Time:2011/3/7 

On February 25th 2011, the Centre for International & Strategic Studies at Peking University held a seminar entitled ‘English School of Sea Power Theory and Maritime Security in East Asia’, discussing China and her evolving maritime policy. Professor Geoffrey Till, a British naval historian and Professor of Maritime Studies at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, began the seminar with a series of lectures on maritime power. He posed the questions ‘What does Sea Power mean today?’ and ‘How is the concept changing?’ He began by elaborating on two maritime strategies: the traditional model and the non-traditional, collaborative model. States do not exclusively adopt one or other of these two models, rather each state uses a mix of the two approaches to devise their maritime strategy. 

Non-traditional, collaborative maritime strategy does not focus solely on the power of a state’s navy. Such a strategy is designed to acknowledge the need to defend the sea-based trading system, where there exists a mutual desire amongst all states to ensure prosperity and security and to remove common threats such as piracy, drug smuggling, terrorism and human trafficking, while promoting certain activities such as disaster relief and the maintaining of fish stocks. This is achieved by encouraging multilateral naval operations and ventures, sharing information, conducting naval diplomacy aimed at improving relations and establishing and abiding by a set of international maritime rules and norms. A result of such a strategy is that individual navies develop niche capabilities and a greater mutual reliance emerges between them. Such a strategy is logical in today’s globalised world, as no matter how strong one country’s navy is, it cannot protect all its interests alone. Cooperation is therefore necessary to ensure maritime security. 

In contrast, the traditional concept of maritime security is concerned with defending sovereignty and national resource, focusing on maritime power projection rather than collaboration against systemic threats. There is a reluctance to abide by a common maritime law or to share information with other states. Much of this theory is derived from the thinking of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who believed that the most powerful navy would control the globe, and that a nation’s greatness was inextricably connected to its ability to conquer the sea. The discussion turned to how these two theories are being applied in the Asia-Pacific region, where a number of great powers operate and there is an unparalleled regional diversity in population size, land mass, political regimes and religious and cultural beliefs. The questions, ‘Where does China’s maritime policy fit into the mix of traditional and non-traditional policies?’ and ‘What is distinctive about Chinese maritime strategy, if anything?’ were raised for discussion.

China, as a rising power, is seeking to expand her own naval capabilities. As America’s relative power declines, there has been speculation over whether China has the potential or the ambition to take over as the leading world power. The general consensus at the seminar, however, was that China still has a long way to go before she will be on a par with America, and that China’s success will depend on her ability to develop innovative technological naval advances, as well as her strategic culture and geopolitical context. Questions were raised such as, ‘Will we see the emergence of Sea Power with Chinese characteristics?’ and ‘Can we identify differences between China’s and other states’ conceptions of ‘Global Commons’ and ‘Harmonious Oceans’?’

European countries and America are generally cited as examples of states that place a greater emphasis on non-traditional maritime strategy: they seek to monitor regions rather than to dominate them, and tend to focus their energies on removing common threats and dealing with failed states. In contrast, many are wary of China’s increasing ‘imposing’ presence in both the Asia-Pacific region and the global community; there is perceived to be a lack of credible transparency in China’s policy-making and often other states find it difficult to predict or understand Chinese foreign policy. A problem China faces, as a rising power with a modernising military, is that even if the government wishes to adopt a more collaborative approach to naval strategy and focus only on the development of her defensive capabilities, it is very difficult to convince the global community of her passive intentions. It is true that China’s naval development should not come as a surprise given the country’s geographical size and economy, China’s navy still has a very limited capacity and thus investing in its expansion is understandable. It is also understandable that while China stresses the PLA Navy will not attack without provocation, the government still wishes to pursue a policy of ‘active defence’, developing both offensive and defensive capabilities so that the country can properly defend itself if attacked. In addition, even with increased transparency, the ambiguity between offensive and defensive weapons (often it is impossible to distinguish between the two categories) makes it hard for China to prove her intentions are ‘peaceful’. 

Why are countries so concerned about an increase in China’s capabilities? Answers discussed at the seminar included China’s political system, a geographic position at the centre of the Asia-Pacific region, the country’s immense size and population, unsolved conflicts of interest between China and the US and China and her neighbours, China’s perceived lack of credible transparency and damaging international media reports of China’s increased ‘assertiveness’ in foreign policy-making.

An important question addressed at the seminar was ‘How will Sino-US relations unfold?’ The US has become accustomed to a strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region in which its maritime power has gone unchecked, and adapting to a new status quo will undoubtedly be a difficult process. However, the US and China have common ground where cooperation will be mutually beneficial. For example, they are both heavily dependent on trade and so securing the safety of sea-based trading routes is a shared priority; China is the world’s largest exporter, the world’s third largest importer and her national interest in overseas activities has almost doubled in the past 10 years. Furthermore, there are over 30,000,000 overseas Chinese residents in countries across the globe. Thus, those at the seminar stressed that both sides should focus on and work towards common goals. However, while China needs to offer concrete assurance to the global community, America also needs to provide China with reciprocal assurance that its presence in the Asia-Pacific region is not hostile. But America faces problems as well: Asia is a region where America has increased interests, military commitments and a mission to preserve and encourage the spread of democracy. The Taiwan issue further complicates the situation and puts strain on Sino-US relations. It was mooted that neither party actually possesses the ability to convince the other of its non-threatening intentions. 

