

Comparing China's and India's Aid to Afghanistan

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As emerging economic powers, both China and India engage actively in international development assistance projects. Afghanistan is their common beneficiary. The power and potential of international aid¹ can hardly be overestimated. For Afghanistan, it functions as the mainstay of Kabul regime. Beyond, it turns out to be substantial in shaping or re-shaping regional and global geopolitical and geo-economic structures.

China's and India's aid to Afghanistan can be traced back to the Cold War. Since 2001 India has become Asia's most active country in assisting Afghanistan and enjoys high reputation there. Whereas China was relatively stagnant, it has stepped up since 2014 though. In May 2016 China signed a memorandum with Afghanistan on co-building the "Belt and Road", yet many aid projects are suspended due to various reasons. For China to truly implement and push forward the political consensus established in the "Belt and Road" memo, India's experience in aiding Afghanistan need to be studied.

Focusing on the two countries' aid to Afghanistan after 2002, this paper is composed of three parts. It figures out at first both similarities and dissimilarities between the aid practices of the two countries in Afghanistan, then analyzes major reasons behind the existing differences, and finally outlines a bigger picture about the international aid to Afghanistan.

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I. SIMILARITIES IN CHINA'S AND INDIA'S AID TO AFGHANISTAN

The completion rate of India's aid projects in Afghanistan is higher than that of China's after 2011.

The most apparent commonality the two countries share in their efforts to aid Afghanistan is the daunting security risk. Both countries have been under terrorist attacks in processing the aid projects. Generally speaking, international aid projects often cannot be completed on time due to the constant turbulence on the ground. By 2011, the completion rates of India's and China's aid projects in Afghanistan were 47.8% and 41.7%², respectively. Since 2011, India's aid completion rate has been higher than that of China.

Besides, the two countries have three similarities as following:

First, they provide aid without attaching political conditions.

This is the basic principle of the two countries' international aid policy. It is the foundation of their aid to Afghanistan as well as the core feature making them totally different from traditional Western donors.

Second, they have some similar goals.

Both countries have publicly announced that their aid is to help enhance Afghanistan's independent development capacity, to assist its post-war reconstruction, and to realize peace, stability and prosperity in the country and the region. Apart from these, India has highlighted its aim to sustain Afghan's democratic system.

Both countries concentrate on regional stability and prosperity, which is in consonance with their geographic location as well as their geopolitical status. Being regional big powers, they both concern about the overall situation in their neighborhood. They practice their assistance on both bilateral and multilateral levels. Both of them include Afghanistan in regional regimes for developing bilateral relations with Kabul as well as joining global regimes related to the Afghanistan.

Third, their main efforts are similar.

Before the end of 2014, the priority for the two countries' aid to Afghanistan was the latter's economic and social development. But changes emerged thereafter and have produced some notable differences. For instance, since 2015, China tried vigorously to promote Afghan's national reconciliation and therefore engaged to mediate negotiation between Kabul and Taliban, whereas India is busy with enhancing the capacity of Kabul in the form of increasing military aid.

II. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA'S AND INDIA'S AID TO AFGHANISTAN

First, Afghanistan holds different position in the two countries' foreign aid agenda.

Afghanistan has surpassed Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and other countries and become the second largest destination, only after Bhutan, of India's aid.³ From 2002 to 2014, India offered two billion US dollars to Afghanistan, ranking the 5th donors in the world. As evident from the annual distribution of India's international aid in table 1, Afghanistan has got more than the total amount India provided to the African continent, Latin America and the five central Asian republics. In September 2016, India promised another one billion US dollars for the next five years. This means India's total aid to Afghanistan is at least three billion US dollars between 2002 and 2021.

Table 1: Regional Distribution of India's International Aid 2002-2014
(million, Indian rupee)⁴

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015
Total Amount	54,719.3	70,381.5	94,348.2
Bhutan	34,090	41,090	60,740
Afghanistan	4,910	5,250	6,760

Africa	2,370	2,500	3,500
Latin America	276	50	300
Five Countries in Central Asia	300	250	400

China has so far officially issued two white papers on international aid, in which there was no specific data about Afghanistan. According to Afghan sources, from 2002 to 2012, China promised 139 million US dollars to Afghanistan, ranking the 21st among international donors.⁵ On the base of the scattered statistics published on the website of China's Embassy in Kabul, however, the total amount of the aid of that period was about 250 million US dollars. From 2012 to 2017, China promised to offer another RMB 2.36 billion.⁶ To figure up, China's total amount of aid to Afghanistan is between 500 million-700 million US dollars between 2002 and 2017.

Given the two emerging powers' current economic and social development, the gap between the 700 million and 3 billion dollars would speak more. For instance, in 2015, India's GDP was about one fifth of China's. About 35.4% of Indian people (450 million) lived below the poverty line. The *2016 Human Development Report* revealed that India's Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.624, ranking the 131st in the world, and China's was 0.738, ranking the 90th.⁷ Additionally, China graduated from the recipients group around 2011, while India is still one of the biggest international aid recipient, receiving OECD's official development aid (ODA). Between 2012 and 2016, World Bank provided India with three billion to five billion US dollars aid annually.⁸

Since 2012, India has increased its aid to other countries by 72%, and more than 7% of India's aid went to Afghanistan. In contrast, in the total volume of 89.34 billion RMB that China provided to the world between 2010 and 2012, the quotation for Afghanistan seems to be woefully scarce.⁹ It is true that China's aid covers 121 countries and Afghanistan is only one of them. Some presented this as the reason why China's aid to Afghanistan

had been so small. Nonetheless, India also helps more than 100 countries each year in the form of aid, though Afghanistan is listed as its priority.

After 2014, China has increased its assistance to Afghanistan. From 2010 and 2013, China's annual grants to Kabul were between 150 million to 200 million RMB. This number rose to 500 million RMB in 2014. In October 2014, Beijing announced to offer 1.5 billion RMB grants in the next three years.¹⁰

Second, the two countries help Afghanistan with diverse approaches and project preferences.

China provides aid mainly in the following six forms¹¹: grants, general goods and materials, debt relief and exemption, human resource training and technical cooperation, humanitarian goods aid, and capital donation. Grants accounts for the largest proportion. It includes all complete turn-key projects such as water conservancy infrastructure, hospital and school facilities. Some details are listed in table 2.


