over time, and the internally contested nature of them, I am not sure these US decisions were clinically one or the other.

尽管我对美国的政策决策过程和其内部竞争传统有过一些观察，我却无法肯定地说美国之决策出于利己或是利他的考量。 

Nonetheless whatever the motivation, the fact remains that these decisions were taken, decisions which over time have benefitted China, and when other decisions could have been taken.

先搁下美国动机不表，且看美国在可以选择其他政策方向的时候，事实上还是做出了如今所见的有利于中国的决策。 

Chinese friends then argue that a further motivation behind US policy was, and is, to use Chinese global engagement as a means of turning China into a full participant, supporter and contributor to a global order designed by the US and the West, for the benefit of the US and the West, and at a time when the PRC was not involved in any way in its formation. 

中国的朋友们会继续质疑：美国一以贯之的对华政策的背后动机乃是希

望基于美国和西方的利益，将中国纳入美国和西方所构建的国际秩序中，使中国完全成为其参与者，支持者和贡献者 ——但中国并非这个国际秩序的初期形成与制定的一份子。 

Or as others have observed, gratuitously offering China the opportunity to become an honorary member of the West, as with Japan several decades before.

这意在吸纳中国成为西方社会的“荣誉会员”——正如西方在正如几十年前如此对待日本。 

Of course, my good friend and Harvard Kennedy School colleague Bob Zoellick encapsulated this thesis in his "global stakeholder theory" of 2005.

我的好友，也是在哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院的同事，罗伯特.佐利克，曾在 2005年将此论题归纳概括为其著名的“全球利益相关者理论”。 

While many Chinese found this to be condescending, in part because of the difficulties of translation of the concept of "stakeholder," and in part for the reasons given above, it should be borne in mind that Zoellick was also directing his remarks at a skeptical American public back in 2005 when many Americans were beginning to react badly to the loss of American jobs through what was perceived to be unfair Chinese competition and currency manipulation. 

由于“利益相关者”这个概念的晦涩翻译以及上述的原因，很多中国认

为这个理论有居高临下之意。但应该注意的是，在 2005年佐利克提出该理论的时候，正值诸多美国人认为他们失业的主因在于中国的不当竞争和操纵汇率 ——佐利克此理论的受众是对此表示怀疑和过激反应的美国公众。 

In significant part, what Zoellick was doing was defending a US policy of consistent support for Chinese global economic engagement. As well as articulating a positive framework for China's greater participation in the global order.

实际上，佐利克所做的努力意在维护美国政府继续支持中国参与国际经济事务的政策。 

Other Chinese friends argue that the real hidden agenda behind US policy in support of absorbing China into the current liberal internationalist, rules-based order is also to subvert Chinese values with western values over time.

另一些中国朋友主张，美国对华政策背后的阴谋是通过渐渐将中国纳入当下基于规则的自由主义国际秩序，以逐渐用西方价值颠覆中国价值。 

This in turn takes us back to my earlier arguments concerning the values divide between the two countries and the two systems, and the need for this divergence to be addressed in any common narrative for the future. 

说到这里，就需要再次说明我之前提及的关于两国和两个政治体系所持

有的价值会使两国渐行渐远的问题，以及为解决这一问题，为未来建构

任何共同叙事所需要付出努力的必要性。 Americans would argue that China has successfully resisted foreign attempts to "subvert" its domestic philosophical traditions for over two thousand years.

对此，美方会主张，中国有成功抵御任何外来势力“颠覆”其存在两千余年的哲学传统的历史经验。 Starting with Christianity which after 400 years made limited progress.

从 400多年前基督教进入中国所取得的相当有限的进展。 Continuing with the failure of political liberalism to take root during the Nationalist period.

到国民政府期间自由主义政治理念试图扎根于中国的失败。 

And most recently with another foreign import, China's rejection of Marxism as an economic theory.再到最近几十年中国摈弃马克思主义经济理论。

In other words, China has consistently proven itself to be sufficiently robust 

as a civilization to evolve its own values over time, and to chart with confidence its own national future.