It was also emphasised that when discussing China’s rise and her maritime policy, we should not merely consider US-China relations, but also relations with China’s neighbours and developments at large in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s neighbours are watching her naval advancements and interactions with the US closely, making their own assessments of the situation and acting accordingly. As the movements of one state in the region are likely to impact heavily the policy decision-making process of others, the seminar raised important questions for consideration: ‘How will Chinese naval modernisation set the agenda for Japan, Korea, Vietnam and her other neighbours and what will the consequences be?’ and ‘How should China react to the fact that she is not operating in a vacuum?’ 

It will be hard for China to completely convince the global community of her ‘peaceful rise’, allay neighbouring countries’ fears and eradicate the perceived threat, especially following damaging media reports last year that China is displaying increasingly assertive behaviour in foreign policy. ‘How should China meet its traditional maritime needs, engage in non-traditional maritime activities and ease the tensions and concerns of America, her neighbouring countries and the global community?’ Suggestions were raised at the seminar on ways China might be able to ease the tension. Firstly, Chinese policy should aim to increase coalition-based operations, focusing on cooperation and peacekeeping missions. Secondly, China should attempt to settle existing maritime disputes by diplomatic means such as through the Court of Justice or demilitarization. Thirdly, the PLA Navy needs to strive to abide by international maritime law, avoid incidents at sea and, in the event of an incident occurring, China needs to have contingency plans to prevent its escalation. Fourth, the PLA Navy needs to provide the global community with a more compelling story about which maritime threats they are responding to, and how they intend to go about removing these threats. America and Asian Pacific countries will hope to see evidence that China’s priority lies in tackling non-traditional threats. If China cannot provide a sufficient degree of transparency, the US Navy has said it will be forced to assume the worst, and will act accordingly. 

In addition, it was agreed that greater communication is needed between powers in the region to prevent minor disagreements from escalating. Increased bilateral and multilateral dialogue should be a high priority. Measures such as an effective hotline between China and Japan were discussed, or a Sino-US agreement similar to the 1972 ‘US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement’. It is evident that America, China and her neighbours are all facing unfamiliar territory, where there is little previous experience to draw upon and misconceptions and incidents are inevitable. Each country needs to be accommodating, within the constraints of public pressure. Greater maritime engagement, joint exercises and cooperation between navies should be seen as an opportunity, not a challenge. It is true that cooperation has associated risks, for example other states can assess your strengths and weaknesses, but at the same time you can assess theirs. More to the point, cooperation is far less risky than doing nothing. 

‘What are the Chinese government’s goals with respect to maritime strategy?’ On the global stage, China is struggling to promote a positive image and, as mentioned above, there has been an increased frequency of reports in the media of a more ‘assertive’ China with regards to foreign policy implementation. However, despite a series of unfortunate incidents in 2010, Professor Zhufeng thinks that there is a general trend towards increased conservatism in the arena of diplomacy. Since the implementation of gaige kaifang, China has witnessed unprecedented rapid development and the country has been so completely transformed that it is still trying to find its feet. Beijing’s policy remains very cautious, lacking a readiness and a comprehensive strategy with which to face the world; China’s naval strategy reflects this uncertainty. 

China’s prime concerns are domestic: the government worries about territorial losses and threats to its sovereignty, and thus wants to avoid developments that exacerbate such worries. Essentially, the driving force behind China’s foreign policy is a concern over domestic social stability and economic development. Domestically, cooperation with the US and global community does little to promote an image of a great power recovering its former glory. Comparatively equipping a navy with state of the art military capabilities promotes an image of a rising power to China’s domestic audience. Using naval modernisation to boost domestic support is not unique to China; many countries of the Asia-Pacific region are increasingly recognising the importance of the sea, and naval nationalism is an increasingly prevalent phenomenon; Russia, Japan and India all use their navies to promote domestic nationalism. In addition, as with the American political system, if the leader is not fully engaged in a department, that department tends to make decisions by itself; thus if the Chinese government is not fully focused on the movements of the PLA Navy it may follow its own direction, and the Navy often has competing ideas with the centre. If the Navy acts independently of the political centre, this will impact the extent to which a more collaborative maritime strategy can be effectively implemented.

The sea is a global commons jointly owned by all. In an increasingly globalised world, we will inevitably see a greater frequency of maritime encounters. Those at the seminar stressed the importance of each country abiding by international laws of the sea in order to send out a peaceful message and avoid unwanted incidents. 

As Colonel Xu Hui aptly pointed out, ‘Confucius once said, ‘Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself’.’ In the West it is said, ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’. Whilst coming from different angles, both phrases carry the same meaning and this is the attitude all states need to adopt when devising maritime strategy. More dialogue, more engagement and more cooperation are what is required to reconcile conflicts of interest. The global community needs to make efforts to understand China’s foreign policy, and China should not give up trying to help the global community understand its motives, however frustrating conveying the message might seem. It is only through active communication that a consensus can be reached.