Table 2: China's Aid to Afghanistan 2001-2017¹²

Form	
Amount and Project	
Grants	Complete project in all is about 600 million dollars, including the Palvan water conservancy project (I and II), Kabul Republic Hospital, teaching buildings and guesthouse of the Confucius Institute at Kabul University, Afghan Science and Technology Center, etc
General Goods and Materials	1. Desilting equipment, worth of 1,787, 500 dollars (2009);
	2. Over 8,000 tons of wheat, worth of 30 million RMB (2009);
	3. 100 ambulances; some school materials and facilities (2012);
	4. Limousine, agricultural equipment, etc. (2014).

Human Resource Training & Technical Cooperation	1. Annual 100 scholarships for Afghan youth since 2011.
	2. Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (2013).
	3. Technical Assistance Cooperation Projects with Afghanistan Republic Hospital (2014).
	4. China-Afghanistan Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (2014), by which China pledged to train 3,000 Afghan personnel and offer 500 scholarships from 2015 to 2019. As of 2016, China had trained more than 2,000 Afghan personnel from the sectors of agriculture, medical and health care, education, trade and business, communication, drug control, etc..
Capital donation	1. Government Startup Fund, one million US dollars (2001)
	2. Currency Assistance, one million US dollars (2015)
Debt Relief	Exempted Afghan debt of 9.6 million British pounds (2004).
Humanitarian Aid	1. Emergency aid of 30 million RMB (2001);
	2. Humanitarian materials, worth of 10 million RMB (2015).

It is obvious that intergovernmental transfer has been the main form China assisted Afghanistan. Aid projects directly benefiting the public, such as scholarship, training, constructing Kabul Hospital and university etc., were limited to a few big cities. Afghans living in rural regions, which account for about 80 percent of the total population of the country, have little access to, not to mention to benefit from, China's aid.

In contrast, India's aid to Afghanistan has been dedicated to supporting Afghanistan's social and economic development, which focuses on infrastructure, intergovernmental transfers and food aid. The following chart illustrates the composition of India's Aid to Afghanistan between 2009 and 2011.



Composition of India's Aid to Afghanistan: 2009-2011¹³

In terms of concrete projects, India's aid is more comprehensive and covers more widely than that of China. Generally, India's aid to Afghanistan is composed of four project categories: strategic infrastructure, government capacity building, education institutions, small social and economic development projects, and humanitarian assistance. Table 3 shows some details.

Table 3: India's Main Aid Projects to Afghanistan (2001-2016)¹⁴

Type	Main Projects
Strategic Infrastructure	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Zaranj-Delaram Highway. (Completed) 2. Afghan-Indian Friendship Dam, i.e. Salma Dam. (Completed) 3. Electric power system renovation. (1) Connecting Kabul and Puli Khumri, stage I has completed, and stage II is expected to connect Uzbekistani power plants. (2) A transmission line within Faryab (130-kilometer long). 4. Communication infrastructure, including projects to rebuild telephone communication system in 11 provinces and satellite TV system in 34 provinces. 5. Afghan Parliament Building. (Completed) 6. Re-construction of Kabul Indira Gandhi Children's Hospital, with whole sets of medical equipment and medical staff training provided. This hospital has remote medical diagnosis and treatment connection with several famous hospitals in India. 7. Various transportation means, including three Airbus planes, 400 big buses, 200 medium coaches, more than 100 multi-functional vehicles, 285 military vehicles, dozens of ambulances, etc.

Type	Main Projects
Small Development Projects	The third phase is in process, with a total of 419 projects in 34 provinces.
Education and Capacity Building	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rebuilding, renovating and upgrading schoolhouses, which benefited dozens of schools all over the country including the famous Habibia High School and National Agricultural Technology University. 2. Providing classroom facilities, teaching materials and books to schools and universities. 3. Establishing various vocational training centers. 4. Training Afghan national army and government officials, teachers and lawyers in India. Training 1,200-1,700 military personnel and police officers plus 675 civil officials each year. 5. Offering 1,500 scholarships each year. As of 2017 about 7,000 Afghan youths had completed their undergraduate and postgraduate studies and had been back to Afghanistan.
Humanitarian Aid	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dispatching five medical teams to Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad and Kandahar since 2002. They provide free medicine and treat about 30,000 local patients per month. 2. Offering one million tons of wheat (worth of 100 million US dollars).

Prioritizing Afghan grass communities and rural development is a distinguished characteristic of India's aid that should be highlighted.

Different from China and many other international donors active in Afghanistan, India's aid prioritizes the local communities in need and rural areas in general. This, in the form of Small Development Projects (SDP) which was launched in 2005, has made India's aid uniquely touchable for Afghan grassroots communities. The SDP has completed two phases in Afghanistan so far, with the third phase being expected to conclude in 2017. Altogether, the SDP in Afghanistan has invested 119.8 million dollars. Its 419 projects have covered all the 34 provinces in the forms of constructing and repairing of schools, libraries, labs, promoting medical and health

care, developing rural electricity, transportation infrastructures in both urban and rural regions, drilling wells, constructing cold

storages, planting trees and grass, training personnel, building irrigation facilities, facilitating public agriculture centers, etc.. India also set up a special social development program particularly for the Pashtuns living in the border area.

SDP has become a hallmark for India's aid to Afghanistan and has won great accolade among the local people. This type of aid has four features: (1) Low budget. The investments in the projects range between 160,000 and 300,000 dollars. (2) Short time-span. The projects are normally to be completed within six to twelve months. (3) Prioritizing the remote and rural areas on the basis of local needs. (4) Mass mobilization and popular participation. The main actors to implement the projects are local residents.

Most Indian officials and academics emphasize that the key characteristic of India's aid to Afghanistan is based on local requirement. Nonetheless, this local need driven model is strategically significant and effective. Evidently, it is a necessary compliment to "high aid" such as grants to the government. It penetrates to local grassroots and thereby makes "Indian Aid" visible for both big cities' residents and rural villagers. With this two-pronged aid, India is winning the hearts and minds of Afghan people. Consequently, India is projected as being responsive to the needs of all walks of life in Afghanistan, at different level and in different fields.