从另一个角度来看，中国文明一贯展现着价值自我进化的强大生命力，以及国家未来规划的强大自信心。 

More fundamentally, however, our American friends would argue that the current rules-based order has overwhelmingly suited and served China's interests over the last 35 years.

从根本上来看，我们的美国朋友认为，过去的 35年来，现行的基于规则的国际秩序毫无争议地符合并满足了中国的发展利益。 

It has been the global economic framework within which Chinese prosperity has been achieved.

中国成就的繁荣是在现有全球经济框架内取得的。 

As for the security policy dimensions of the order, including overwhelming US military power, the Americans would argue that their strong and continuing strategic presence in Asia has preserved the peace and stability of the wider region, creating the post-75 strategic environment in which all regional economies have prospered, not least China. 

从国际秩序中的安全政策角度看，美方会声称，是以美国强大的军事力

量为基础的安全政策自 1975年起保障了广大区域的和平与稳定，为包括中国在内的整体区域繁荣创造了战略环境。 

The alternative, the Americans would argue, could have been a rolling series of regional conflicts, in the strategic vacuum arising for US withdrawal, including over time the radical re-armament of Japan.

美方会进一步认为，如果没有这一安全政策，区域冲突会持续不断发生，甚至有可能日本在某个时间节点上再度出现的军国主义化。 

This brings us to US perceptions of more recent Chinese conclusions concerning whether or not the US is pursuing a policy of containment.

由此，我们可以回到中国近期关于美国是否寻求遏制中国政策的讨论上。 

The Americans argue that if China has seriously concluded that is it now the object of a policy of US containment, then this represents a fundamental miscalculation.

美国认为，如果中国真的认为美国对华奉行遏制政策，那么这表明中国对此有根本性的误判。 

They argue that US policies towards China across the last 35 years have been the actual antithesis of containment. 

美国认为，过去的 35年间美国对华政策恰恰与遏制政策相反。 

Containment against the Soviet Union during the Cold War was designed to diplomatically isolate, economically undermine and militarily confront Moscow, overtly and covertly, at every corner of the globe.

回顾冷战期间美国对苏联的遏制，其表现为：在全球每一个角落，无论明处还是暗处，对苏联实施外交孤立，经济颠覆以及军事对立。 

The Americans would further ask China the question that if the US is seriously containing China, then what is China currently being prevented from doing in the region and the world that it would otherwise want to do were it not for US policy?

进而美国会问中国这样的一个问题：如果美国确实在遏制中国，那么美国究竟在哪些区域和全球事务上对中国进行了哪些遏制呢？而且，如果没如前假设的美国对华遏制政策，中国又会有哪些不同作为呢？ 

This brings us to the related charge from my Chinese friends that the US is seeking to isolate China.

这个问题让我想到中国朋友们对于美国正在寻求孤立中国的指控。 

For this, Chinese commentators point to a policy of encirclement by US allies, and the strengthening of these alliances in recent years. 

不少中国的评论员指，美国的盟友正在包围中国，而美国与这些盟国的关系在近年不断巩固。 

America would argue that every one of these alliances pre-date the rise of China by decades.

美方则会辩称，美国在亚太地区的盟国关系都是在中国崛起之前就已经建立的。 

And in Australia's case by half a century.

以澳大利亚为例，美澳同盟关系早在半个世纪前已经建立。 

They further argue that many of these alliances had their original rationale in providing security guarantees against the long-term re-emergence of Japan.

他们会继而表明，美国在亚太的盟国关系之初衷是为了长期防范日本军国主义的再度崛起而向其盟国提供的安全保障。 

Then as part of a world-wide network of alliances against the Soviet Union in a period of profound ideological, political, diplomatic and military confrontation with the Soviet Union.

这同时也是美国在与苏联在意识形态、政治、外交以及军事等方面的全面对抗时期所形成的全球范围的盟国关系网的一部分。

And following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these alliances have 

performed a range of functions against multiple and changing contingencies, not least contending with the rise of militant Islamism over the last decade and a half.

