Time:2013/7/8 

From 22-23 June, 2013, the China-U.S. Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue was held in Peking University. Ex-government officials, military officers and leading academics from both countries were brought together to discuss pressing issues facing the U.S-China relationship in the post-election era and beyond, including the issues in the fields of security, military, domestic politics, economy and culture. The conference was hosted by the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CISS) at Peking University and generously funded by the MacArthur Foundation Asia Security Initiative（ASI）. The main participants are: Michael Swaine, Senior Associate of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Elizabeth Economy, Director for Asian Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jonathan Pollack, Senior Fellow, Director of John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution, Douglas Paal, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sheila Smith, Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Michael Glosny, Assistant Professor of U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Christopher Jonathan, Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies；Professor Wang Jisi, Director, CISS, Professor Yuan Ming, Executive Deputy Director, CISS, Professor Jia Qingguo, Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University, Professor Wang Yizhou, Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University, General Yao Yunzhu, Director, Center on China-America Defense Relations, PLA Academy of Military Science, General Zhao Ning, Vice President, China International Institute for Strategic Society (CIISS), Zhang Tuosheng, Director, Academic Committee, CIISS, Ruan Zongze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies, Professor Sun Zhe, Director, Institute for Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University, Professor Zhu Feng, Deputy Director of CISS, Associate Professor Gui Yongtao, Secretary-general, CISS and Wu Shicun, President, National Institute for South China Sea Studies. 

Participants noted that this conference was particularly timely given the recent summit at the Sunnylands estate between Chairman Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama. The two-day-long conference was broken into five sessions: “Regional Security Dynamics”, “Domestic Political Concerns”, “Cyber-Security and China and U.S. Military Engagement”, “Denuclearization, Stability and Peace on the Korean Peninsula”, “China-U.S.-Japan Relations, and China-Japan Territorial Dispute”, and “Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean”.

Participants from US argued that China’s domestic policy debate will influence China’s foreign affairs, and how China’s neighbors interpret this will inform their own reactions. The three Chinese domestic issues most draw one of American scholar’s attention are: the rule of law, government transparency, and whether and how the government chooses to incorporate the public’s opinions into its policy. Moreover, the U.S.-China relations and interactions are sometimes trapped by certain strategic vocabulary. Different interpretations on each side lead to certain strategic mindset traps. Understanding U.S.-China relations with a “Cold War mentality” will lead to mischaracterizations. U.S. and Chinese scholars and policy makers are still searching for new vocabulary and characterizations, but that they may have not yet found them. In both countries, there is a wide range of views and many platforms to express those views. However, not all viewpoints are valid and not all voices matter. One thing for certain is that the debate is still ongoing within the U.S. about whether China’s rise is necessarily a threat.

With regard to issues relating to military-military cooperation and cyber security, there has been much attention given to improving military relations. Regretfully, each side naturally views this aspect of the overall relationship in a more zero-sum fashion. The Chinese understand that the US does not see a more capable PLA as within its own interests and so, despite increased exchanges and cooperation on non-traditional security issues; the US is unwilling to treat China like a full partner. The American scholars agreed that the US government seemed positive about the potential for real increases in military-military cooperation based upon the actions of the new Chinese leadership. They mentioned some wariness, however, within government circles in committing time and resources into cultivating a relationship which the Chinese will just shut down in response to another round of Taiwan arms sales. 

For topics on Sino-Japanese territorial disputes and their effect on Sino-American relations, US scholars discussed some of the domestic factors leading to “Senkaku Nationalism.” Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party is led by a new generation that is more conservative than the previous set of leadership. Japanese public does not want to be told what to do or bullied by anyone, whether it be China or the US. Understood in this light, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute has come to represent the entirety of Japanese strategy for the Japanese public. Participants mostly agreed that the situation was highly volatile and they discussed the various potential outcomes. They also discussed what could be done to lower tensions, such as adopting a formal code of conduct, having the US exert pressure to restrain Prime Minister Abe’s incendiary tendencies, and delinking territorial disputes from other aspects of Sino-Japanese relations.

All speakers agreed that US interests and Chinese interests converged in the Korean Peninsula. This could provide a potential “success story” to help further improve Sino-American relations in other areas. US participants felt that China was still not clear as to whether it valued denuclearization higher than regime stability. Although China has applied more pressure to North Korea, it is unclear to the US where this will lead. Chinese scholar argued that China was in the midst of considering a change to its policy towards North Korea. However, change, if it happens, will come slowly. As many other Chinese participants noted, there are many within the Chinese government and foreign policy establishment who consider support for North Korea to be beyond question. Additionally, Dr. Ruan pointed out that many US actions intended to make China more willing to put pressure on North Korea, such as increasing anti-ballistic missile capabilities in the region, actually have the opposite effect because Chinese leaders see through this policy and do not want to be accused of caving to US pressure. All agreed that there was much potential for cooperation between all concerned parties, and that this was an important issue worthy of further attention.

With regard to maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, both sides believed that China's room to maneuver is constrained by domestic political considerations. Meanwhile, some of China’s neighbors are genuinely worried by China’s assertiveness. Several Chinese participants discussed the role that the US pivot may have in encouraging its allies and friends in the region to be assertive towards China. In China, the dialogue tends to blame tension in East Asia on the “US Pivot,” but that it fails to examine China’s own role. As for the US role in exacerbating tensions, the US does not see itself as a non-stakeholder. Though the US claimed that it remains neutral on the final outcome of the various disputes, the US is not neutral about the means used to settle them. A zero-sum relationship is likely to emerge, unless there is a concerted effort to build a positive-sum relationship. 

Solutions to international problems will more likely come about if all sides can agree on the same basic sets of facts. Although divergences clearly existed in the discussion about policy prescriptions, most pointed to economic interdependence and the rise of shared non-traditional security threats as important drivers of cooperation between the US and China. Non-traditional security issues should be addressed by establishing a crisis management mechanism so that the right players can get to the table. One thing would deserve more future attention will be the role of each country's economic performance; especially if there are major changes. Improving economic ties and laying the groundwork for future steps towards a comprehensive multilateral free trade agreement should be one of important areas that the US and China should focus on the coming years. 

Several Chinese participants remarked the important role of domestic politics that begins to play in China. Moreover, the emotional element that sometimes affects Chinese foreign policy. To some extent, a quantity of internal Chinese rhetoric remains nationalist and even bellicose. The fact is there is more and more room for scholars with differing opinions to seek to influence policy makers' thoughts, but that it is not always clear which channels they need to push.

The present moment in Sino-American relations is marked by a return to the strategic competition that had been existent until 2001, when the US started to focus solely on counter-terrorism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. China had used this pause to capitalize on its interests, but now the US was refocusing and, as a result, the US and China were returning to a state of strategic competition. The possibility for interacting without causing conflict rests on both sides acknowledging that they are both big countries, acknowledging the other side's interests, and understanding the other side's decision-making processes such that they can maintain positive relations in practice, not just in rhetoric. 

Several Chinese scholars noted that the maintenance of positive US-Chinese relations was a domestic political issue. The American side predicted that US-Chinese relations would be more stable in three to five years, although the road to get there might be “rocky.” All participants generally seemed positive for the long-term trend in the bilateral ties.