Third, the two countries responded to the local security risks in distinct ways.

Both countries have faced terrorist threats in delivering aid in Afghanistan, although India has been more active and more unremitting than China. In principle, they are both determined to promote peace and stability in this war-torn country, but their efforts are distinct in terms of handholds and priorities. Briefly speaking, China's focus is to improve Afghanistan's political environment, both domestic and international, for which it tries hard to facilitate negotiation between Kabul and Taliban. India's working point is, on the contrary, to enhance capacity building of the government and the army of Afghanistan.

1) Different Wills to Deliver Aid Project

Most of China's projects in Afghanistan have been held back, even

paused, by the security risks on the ground. For instance, Aynak copper mine project¹⁵ was started in May 2008. About six months later, it experienced a terrorist attack, and basically paused after 2012. As of 2015, there were only eight Chinese companies stationed in Afghanistan, with roughly 150 Chinese employees in all.¹⁶

India has more aid projects scattering all over Afghanistan, for this, plus the traditional hostility between Delhi and Taliban, India faces higher security risks than China. Facts turned out that Indians have suffered more attacks in Afghanistan. Despite of this, India's aid projects are seldom halted for a long time, even less stopped at all. Instead, it has managed to overcome difficulties with all the available resources and completed most of the projects. The Zaranj-Delaram Highway is a typical case in this regard. This project was attacked several times in 2005 at its initial stage. Some Indian engineers were seriously injured and died. The construction did not stop though. As an active response, India allocated 200 staff from the India-Tibet Border Police (ITBP) in March 2006 to protect the project workers and guarantee its completion in 2009. Here arose a model for India to deliver major projects in Afghanistan. Nowadays the number of members of security team has increased to 500. Another example is the Salma dam project. It was launched when the overall security situation got worsening in Afghanistan. Still, India did not give up. It tried many means for escorting with special security force and seeking support from famous Herat warlords. But all these efforts could not change the general context at that time and the security risks for ground transportation were still on the rise. Finally, India decided in January 2011 to use helicopter to transport construction materials. By the time of its completion in 2016, the actual expense on this project was 17.76 billion rupees,¹⁷ three times more than the original budget.

2) Different Efforts to Improve Afghanistan's Political Environment

On the level of high politics and diplomatic arena, China actively supports Afghanistan's survival, stability and peace. It offered financial support to the new Kabul authority from the very beginning. It included Afghanistan into a peaceful regional environment. From 2002 to 2004, China, together

with Afghanistan and its neighboring countries -- Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Pakistan -- issued a series of declarations such as the *Declaration on Good Neighborly Relations* in December 2002, *Declaration on Encouraging Closer Trade, Transit and Investment Cooperation* in September 2003, and *Kabul Declaration on Good Neighborly Relations and Counter-Narcotics* in March 2004. In the form of these documents the regional countries agreed to respect Afghanistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to support Afghanistan's peace building and post war reconstruction. This is of course highly meaningful for the Afghan new government. In 2015 China went further by trying to facilitate Afghan national reconciliation, for which negotiation between Taliban and Kabul was regarded as the first step. The aim was to realize Afghanistan's stability and peace. Yet due to the extremely sophisticated nature of the Taliban-Kabul rivals, the "Murree Process" launched by China with the help of Pakistan has been fraught with obstacles and no substantial progress comes out so far.

India also endeavors to promote Afghan stability on both bilateral and multilateral levels. In the bilateral relations with Afghanistan, India was, and still is, not interested in Kabul's peace talks with Taliban. Instead, India is preoccupied with the competence of Kabul democratic regime and its military capacity in face of Taliban challenges. As a support, India included Afghanistan into the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 2007. It also actively participated in the "Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process" (HoA). China joined HoA as well. But India is far more active. Delhi takes part in HoA's all six working groups and takes a leading role in two of them, whereas China is only registered as member in two groups, respectively, on drug control and anti-terrorism.¹⁸

In all, India's response to Afghan local political and security risks can be summarized as following:

To deliver project based on local situation and local people. SDP is a typical example.

To mobilize or utilize third-party forces, especially non-government organizations (NGO) and multilateral regimes. For instance, it encourages Indian Self Employment for Women

Association (SEWA) to venture in Afghanistan. Delhi funded SEWA to establish “Women’s Vocational Center for Training” to train Afghan women (especially the war-resulted widows and orphans). It has overcome some realistic obstacles with the help of the United Nations. For instance, it promised Afghanistan one million tons of wheat. But Pakistan refused to allow Indian materials to pass through its territory. To solve this problem, India repackaged parts of this aid into the “School Feeding Program” and supplied through the World Food Program (WFP) to Afghan school children.¹⁹

To develop the capacity of the new Kabul government. By projecting the Parliament Building as “symbol of the world’s biggest democratic country helping rebuild the youngest democratic country”²⁰. Besides, more practical support lies in the aspect of security and defense. India played an important part in reorganizing the Afghan National Army (ANA).²¹ As the U.S.-NATO alliance started to withdraw in 2011, India expanded its effort to train Afghan security forces. In 2014, India formally launched a project to repair Soviet/Russian made weapons for ANA. Currently, the annual budget report of India’s Ministry of External Affairs categorizes the aid projects to Afghanistan into two types, i.e., security cooperation and civil cooperation, with the former including military and security personnel training, military equipment, military logistic service, especially weapon maintenance and repair, etc..

Fourth, Afghan public holds different opinions about the two countries.

The two countries both seek to win the hearts and minds of the people, and India has been more successful. Generally, Afghans have a positive opinion of both countries, though India enjoys evidently comparative advantages. According to a BBC poll conducted, 71% of Afghan interviewees named India as their favorite foreign country, which exceeded many other countries a lot.²² Before 2012 China hardly had position in kinds of polls conducted by western organizations in Afghanistan, while India always took the spotlight.

Many Afghan people are aware that India is helping their post war reconstruction. As early as in 2009 Gallup discovered that

59% of Afghans thought India should do this. Table 4 shows that Afghans valued that India had made greater contributions to Afghanistan than UN and NATO.