这些同盟关系，在苏联解体后，在应对多个偶发性事件中起到了多方面的作用 ——尤其是在过去十五年间与激进伊斯兰主义的对抗中。 

As for the strengthening of these alliances in recent years, the Americans may argue that this has nothing to do with the rise of China.

而说到美国与盟国关系的强化，美方会强调这与中国的崛起毫无关系。 

I personally do not think that is the case.

我个人认为这种说法不符合实情。 

It is more likely to have been the case that this strengthening was in part in response to US and regional perceptions of a more assertive Chinese policy in the South China Sea and elsewhere.

更贴近实际的情况是，美国与其盟国关系的强化是美国及区域内对中国在南海及其他地区之独断作为的意图判断与政策反应。 

Of course our Chinese friends provide a different account of both this and the East China Sea where they see their actions as responding to the efforts of others to unilaterally change the status quo. 

当然我们的中国朋友会对此给出不同的看法，他们会认为无论是南海还是东海，中国的行动完全是对对方单方面改变现状做出的回应。 

On the broader question of alliances however, the Americans argue that none of these arrangements have been forced on regional states, nor has their recent strengthening, but rather they have been the subject of voluntary requests arising from the internal democratic deliberations of sovereign states.

然而，从一个更广泛的角度来看盟国问题时，美国人宣称无论是缔结盟国关系还是强化盟国关系都不是美国强加给这一地区的国家的；与之相反，美国是这些主权国家在经过国内自主民主商议之后的安全保障受托方。 

Indeed the Americans point to the example of the Philippines in the 1980's when the government requested the US to leave Subic Bay and Clarke Field, which they then did.

的确，他们所指的美国仅仅作为受托方的例证之一，就是 80年代菲律宾政府要求美军撤离苏比克湾和克拉克空军基地时，美军确实撤离了。 

As for the re-balance itself, and its implications here in the region, when the US says in the future it will have 60% of its global fleet here in the Pacific, compared with 50% in the past, against a shrinking US navy, that will in all probability result in the same overall naval presence, if not smaller than what we have today. 

至于美国的再平衡以及再平衡概念在亚太地区的意涵，也值得思量。其实，当美国宣称未来全球美军 60%的舰队将部署在太平洋地区时，实际上美国海军部署在亚太地区的规模如果大致仅会基本维持现今的规模（因为虽然这一数字将从 50%上升至 60%，但美国海军的整体规模正在缩减。） 

The US is also puzzled by other apparent Chinese conclusions that the US in engaged in an operational strategy to diminish and divide China and ultimately "sabotage" the Chinese political system from within.

美国对其他的武断的中方结论，譬如认为美国正在在筹划削弱、分裂中国，并最终从内部“预谋破坏”中国政治制度的运作战略等等，同样感到疑惑。 

These deep questions of domestic Chinese politics require further deliberation.

这些深层次的关于中国国内政治的问题需要更审慎的考量。 

They also return us to the core question as to whether the US ultimately accepts the legitimacy of the Chinese political system given the radically different values system on which it is constructed, and continued Chinese objections to the universalist claims of US and western values systems over all others. 

中方继而回到了一个核心的问题上：在中美的政治体制建立在极为不同的价值基础之上的情况之下，美国是否能够最终认可中国政治体制和合法性，以及容纳中国对美国和西方价值体系中的普世主张的一贯反对。 

But the baseline US response, still dis-believed by many in Beijing, is that the development of China's future political arrangements are a matter for the Chinese people themselves.

对此，纵然北京长期怀疑，但美国的底线在于，中国未来的政治筹划取决于中国人民自己。 

There is one final set of American perceptions I wish to address today concerning China's long-term aspirations.

最后，我想探讨的美国国家意图之中关乎中国的长期愿景的议题。 

And that relates to the simple question of what China will seek to do in the region and the world once it has realized its dream of national wealth and power.

