Time:2010/9/2 

Hosted by:     Center for the Study of Grand Strategy, Chung-Ang University

               US-Korea Institute, School for Advanced International Studies, The John Hopkins University

Supported by: Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University

Sponsored by: Northeast Asian History Foundation, South Korea

Conference Report and Summary

On August 2, 2010, academics and policymakers from South Korea, United States and China gathered at Peking University’s Center for International and Strategic Studies (CISS) to discuss regional security issues and the concept of an East Asia Community under the auspices of the Northeast Asia Future Forum. Hosted by the US-Korea Institute at the School for Advanced International Studies and the Center for the Study of Grand Strategy at Chung-Ang University, the event was sponsored by Seoul’s Northeast Asia History Foundation. Participants at the dialogue included Professor Karl Jackson, Director of Asia Studies at SAIS, Professor Taehyun Kim, Chung-Ang University, Dr Jae Ku, Director of the US-Korea Institute, Drew Thompson, Director of China Studies at the Nixon Center, Professor Jin-Young Chung, Kyung-Hee University, John Park, Senior Research Associate at the US Institute of Peace, Hochul Lee, University of Incheon, and Yang Zerui, MoFA. CISS was represented by Deputy Director Professor Zhu Feng, Professor Pan Wei and Associate Professor Yu Wanli. 

The dialogue was structured around the concept of an East Asian Community (EAC), an idea that has been propagated at both academic and official-levels in recent years, notably at the China-Japan-South Korea Summit in 2009. The EAC points to the possibility of developing a distinctive regional ‘community’ amongst East Asian states – meaning closer economic, political and normative bindings – through the development of regional economic and political institutions. Drawing partly on the European experience of post-war integration, the EAC idea is based on the understanding that institution-building can help mitigate traditional inter-state rivalries and encourage a greater sense of collective security, potentially moving towards what Karl Deutsch termed a ‘security community’. 

Despite those optimistic visions, the actual history of the EAC has, up to this point, been a troublesome one. Competing notions about what states ought to be included within the EAC have suspended substantive discussion and there remains confusion about how the concept can be operationalized. The departure in the past year of two prominent political leaders who had promoted efforts at building a regional community – Australia’s Kevin Rudd and Japan’s Yukio Hatoyama – has also cast fresh doubt on the idea. In that context, this dialogue aimed to encourage fresh thinking on the EAC and to address outstanding empirical issues and contentions. 

The first session of the dialogue looked to articulate possible ‘visions’ of a future EAC, recognizing the intellectual importance of engaging in a discourse characterized by hope and optimism rather than scepticism and defeatism. Taehyun Kim presented on the ‘security dilemma’, a term that refers to the problem of when states take measures only intended for their own security that are nevertheless interpreted by other states as threatening their own security, leading to a vicious circle of mutual and collective insecurity. Kim argued that awareness of the ‘security dilemma’ should alert states to the interdependent nature of security and the importance of encouraging greater mutual understanding. Analyzing recent regional responses to the sinking of South Korea’s Cheonan vessel, Kim argued that ‘security dilemma’ dynamics appear dangerously apparent, particularly between the US and China. The future of an EAC depended on regional powers taking steps to improve communication and heighten levels of interdependence. 

Karl Jackson looked to explore what lessons from the history of ASEAN could be applicable to Northeast Asian regionalism. Key to the formation of ASEAN, according to Jackson, was ‘high politics’: ASEAN regionalism has been an elite-led process, reflecting the determination of state leaders to develop a limited institutional framework that minimized the possibility of inter-state conflict and allowed governments to focus on domestic economic development and regime security. He argued similarly strong and visionary leadership does not yet exist in Northeast Asia, where the positive effects of trade are counter-balanced by historical contentions and territorial disputes. Moving towards a regional security community will first require a generation of leaders who have the authority and resources to make long-term, not necessarily populist, decisions. 

Pan Wei used his presentation to argue that the world was now in a ‘new era’ of international relations that made visionary concepts like the EAC a possibility. Suggesting that peace was the key ‘trend’ of the 21st century, he argued that the fundamentals of 19th and 20th century power politics – balance of power, alliance politics, military spending – were increasingly redundant concepts in a globalized world. The ‘new’ international politics are characterized by intertwined cooperation and competition, with the necessity of cooperation in one issue area checking competitive impulses in other areas. Pan built on this insight by outlining a series of confidence-building steps through which the region could move from an ‘economic’ to ‘socio-cultural’ community, including a four-party FTA, the freezing of territorial disputes, relaxed visa regulations, joint military exercises and a Northeast Asian summit. 