Table 4: Afghan's Assessment of the Contribution of International Actors (%)²³

	NATO	UN	India	Iran	Pakistan
Reconstruction	44	51	56	42	30
Economic Development	15	14	15	13	13
Peace Keeping	20	15	6	3	4
Support the Current Authority	13	8	9	8	4

According to the Asia Foundation's investigation in Afghanistan, in the past 10 years, the popularity of China and India on the ground both increased, but India took the lead with faster speed. When asked "Who offers the biggest help and provides the maximum projects to Afghanistan reconstruction and development?", Afghans gave the following answers:

Table 5: Afghans' Assessment of China's and India's Contribution 2006-2015²⁴

	2006	2009	2013	2014	2015
India	6%	10%	16%	11%	11.1%
China	2%	3%	7%	5%	5%

Noteworthy is that India has significantly ameliorated its relations with the Pashtuns mainly by efforts from two dimensions. One is that All India Radio set up Pashtu and Dali programs in 2002 in Afghanistan.²⁵ Another is it has included Pashtun communities and Pashtun regions into its SDP aid program since 2006. In fact, Pashtuns valued India even higher than the average rate of Afghanistan, as shown in table 6.

Table 6: Which country do you think has provided the most help to local development?(2009-2014,%)²⁶

	2009		2011		2012		2013		2014	
	India	China	India	China	India	China	India	China	India	China
National Average	10	3	4	2	4	2	14	9	5	4
Southeast Region	9	1	3	1	6	1	22	6	18	8
East Region	19	10	8	2	7	3	25	9	20	10
Southwest Region	9	1	10	1	7	2	28	7	21	6

III. STRATEGIC FACTORS BEHIND THE DIFFERENCES

Many factors co-produced the differences discussed above. Traditionally, China’s and India’s relationship with Afghanistan have been long different. Nowadays both countries, as emerging power in the world, have their own ideas and aims in international and regional affairs. Among all the elements shaping the current picture, I would only specify two of them here. These two factors not only are important to understand the existing differences but also reflect the two countries’ self-image and international strategy. Their evolution will have a direct bearing on the future development of China as a major economy and regional power, and shape the regional political landscape in future.

First, the strategic position of international development aid in the two countries.

Although both China and India stress the inherent connection between their aid and South-South cooperation, they define international aid differently in terms of strategic weight. In China, international aid belongs to the field of international economic relations. While in India, international aid is established as an organic part of its national foreign policy.

Despite of the loud voice from academia that foreign aid should be integrated into national world strategy as at least a carrier³⁵, reality in China has been the opposite. Up till now, China’s

international aid has been managed and coordinated by the Ministry of Commerce. In official documents, aid is often referred as a type of “economic and trade cooperation”. In *China's Foreign Aid White Paper* of 2011, for instance, the definition of “international aid” entails three elements: (1) It belongs to the domain of South-South cooperation, which means its nature is mutual help amongst developing countries. (2) It is assistance that China “provides to other developing countries with economic difficulties”, thus proving China is “shouldering relevant international obligations”. (3) This type of economic cooperation has witnessed a change since 1978, transforming from the previous “simple aid” to the present “mutually beneficial cooperation in multiple forms”.²⁸

Indian government puts international aid to much higher position than Beijing. Proving aid is defined as “integral part of India's foreign policy”²⁹ and overseen by the MEA. In 2012 the MEA created a specialized institution to manage foreign aid agendas and to offer One-Stop Service for its domestic stakeholders. The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defense, as well as the Export-Import Bank are to support and cooperate according to the MEA's advice, plans, and proposals.

Two other differences between China and India in this regard are noteworthy as well. First, India does not boast itself as “donor”, and does not call countries it aids as “recipient”. Instead, its official documents use “development partner” to denote its aid receivers. Accordingly, in diplomatic practice, foreign aid relationship is expressed as “development partnership”. The institution in charge of development aid within the MEA is named “Development Partnership Administration” (DPA). Second yet more importantly, since the mid-1990s India has been upholding “non-reciprocity” principle in aiding South Asian countries, according to which India should aid the neighbors without expecting or asking for returns.³⁰

In the 21st century, India has

Different from China's “mutually beneficial cooperation”, India's international aid has generally adhered to “non-reciprocity” principle.

increased its provision of development aid, with the South Asia region accounting for over 80% of the total.³¹ This means 80% of the aid it provides is non-reciprocal. Of course it will be naïve to believe that Delhi asks for nothing at all. It does expect something. It simply does not pursue mutual benefits in economic terms though. As a matter of fact, this non-reciprocity principle indicates the special status of South Asia in India's foreign policy. It also exemplifies that foreign aid has been integrated into India's geopolitical strategy and serves as an instrument. This marks the most striking contrast between China and India. In China, the principle of "mutual benefits" practically equates international aid to ordinary economic and trade relations.

On the surface, the different phrases used by the two countries with regard to their international aid, like development partner versus aid receivers, non-reciprocity versus mutual benefits etc., are nothing but diverse expression habits or rhetorical devices. The role and function of narratives, however, can never be overestimated in world politics. Not to mention the huge power hiding in moral legitimacy and ethics. More than 2500 years ago, Confucius warned in his *Analects* that "if the name is not right then speech will not be in order, and if speech is not in order then nothing will be accomplished" (名不正则言不顺, 言不顺则事不成).

Second, the understandings about Afghanistan's strategic value

Physically China is closer to Afghanistan than India. India does not border Afghanistan directly. Pakistan separates them. Economically, China is stronger than India, so is its international aid volume as a whole. However, India's will and tenacity to aid Afghanistan are much stronger than China. The key reason behind is that the two countries hold different attitudes regarding Afghanistan's strategic value and potential.