这关系到一个简单的问题：在实现了繁荣富强的中国梦之后，中国对于区域和世界秩序会有什么样的诉求？ 

Put simply, a widely-held American view is that China's declared policy of its "peaceful rise" is temporary, in order to convince Americans and others that there is nothing to worry about. Whereas the reality, according to this view, is that once Chinese power, economically and then militarily, begins to achieve parity or pass that of the United States, China will begin rapidly to push the United States out of Asia, expand its sphere of influence in the region, and in time begin challenging some of the fundamentals of the current rules-based order.

简而言之，在美国普遍存在的看法是，中国宣称的“和平崛起”只是暂时的，用来说服美国及其他国家不必担心中国现在的发展。由此看法所演化出的认定现实将是：当中国实现经济和军事上的强大之后，会寻求与美国达到权力均衡甚至超越美国；那么，到了那时，中国会迅速把美国赶出亚洲，以扩大中国在亚太地区的影响力，继而撼动现行的基于规则的全球秩序的基础。 

Proponents of this view argue that this strategy is consistent with millennia of Chinese strategic thinking, such as Sun Tze's "Art of War," that the best way to prevail is to become sufficiently powerful so that armed conflict is rendered redundant, and one's objectives can be achieved by peaceful means. It is also seen as consistent with Deng Xiaoping's long-standing dictum of "hide your strength and bide your time."

这一看法的支持者认为上述战略与中国数千年来的战略思想是一致的，正如“孙子兵法”所云：“不战而屈人之兵，善之善也”（《孙子兵法 .谋攻篇》）。与此同时，上述战略与邓小平的经久不衰的名言“韬光养晦”也有不谋而合之效果。 

For these reasons, it is argued, China wishes to avoid the possibility of armed conflict with the US for the foreseeable future because China fears, legitimately, that it would lose. Similarly with Japan where the argument is also that premature conflict could also result in China losing, or at least not winning. In either case, such an outcome would be deeply domestically delegitimizing for the Chinese government and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.

出于上述原因，美国认为，中国希望避免在可以预见的未来与美国发生军事冲突。基于中国的理性判断，若中美当下开战，中国难以取胜。与此相似，若在时机不成熟的时候与日本开战，中国一样有可能失败，或者说难以取得全面胜利。但无论如何，这样的结果会从根本上撼动中国共产党的执政合法性。 

This long-term American view that China's operational strategy is simply to buy time until it can alter the overall "correlation of forces" against the US and its allies has a growing constituency. And its effect is to encourage a deeply "hawkish" view on China's future, and importantly on how to respond to China in the interim "before it is all too late." This view may in turn also be reflected in increasing concern from a number of regional states requesting a strengthening strategic partnership with the US to offset this longer-term Chinese contingency.

这个关于中国“买时间”的战略运作，在美国长期存在且得到了越来越多的支持。其影响在于强化鹰派视角 ——要在“一切为时已晚之前”应对中国崛起。这一点也反映在近期美国与亚太地区盟国关系的强化上，尤其反映在亚太国家为避免长期来看可能与中国发生的意外，而主动要求与美国强化盟国关系上。Of course China has many responses to this particular American view. They are grounded in China's historical behavior of not extending its power beyond its borders. They point to China's long-term domestic pre-occupations. Also to the well-defined contours of its current policy settings which are set in deeply held views of the China's leadership on a multi-polar, rather than hegemonic world. Nonetheless dealing with this emerging American view of China's long-term intentions will be a critical factor in developing any common narrative for the relationship's future.

当然，中国对美国的上述看法在各个方面都可以进行回应：无论是从中国在历史上的角色，或是出于中国长期专注国内事务的事实，以及中国现行政策上所反映出构建多极世界而非建立霸权主义的中国希望。尽管如此，如何智性处理正在持续升温的美国对于中国长远意图的猜疑与揣测，将会成为两国构建关于地区和全球未来共同宏大叙事的重要考量。 

Conclusion结语 

These remarks have primarily concentrated on China as seen through a range of American eyes.

上述评议主要集中在美国是如何看待中国的这个主题上。I recently concluded my remarks at the CSIS in Washington DC on Chinese strategic perceptions of the US by saying that the fact that these Chinese perceptions exist does not by definition make them accurate.