The second session looked to build into the discussion some deeper empirical insights based on close analysis of recent developments in the region. Jin-Young Chung presented on the recently established regional foreign reserve support system known as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). Noting the differences between with the Chiang Mai Initiative, which was based on bilateral rather than multilateral currency swops, Chung suggested that although CMIM represented a ‘major breakthrough’ in regional financial cooperation, there remained many institutional limitations. These include the retention of the so-called ‘IMF link’, underdeveloped regional surveillance, insufficient borrowing quota, and the lack of a permanent secretariat. Overcoming the factors prohibiting deeper institutional development, such as opposition of the US and IMF and the lack of consensus amongst regional states, will be key if the CMIM is going to become an ‘Asian Monetary Fund’.

Drew Thompson presented his research on Chinese investment in North Korea and its significance for efforts to resolving tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Although Sino-DPRK trade only accounts for a small percentage of China’s overall trade – and considerable less than bilateral trade with South Korea – it assumes importance because of the value attached to it by local governments and investors in China’s north-eastern provinces of Jilin and Liaoning, where North Korea forms an important part of regional development plans. Thompson argued that although Chinese investment may potentially influence policy in the DPRK, there is so far no evidence to support that suggestion, with Pyongyang plainly unwilling to embark on durable economic reform or to alter its external behaviour. In that case, Chinese economic interests in North Korea may prove a complicating factor in efforts to build regional consensus on Korean Peninsula issues. 

Zhu Feng used his presentation to explore China’s response to the sinking of the Cheonan and to analyze the incident’s implications for regional security. He began by stating that the Cheonan incident had opened up a visible rift between China and South Korea that revealed competing ideas about the appropriate response to the sinking and overall policy towards the DPRK. He also said that the incident now risked spilling-over to impact on Sino-US relations, noting the heavy criticism made by Beijing of the joint US-South Korean military drills in the Yellow Sea. Zhu nevertheless insisted that there was room for this rift to heal if Beijing adopted a less ‘indecisive’ attitude towards the DPRK and Seoul took a less ‘inflexible’ and more ‘multilateral’ position on the issue. Improving China-South Korean relations, Zhu argued, was crucial for future of regional security. Considering the deteriorating condition of the North Korean economy, Zhu argued, there is also potential for all sides to cooperate on crisis management in the event of regime collapse or instability. He also argued that it was important to try to re-engage Pyongyang on nuclear disarmament through a restarted Six-Party Talks process. 

The third session looked at issues that will impact on scenario-planning for the EAC. Hochul Lee analyzed a range of issues to assess China’s behaviour as a ‘rising power’, concluding it is a system ‘defender’ rather than ‘challenger’ and that any power transition with the United States will only come in the distant future. John Park’s presentation aimed to explain China’s role in the Six-Party Talks and its interests on the Korean Peninsula, dwelling in particularly on what appear to be growing Sino-DPRK economic ties. In the final paper, Yang Yirui looked at competing models of regional economic cooperation, drawing distinctions between the system embodied by APEC and the potential offered by the EAC. 

The dialogue drew out a number of points. These can be summarized as follows: 

· That there currently exists a sizeable gulf between rhetoric about an EAC and awareness about how to go about it. There is a real need for policy work to bridge this purposive gap between vision and reality, particularly on security issues. 

· That however the process of East Asian regionalism proceeds, it will be slow and difficult. Competing historical narratives, disputed territorial claims and a lack of mutual trust currently prohibit substantive institutional development. The difficulties involved in managing even apparently ‘low-hanging fruit’, such as the CMIM, reflect these limitations. 

· Political leadership will be key to developing the EAC. Northeast Asia needs leaders who are committed to the idea of regional community and willing to invest political resources in achieving it. Most noted, however, that trends in Northeast Asia are in the opposite direction. 

· Discussions on the ramifications of the Cheonan incident highlighted that it could have a significant, long-term impact on regional security if measures are not taken to mitigate its effects. Participants noted with concern the rift that has opened between China and South Korea/US over the appropriate response to the incident. Such ‘security dilemma’ dynamics risk upsetting the mutual trust that has to be the foundation of any EAC. 

· Discussions highlighted that the future of the bilateral US-China relationship will be a key determinant in the success – or otherwise – of the EAC. Recent tensions in the bilateral relationship, notably over the DPRK and South China Sea issue, are not positive. Beijing needs to decide whether it will accede to US membership of the EAC and the US should demonstrate its commitment to regional multilateralism alongside its traditional ‘hub and spokes’ policy.