1) Strategic Interests

According to China's diplomatic strategy layout—with great powers as the key point, neighbors as the priority, developing countries as the foundation, and multilateral regimes as a significant platform—Afghanistan should have been extremely important in that it is both developing country and China's neighbor. More

than this, in 2012, China and Afghanistan established strategic cooperation partnership. In 2014, the two countries agreed to deepen their partnership on the base of co-building the “Silk Road Economic Belt”.³² However, in China’s diplomatic practice, Afghanistan is no real primary concern and foundation. There is even no trade port on the 92.45 kilometers’ border between China and Afghanistan. In 2013, the bilateral trade volume between them was 337 million dollars, with China exported 328 million dollars. By the end of 2014, China’s direct investment in Afghan non-financial sectors was 514 million dollars. Its engineering contracts with Afghanistan in all valued 968 million dollars, and the total turnover--covering telecommunication, power transmission and transformation and road construction--was 638 million dollars.³³ International community has been stressing the strategic value of Afghanistan’s mineral resources. For China, however, this value is yet to be realized. Whether or not it can come true will depend largely on if and when Afghanistan can restore its domestic political and security order. The security value Afghanistan has for China is related to Beijing’s effort and determination to fight against the “three evils”. And China is also exposed to the risk resulted from the spillovers of Afghan turbulence.

Judging from China’s practical interests on the ground, the amount of aid it provided to Afghanistan was reasonable. It might be able to maintain the existing bilateral friendship as well. The problem is that, however, it is not enough for shaping a different future. In fact, one can hardly find any strategic vision in China’s policy toward Afghanistan. India’s case is very different. The aid it provides to Afghanistan cares not only for the current situation but also for future. Its aid is re-constructing Afghanistan and its role in the region. They are a part of grand vision India has for the whole region.

India’s foreign strategy prioritizes the South Asia region and its immediate neighbors. Afghanistan is defined as an immediate neighbor.³⁴ During the Cold War, India intended to make Afghanistan a partner to contain Pakistan. When Afghanistan was ruled by Taliban, India supported the Northern Alliance, Taliban’s rival, and tried to court Tajikistan to contain the Taliban. Since 2002,

India has been assisting Kabul authority with various aid projects.

Containing Pakistan is amongst India's practical interests in aiding Afghanistan. Besides, India also seeks to shape the future of the regional order by incorporating Afghanistan into its strategy to connect the Central Asia. The Zaranj-Delaram Highway project completed in 2009 is an example. This 218-kilometer road is located in Nimruz Province, for which India invested 136 million dollars. Its MEA said this project "symbolizes India's determination and commitment to Afghanistan".³⁵ On the ground, this road has boosted local development. The population in Zaranj increased to more than 200,000 from 55,000 after the road was completed. And the land price along the highway rose significantly, too.³⁶ But its strategic value goes beyond this. It connects Iran's Chabahar port, west of Zaranj, and extends all the way north to the Central Asia by joining the Ring Road at Delaram. Its direct geopolitical and geo-economic impact is that this highway may reduce Afghanistan's long-term heavy reliance on Pakistani ports, and thereby undermine the geographical foundation for the latter's influence over Afghanistan. In May 2015, India, Iran and Afghanistan signed a collaboration agreement to develop Chabahar port and transit trade.

In recent years, India has been highlighting that Afghanistan should and could act as an important corridor between the central and south Asia, the West and East Asia. In 2012, it included Afghanistan into the program of International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that was designed to bridge India and the northern and central Eurasia, with India as their gate to the Indian Ocean. In the coming years India will try to forge Afghanistan into its passageway to the central Asia. It is true that India's interests in the central Asia has deep root in its need for energy and market. Equally, if not more, important is India's relentless desire and effort to become a "world-class great power". Some analysts pointed out that for India to overcome the geographical barrier of the Himalayas, to upgrade itself from a sub-continent country to an Asian great power, and then to become a global great power, building close relations with the central Asia is the key. This dream to be great power determines it will seek for

“strategic depth” in the central Asia.³⁷

2) “Strategic Partnerships” with Different Connotations

China and India have both established strategic partnerships with Afghanistan, but the exact intricacies of the partnership differ slightly: China and Afghanistan have “strategic cooperation partnership”, while India and Afghanistan have “strategic partnership”.

One can hardly find anything in the texts of China-Afghanistan contracts really strategic. The strategic cooperation relationship’s legal base is composed of three documents. The first one is the joint declaration issued in 2012 and the content is little more than general principles. The other two documents—declared respectively in 2013 and 2014 while with the same title *China-Afghanistan Joint Statement on Deepening Strategic and Cooperative Partnership*—listed only specific aid and cooperation projects.³⁸ Judging from these documents, not to mention their delivery, the “strategic cooperation” relationship between Beijing and Kabul is still on tactical level, or at most nominally strategic.

The legal text of India-Afghanistan strategic partnership is more comprehensive and substantial. The *India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement* signed in October 2011 is the first of its kind signed between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and a foreign country. This agreement is composed of three parts. The first describes the general principles. The second establishes the framework of the strategic partnership, including political and security cooperation, trade and economic cooperation, capacity development and education, social culture and civil society, and civil relations. India promises in the agreement to help Afghanistan build its national security force, to provide training, equipment and capacity assistance, etc. As a part of its support to build up Kabul’s capacity, India pledges to expand its technical, training and other support to the staff of Afghan institutions including administration, judiciary and parliament. Both countries also agrees to enhance the connection between their media, educational, religious and civil groups. The third part of the agreement outlines operational mechanism to realize the strategic partnership. It entrusts its implementation to a “Partnership committee”, a special institution

under two countries' foreign/external ministry. The committee is expected to convene several meetings annually, and the existing bilateral regimes are a part of the committee.³⁹

The India-Afghanistan agreement also declares that sustainable development of Afghanistan is an important target. They vowed to "deepen economic interdependency" and to increase diversified cooperation in agriculture, rural development, mining, industry, energy, information technology, transportation communication, civil aviation and other sectors. Meanwhile, they agreed to further regional economic cooperation through bilateral and regional efforts, to help Afghanistan become the trade, transportation and energy hub that connects the central and south Asia, and to help Afghan economy merge into the south Asian and global economic system.

CONCLUSIONS

To get a clearer picture of China's and India's aid to Afghanistan, we need to put them back to the general framework of the international aid system established there. Hence the following four points are worthy of attention.

First, neither China nor India is the leader in the system of the current international aid to Afghanistan. Both of them are participators.