前日我在位于华盛顿的美国战略与国际问题研究中心所发表的演讲以中国的战略意图作为结束语，结束语中我提到，中国国家意图的存在并不等同于这些意图是精确无误的。 

What is important, however, is that these perceptions do exist, and to some extent they shape Chinese policy behavior.

重要的是，这些意图是存在的，而且在某种程度上他们影响了中国的政策制定。 

Similarly with my address today here in Shanghai.

这与我今天在上海的演讲是一致的。 

What I have sought to do is describe a range of US strategic perceptions concerning China's rise. Again that does not necessarily mean these perceptions are correct.

我期望能够阐述一系列与中国崛起相关的美国战略意图。需要重申的是，这并不代表美国的战略意图是正确的。 

Nonetheless, they do exist, and they too contribute to the shaping of US policy.

然而，这些战略意图是存在的，同样地，他们也影响了美国的政策制定。And the more powerful China becomes, the sharper these differences in perceptions are likely to become.

随着中国的强盛，这些不同与分歧会与日俱增。 So let me now conclude in identical terms to those I used to conclude my remarks in Washington.

也请允许我用我在华盛顿发表演讲的结语来总结今天在复旦大学的演

讲。 In foreign policy, the beginning of wisdom is to understand what the other party thinks and believes and why.

智慧的外交始于理解彼此的意图和其背后的原因。 And this is just as important for our Chinese friends as for the United States.这对中国是如此，对美国也是如此。 Nonetheless, I am not some sort of foreign policy utopian, believing there is a 

mystical center-point at which both these world-views will one day 

mysteriously coincide.尽管如此，我并不认为两种世界观之间存在某个神奇的中点，能让两端神秘地相遇。 

I am too much of a realist for that.对此，我还是秉持现实主义的态度。

Although at the same time I am sufficient of a liberal internationalist not to allow hyper-realism to overwhelm the possibilities of evolving a common approach for both the US and China, at least on some common challenges.

尽管作为一个自由主义国际关系者,我也时时警惕超现实主义,防止它对于中美在面对共同挑战时共同探索前路的可能性造成打击。 

As I have written for most of this year that I have been at the Belfer Center at Harvard, I believe what is useful for the two Presidents to develop a common narrative for the future that allows sufficient space for real differences to be acknowledged.

无论如何,基于今年以来我在哈佛贝尔福中心研究所得,我相信中美双方领导人共同构建未来中美关系的宏大叙事,并在其中留足分歧的空间,是大有裨益的。 

At present, each side has a narrative, usually private rather than public, about the other.

现在,中美各有一个关于彼此的表述,而且这些表述常常是私下而非公开的。 

In stead I argue for a public narrative that contains an overall conceptual framework, a mechanism for managing differences, as well as a longer-term goal of substantive positive improvement in the areas of fundamental disagreement.

而我所倡导的是,中美共同构建一个包含全面指导框架、具体分歧管控、以及长远积极发展的宏大叙事。One possible framework might be called "constructive realism", or even 

"constructive realism for a common future".可以称其为“建设性的现实主义”,或者说以“建设性的现实主义”构建一个中美共同的未来。 

What do I mean by that?

何解？ 

First, the realist part.

第一，现实主义的部分。 

Both the Chinese and the Americans come from a deeply realist approach to 

international relations.

中美双方对于当下国际关系的理解都基于根深蒂固的现实主义。 

And within that frame, there are defined areas where a lack of common 

values and or common interests will deny any ready resolution.

在这样的背景框架下,缺乏共同价值和共同利益会导致任何解决方案的不可能。 Areas such as the outstanding territorial disputes in East Asia.譬如东亚的领土争端。

These cannot be solved for the foreseeable future.They can only be acknowledged and managed so that conflict does not erupt, thereby destroying the relationship altogether.

这些争端很难解决。只能认可分歧,管控危机,以免全面破坏现有的关系。 

Second, the constructive part.