So far, besides the UN and NATO, the core force supporting Afghanistan is western countries. The key multilateral mechanisms currently functional are also initiated and led by them such as the Bonn Conference, the Tokyo Conference, the London Conference and the Brussels Conference, to name a few. Afghanistan ranks No. 1 in OECD members' bilateral official development aid agenda. The U.S. and NATO are unquestionable leader in facilitating Afghan national security and army. No matter how hard India tries to expand its military aid, it cannot catch up with the U.S. in short time. From 2002 to 2016, among the 130 billion dollars Afghanistan received from international community, 115 billion were provided by the U.S. At the EU's Brussels Conference held in 2016, the international society promised another 15.2 billion dollars aid to

Afghanistan before 2020.⁴⁰

The fact that India and China are only participators instead of leaders in aiding Afghanistan is roughly consistent with their current international status. After saying this, given their geographic proximity as well as their special geopolitical and geo-economic concerns about this region, it would be oversimplified to measure their role simply with aid volume. As big powers in this region, both China and India have more natural advantages than any extra-regional powers. Another variable is that during the past few years the two countries have been strengthening their aid to Afghanistan.

Second, international aid has generally improved Afghan living conditions, but it is a long way for this country to achieve its economic self-reliance.

Since 2002, Afghanistan has experienced huge progress in its economic and social development. According to the UN,⁴¹ between 2002 and 2014, Afghans' average life expectancy rose from 42.5 years to 60.4 years, and the GNI per capita from less than 735 dollars to 1885 dollars. It is true, however, that Afghanistan is still lagging far behind in the world with regard to human development. Statistics show that in 2016 its 35.8% population lived below poverty line, and its HDI was 0.479, ranking the 169th in the world.

Worse is that Afghanistan's national economy heavily depends on external aid, which amounted to 80% of its fiscal budget in 2016.⁴² Its military expense is almost entirely reliant on NATO. In the coming years, international aid will determine in large measure the operation of its state apparatus. To re-build this miserable nation out of the ruins of several decades' war that is still going on asks for lengthy and hard struggles. In light of this, patience is required for the aid providers or, to use India's term, the development partners. In practice, however, donors always expect quick and visible success. In recent years, various parties involved in aiding Afghanistan face a dilemma of giving substantial aid while producing far less results than expectation. Some are losing their patience. And some have started to place blame on Afghanistan. For instance, western media and governments frequently accused Kabul of corruption and incapability. They criticized Afghanistan as "rentier state" and attributed the "failure" to Afghans, and claimed

that it is international aid that has nurtured Afghan “dependency culture”⁴³.

Looking back to the Afghan history, however, one may find the current situation is not something new. Since the second half of the 19th century, this country has been economically weak and heavily dependent on foreign aid. In order to win the “Great Game”, British India used generous economic aid as a tool to keep Kabul in its hand. After the second Anglo-Afghan war in 1880, Britain cut off Kabul’s connection with third countries. Consequently, Afghanistan had to rely on Britain to sustain its economy and artillery. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry finally re-enhanced its reliance on great power. Even in the 1960s that was recorded as good days for Afghan national economy, 40% of its fiscal budget came from international aid.⁴⁴The PDPA regime completely relied on Soviet bloc. And the result is disastrous for Afghanistan. When Moscow abolished its aid at the beginning of 1992, Najibullah government collapsed right away and the Afghan Civil War broke out. Between 2002 and 2004, Afghanistan’s dependence on international aid was again above 90%.

Third, there exists internal contradiction between international aid and Afghanistan’s development.

International aid itself is no panacea at all. Most projects have time-limitation and are sporadically allocated to specific fields and regions. Their core destination is to accomplish project itself in time. Yet on the other hand, socio-economic development of a country is a process refusing any artificial end or completion. It is a common sense that a healthy economy should be sustainable and all-inclusive.

Afghan case tells something more. Since 2002, huge aid flew in this land without any order. The implementation of these projects has aggravated the local human resource scarcity. Due to the different salary, foreign aid organizations have competitive advantage in Afghan talent market. Many Afghan teachers, doctors and engineers were attracted by the better payment and resigned their original jobs to act as translator, driver, and agent for foreigners.

International aid adds management burden to Afghan

government as well. Ministries of the state have to invest lots of energy and time to handle aid-related issues. To complete and review aid projects has become some departments' primary job, scarcely leaving time and space for the officials to make their own development plan. President Ghani felt the dilemma himself when he was Finance Minister. He once commented that more than 60% of his time as Finance Minister was spent on managing international aid such as to meet visiting groups and delegates, to reiterate Kabul's policies, to raise fund to balance the current account, to discuss kinds of projects, to review aid projects, etc. In his opinion, he could have instead been devoted to raising domestic revenue and promoting internal reform.⁴⁵

Seen from this perspective, international aid has become an internal part of Afghan development predicament. For the past decade, Afghanistan has been trapped by the vicious cycle of "hungry for aid because of economic weakness --aid and its implementation weakening the country's development capability-- heavier reliance on foreign aid". Still, the harm of this cycle is yet to manifest itself in full size.

There have been tragic cases proving the negative influence of international aid upon Afghan political ecology. A key point is the politicization of aid. Namely, some donors use their aid as a tool to promote their global and regional political interests and to interfere with Afghan domestic issues. One result is the local conflicts become more sophisticated and more intractable. From the 1970s to the early 21st century, many donors active in Afghanistan pursued their political strategies through generous donation to their local agents, such as the Soviet Union supporting the PDPA regime, the U.S. backing Mujahideen, Pakistan assisting Taliban, and Iran and India facilitating the North Alliance, so on and so forth. The war launched by the U.S. in 2001 changed Afghan political system in Kabul, though the political ecology on the ground remains basically intact. Even today, it is difficult to ascertain whether this kind of detrimental international aid has stopped. Against this backdrop the possible impact of India's increasing military aid, particularly the heavy weapons, upon Afghan national reconciliation is noteworthy.

Fourth, international aid and the structure of the regional international relations are mutually inter-constructing.

Countries that provide aid try to shape or reshape the regional order in their own ways. This process is not without any limitation at all, however. On the ground, a country's behavior is restrained by the established regional international relations. The environmental constraints will, in turn, stimulate new efforts from the actor. Here grows and maintains a continuous interaction.

The India-Pakistan conflict is the core dynamics of the region's international relations. It is one strategic element behind India's aid to Afghanistan. It has influenced the approaches and extent of India's aid. Pakistan denying Indian goods to cross its territory to Afghanistan, for instance, pushed India to turn to Iran for Chabahar port as the alternative. Meanwhile, Pakistan is very sensitive to Indo-Afghan strategic relations, fearing being attacked from two sides. This, to some extent, had slowed down India's pace in delivering military aid. This explains to a large extent why India did not immediately fulfill its promise in the Strategic Partnership Agreement after 2011. Analysts said India does not want to outrage Pakistan. Although some argue that India's hesitation was because of the opposition of the U.S., the reason behind the U.S. attitude they said was Washington worried it might provoke Pakistan.⁴⁶ Another interesting case is that President Ghani was determined to realize political reconciliation at the beginning when he took office, for which he tried to improve relations with Pakistan. He signed bilateral military training agreement with Islamabad and allowed Pakistani army to operate on Afghan soil. India was quite disappointed about this, and one of its responses was to step up aid to Afghanistan. At the end of 2015, India provided three Mi-25 armed helicopters to the Afghan army, opening a new chapter in the aid delivery. It turns out no matter how India practices its military aid to Afghanistan, either to actively refrain itself, or being passively prevented, or to step up cautiously, the shadow of India-Pakistan rival is always there. One step further, the impacts of aid, particularly military aid, upon the South Asian IR is noteworthy. Although military cooperation between India and Afghanistan has been framed in their strategic partnership agreement, its practice

is alarming enough for Pakistan. Against this background, if India increases its military assistance rapidly in near future, its tension with Pakistan might be escalated, which will not be a good news for the region.

¹ The definition of “international aid” is controversial. In the field of development studies, “international aid” has specific international politics connotation. The narrow definition refers to developed countries’ transfer payments to developing countries. In recent years, Development Assistance Council (DAC) under OECD said that some aid provided by China was not genuine development assistance. In the related discussions, Prof. Lin Yifu and others advocated to go beyond aid and replace “development aid” with “development cooperation”. For details, please refer to Lin Yifu and Wang Yan, *Going beyond Aid*, translated by Song Chen. Beijing: Peking University Press 2016. For more information about *China's Foreign Aid White Paper* published by the government in April, 2011 and July, 2014, see <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/index.htm>, 2017-03-25.

² For details, please refer to the Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Development Cooperation Report 2012*, pp.48-49, [http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/DCR%20-%202012%20\(English\).pdf](http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/DCR%20-%202012%20(English).pdf), 2017-04-18.

³ MEA, Government of India, *Outcome Budget 2014-2015*, p.12, http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/23954_MEA_Outcome_Budget_ENG_2014-15.pdf, 2017-03-25.

⁴ The exchange rate of US dollar to Indian rupee was 1:66-67 in 2016. The data come from annual budget plans of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. MEA, Government of India, *Outcome Budget 2013-2014*, http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/21546_MEA_Outcome_Budget_2013-14_English.pdf, 2017-03-25. p.12; MEA, Government of India, *Outcome Budget 2014-2015*, p.12, http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/23954_MEA_Outcome_Budget_ENG_2014-15.pdf, 2017-03-25

⁵ Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Development Cooperation Report 2012*, pp.48-49, <http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/2013/Development%20Cooperation%20Report%20-%202012.pdf>, 2017-03-25.

⁶ Economic & Commercial Counsellor's Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Afghanistan, *General Situation of Economy and Trade Cooperation between China and Afghanistan*, 2017-01-27 <http://af.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zxhz/201501/20150100879514.shtml>, 2017-03-25.

⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone*, pp.199-200, 2016 by the United Nations Development Programme 1 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017 USA.

⁸ OECD, *Development Co-operation Report 2016*, p.306, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/development/development-co-operation-report-2016_dcr-2016-en#page1, 2017-04-12. Lorenzo Piccio, “India's Foreign Aid Program Catches up with Its Global Ambitions”, May 2013, <https://www.devex.com/news/india-s-foreign-aid-program-catches-up-with-its-global-ambitions-80919>, 2017-03-25.

⁹ *China's Foreign Aid White Paper* (2014).

¹⁰ Economic & Commercial Counsellor's Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of

China in Afghanistan, *General Situation of Economy and Trade Cooperation between China and Afghanistan*, *China-Afghanistan Economy and Trade Cooperation*, 2015-01-27, <http://af.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zxhz/201501/20150100879514.shtml>, 2017-03-25.

¹¹ China's Ministry of Commerce categorized the international aid into eight types: complete turnkey project, general supply, technical cooperation, human resource development and cooperation, medical team, emergency & humanitarian aid, volunteer group, and debt relief. See *China's Foreign Aid* white paper (2011). This paper does not use this classification in that the official figures to Afghanistan are not available and it is not convenient to make comparisons with India.

¹² Data from the website of China's Embassy in Afghanistan, available at 2017-02-01 <http://af.mofcom.gov.cn>, 2017-03-25.

¹³ Data comes from Rani D. Mullen, "India-Afghanistan Partnership", May 16, 2013, Centre for Policy Research.

¹⁴ Data comes from the report of the MEA, the official website of Indian Embassy in Afghanistan, and Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, "India's Aid to Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.31, No.5 (Sept. 2007), pp.833-842. MEA, *India and Afghanistan: A Development Partnership*, http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/176_india-and-afghanistan-a-development-partnership.pdf, 2017-03-25; Embassy of India, Kabul, Development Partnership, <http://eoi.gov.in/kabul/?0707?000>, 2017-03-25.

¹⁵ International community has different opinions on the nature of this project. In my opinion, this project includes investment and commitment to the local economic, social and educational development in its contract. Therefore, it could be counted as assistance. According the contract, Chinese investors will construct local infrastructures such as creating 3,500-4,000 jobs for local people, providing accommodation, medical care and schools to local employees and their families, building drinking water supply systems, building fire power plant (in Kabul) of 400MW, building a railway to connect Tajikistan.

¹⁶ China's Embassy in Afghanistan, *General Situation of Economy and Trade Cooperation between China and Afghanistan*, <http://af.china-Embassy.org/chn/zagx/ztgk/t1097560.htm>, 2017-03-25.