第二,建设性的部分。 

Namely those areas of the relationship (bilateral, regional or multilateral) where China and the US, because of overlapping values and interests, can cooperate to build new "public goods" together.

无论双边,区域或多边关系,只要在中美有价值相通或利益重合的地方,就可以由中美共同构建区域及全球“公共产品”。 

In areas such as the bilateral investment treaty, new approaches to regional architecture in the Asia Pacific that help construct some basic confidence and security building measures over time in a region where there are none, climate change, cyber security, the Korean Peninsular and in time militant Islamism.

这些“公共产品”可以包括:双边投资协定、气候变化、网络安全、朝核问题、伊斯兰激进主义问题以及亚太共同体的构建以促进从来未有的区域互信和战略合作的形成。 

Third, the future part.

第三,未来的部分。Which if strategic trust is built incrementally over time by achieving success in part two above (ie the "Constructive" part) to deploy the political and diplomatic capital from these successes to tackling the thus far "too difficult to solve" issues in part one above (ie the "Realist" part).

中美共同建设区域及全球公共产品可以促进中美之间战略互信的逐渐形成;而由这些公共产品构建成功所带来的政治和外交资源也可以逐渐弱化原先现实主义视角下不可能解决的问题,并最终将其解决。 

It is important to have a long-term ambition for the relationship beyond an exercise in temporary utilitarianism.

如此中美关系的构建须基于长远的愿景,而非短期的功利。 

Otherwise, we are simply postponing the inevitability of crisis, conflict or even war.

否则，我们只是在单纯地推迟不可避免的危机，冲突，乃至战争。 

Of itself, such a long-term ambition can also become transformative.

如此长远的愿景本身,也可以是变革性的。 

Of course, such a concept of constructive realism, with or without a common future, would provide a framework for gradual progress, and ideally less regress, over time.

建设性现实主义,无论是否导向一个共同的未来,都可以随着长期的互动,逐步减少逆行的可能,并渐进改良互相之间的关系。The good news is that these concepts may well translate reasonably into Chinese.

令人高兴的是,这些概念可以在中英文之间翻译无阻。 

Realism is as sound a word in Chinese as it is in English. Constructive is an overwhelmingly positive phrase in Chinese.

现实主义在中英文里都是一个好词。建设性则更是极具积极意味的。 

And it is difficult, but not impossible, to reject the idea of a long-term common future in either language, albeit through a process of gradual transformation.

通过渐进变革导向一个长期的共同未来,在中英双语里也都是难以拒绝的良好期许。 

Finally Deng Xiaoping even has a phrase that while traditionally used to describe the arduous task of Chinese domestic economic reform, may well be more broadly applicable.

邓小平以中国国内改革为背景提出的一个概念,对于中国的进一步国际化和中美关系构建的未来,也极具参考意义。 

Deng said that to cross the river, it is important to feel the stones step by step with your feet.

那就是：“摸着石头过河。”So too might we be able to breach the widening gap between China and the United States over time.

以此为导向,我们可逐步消弭中美之间理解与价值的鸿沟。 

It requires a realistic understanding of the values, perceptions and interests of the other.

这需要对彼此价值,认知和利益的现实理解。 

It requires an equal amount of creative diplomatic imagination about what can be done constructively together.

这需要对等的富有创造力的外交想象力,来绘制中美可以共同建设的宏伟蓝图。 

It also requires the political will to dream of a different future other than that which history has shown us, often horrifically, from the past.

这也需要政治意志和决心来梦想和开创一个有别于可怖的历史轨迹的新的共同未来。 

Perhaps this what Xi Jinping had in mind when he floated the idea of “A New Type of Great Power Relationship.”

或许这也是习近平提出“新型大国关系”的初心本愿。 

President Xi has talked much about the China Dream. American dream is also embedded within the American culture. 

习主席常常谈论“中国梦”。同样的 ,美国梦也是美国文化所不可缺少的核心价值。 

Maybe it's time for us all to start dreaming more broadly of a common dream for all our futures.

或者,已经到时候,让我们一起梦想并开创一个属于我们共同的未来之梦。