¹⁷ Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, "India's Aid to Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.31, No.5 (Sept. 2007), pp.833-842; J. Cherian, "Killed in Cold Blood", *Frontline*, May 19, 2006. Srinjoy Bose and Ankit Panda, "India and Chinese Foreign Policy Imperatives and Strategies vis-à-vis Afghanistan," *India Review*, Vol.14, Iss. 4 (Oct-Dec. 2016), pp.379-406; Devirupa Mitar, "The Amazing Indian Story Behind Heart's Salma Dam," June 4, 2016, <https://thewire.in/40763/the-story-behind-herats-salma-dam/>, 2017-03-25.

¹⁸ The other four groups are: disaster management; trade, commerce and investment, regional infrastructure, education.

¹⁹ Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, "India's Aid to Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.31, No.5 (Sept. 2007), pp.833-842.

²⁰ Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, "India's Aid to Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.31, No.5 (Sept. 2007), pp.833-842.

²¹ R. Bedi, "Strategic Realignment," *Frontline*, April 17, 2003.

²² http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_01_10_afghanpoll.pdf, 2017-03-25. Some other data is: 59% interviewees preferred Germany, 51% selected the US, 50% favored Iran, 39% named UK, and 16% liked Pakistan most.

²³ Julie Ray and Rajesh Srinivasan, "Afghans Assess Roles for NATO, U.N., Regional Actors," Nov.20, 2009, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/124445/Afghans-Assess-Roles-NATO-Regional-Actors>.

aspx, 2017-03-25.

²⁴ Based on data from the Asia Foundation's Afghanistan Survey series from 2006 to 2015, See the relevant reports at <http://asiafoundation.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/survey/resources/#archive>, 2017-03-25.

²⁵ Smruti S. Pattanaik, "India's Afghan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.36, No.4, July-August 2012, pp.569-583. The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the Afghan People*, p.76.

²⁶ Based on data from the Asia Foundation's Afghanistan Survey series from 2009 to 2015, <http://asiafoundation.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/survey/resources/#archive>. Traditionally, east region includes four provinces of Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar and Laghman. Southeast region four provinces of Gazni, Paktia, Khost and Paktika. Southwest region five provinces of Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul and Uruzgan, which, except Nuristan, are dominated by Pushtus.

²⁷ Zhang Haibing, *China's International Aid and Its Global Strategy*, Li Xiaoyu et al (eds.), *International Development Assistance: China's International Assistance*. Beijing: World Affairs Press 2015, p.3.

²⁸ China's State Council News Office, *China's Foreign Aid* (2011), released 2011-04-21, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-04/21/content_1849712.htm, 2017-03-25.

²⁹ See MEA, Government of India, *Outcome Budget 2014-2015*, p.87, http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/23954_MEA_Outcome_Budget_ENG_2014-15.pdf, 2017-03-25.

³⁰ Srinjoy Bose and Ankit Panda, "India and Chinese Foreign Policy Imperatives and Strategies vis-à-vis Afghanistan," *India Review*, Vol.14, Iss. 4, Oct-Dec. 2016, pp.379-406.

³¹ Rani D. Mullen, "5 Predictions for India's Development Cooperation Under New Government," May 28, 2014, <http://asiafoundation.org/2014/05/28/5-predictions-for-indias-development-cooperation-under-new-government/>, 2017-03-25.

³² *Joint Declaration of The People's Republic of China and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Deepening Strategic Cooperation Partnership*, 2014-10-29, <http://af.china-embassy.org/chn/zagx/wxzl/t1206563.htm>, 2017-03-25.

³³ China's Embassy in Afghanistan, *General Situation of Economy and Trade Cooperation between China and Afghanistan*, 2015-01-17, <http://af.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zxhz/201501/20150100879514.shtml>, 2017-03-25

³⁴ China is defined as "great power" in Indian foreign strategy, not as a neighbor.

³⁵ MEA, *India and Afghanistan: A Development Partnership*, http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/176_india-and-afghanistan-a-development-partnership.pdf, 2017-03-25.

³⁶ Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, "India's Role in The Economic Stabilisation of Afghanistan," Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Report, Nov. 2016, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-fi les/bueros/kabul/12959.pdf>, 2017-03-25.

³⁷ Scott Moore, "Peril and Promise: A Survey of India's Strategic Relationship with Central Asia," *Central Asia Survey*, Vol.26, No.2, June 2007, pp.279-291.

³⁸ The three documents are available at <http://af.china-embassy.org/chn/zagx/wxzl/>, 2017-03-25.

³⁹ The full text of the agreement is available at <http://mfa.gov.af/Content/fi les/Agreement%20on%20Strategic%20Partnership%20between%20Afghanistan%20and%20India%20-%20English.pdf>, 2017-03-25.

⁴⁰ OECD, *Development Co-operation Report 2016*, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/development-co-operationreport-20167721.htm>, 2017-04-18. SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, July 30, 2016, <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2016-07-30qr.pdf>, 2017-03-25. Anonymous, "Afghanistan aid: Donors promise \$15.2bn in Brussels", Oct.5, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/>

news/world-asia-37560704, 2017-03-25.

⁴¹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002*, p.251; *Human Development Report 2004*, p.280; *Human Development Report 2015*; pp.210/228.

⁴² Anonymous, "Afghanistan Aid: Donors Promise \$15.2bn in Brussels," Oct.5, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37560704>, 2017-03-25.

⁴³ Jonathan Goodhand, "Aid Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in Afghanistan," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.23, No.5 (2002), pp.837-859.

⁴⁴ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005*, p.82.

⁴⁵ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005*, p.101.

⁴⁶ Sandra Destradi, "India: A Reluctant Partner for Afghanistan," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.37, Iss.2, Summer 2014, pp.103-117; "Anthony, India will Not Send Troops," *The Hindu*, Oct.29, 2009; Virkran Sood, "US Just Can't Leave Afghans to Their Fate," *Mali Today*, Oct 16,2009; Harsh V. Pant, "India in Afghanistan: A Test Case for a Rising Power," *Contemporary South Asia*, Vol.18, No.2, June 2010, pp.133-153; Sumit Ganguly, "India's Role in Afghanistan," Jan. 2012, *CIDOB Policy Research Project*; Shashank Joshi, "India's Af-Pak Strategy," *RUSI Journal*, Vol.155, Iss.1 (2010), pp.20-29.