

# Sino-U.S. Strategic Maneuvering and the Korean Peninsula Issue\*

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OVER the past two years, with China's rapid ascent and the U.S. accelerating its rebalancing strategy, East Asia has witnessed significant changes in its geopolitical dynamics. Against this backdrop, PLA Major General Peng Guangqian, an outspoken military critic observed, "With its large-scale military presence in Asia Pacific, the U.S. has turned China from a potential rival into a real one, shifted its policy from soft balancing to containment, and transformed a conceptual discussion into operational deployment."<sup>1</sup> Despite his exaggeration of the U.S. strategic intent, Peng correctly points out that the U.S. is systematically carrying out a strategy of containment. In this light, the *Cheonan* Incident and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island two years ago provided a rare opportunity for the U.S. to comprehensively implement its containment strategy. Taking advantage of the political fallout following the two incidents, the U.S. has become more assertive in reinforcing its military alliances with Korea and Japan to promote its overall rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific, with the containment of China as one of its major policy goals.

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In the wake of these incidents, the strategic competition between the United States and China is unfolding and the focal point lies in Northeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula in particular. The U.S. rebalancing strategy, albeit not necessarily meaning a life-and-death struggle with China, explicitly indicates three basic goals with regard to containing China: squeezing China's room for development, hindering East Asian regional integration, and isolating China. China views it imperative to enhance its regional competitiveness and expand its room for development through establishing close ties and friendly cooperation with its neighboring countries. The substantial divergence of the strategic goals reflects the ongoing strategic gaming between the two sides in the form of a containment-and-counter-containment struggle.

This paper explores the strategic objectives of China and the U.S. in Northeast Asia and how the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula impacts on their respective strategic goals, and concludes that although the Korean issue is not the decisive factor in the formation of the strategic goals of either side, its weight on the implementation of the two sides' regional strategies is tremendous. In other words, to what extent the tension of the Korean Peninsula is alleviated or how the Korean issue is ultimately resolved will determine the outcome of Sino-U.S. competition.

#### I. THE REGIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS OF THE U.S. AND CHINA IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS

APPARENTLY CHINA and the United States diverge greatly on the global strategic goals. China's core national interest lies in guaranteeing sustainable development at home with its foreign policy and security strategies serving the domestic priority. However, the U.S. core national interest lies in maintaining its global leadership and the existing world political and economic order, with its grand strategy centering on the global leadership.<sup>2</sup> This divergence explains the aggressive nature of the U.S. rebalancing strategy and the defensive nature of China's regional strategy.

### **A. The U.S. Strategic Goals in Northeast Asia**

THE U.S. global grand strategy is designed to maintain its hegemonic position and maximize its economic interests. To ensure its global primacy, the U.S. intends to dominate the areas of strategic significance, such as Europe and Asia Pacific. To achieve its economic interests, the U.S. also needs to cooperate with the countries in Europe and Asia Pacific. The U.S. strategic goals in Northeast Asia are hereby twofold, ensuring its economic interests and strategic dominance in East Asia. Obviously, the cooperative and dominant elements of such a strategy are contradictory.

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Economically, Northeast Asia is a key area in U.S. strategy. "In Asia-Pacific, Northeast Asia is a core area that matters most to the U.S. economic development in that as a major export market and investment outlet, Asia-Pacific plays a significant role in the U.S. economy."<sup>3</sup> For example, since 1990s, the U.S. trade with Asia amounts to over 40% of its total trade volume, which substantially exceeds its trade with North America and Europe. In other words, the U.S. economy is so heavily dependent upon Asia that Northeast Asia, the most dynamic part of the region, has become indispensable to the continuing prosperity of American economy. Therefore, to safeguard its economic interests, the U.S. is taking every possible means to dominate the regional economy.

From the geopolitical perspective, Northeast Asia is also a key area the U.S. intends to dominate. A report released by the Commission on the United States National Interests in June 1996 clearly stated that the U.S. must prevent the emergence of any hostile power in Northeast Asia from challenging the U.S. dominant position in the region. This is a major factor underpinning the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia.<sup>4</sup> Actually to maintain its global hegemony, the United States intends to dominate Europe as well as Asia-Pacific. Out of the historical and cultural ties, and the cohesion of the existing political and economic arrangements,

it is relatively easier for the United States to control Europe. But the situation in Asia is different. With Russia, a major military power and China, an important economic power in the region, it is difficult for the United States to effectively dominate East Asia.

Then, how does the United States formulate its strategy to dominate Northeast Asia? In my view, as it is not feasible for the United States to choose a direct military confrontation with Russia or China, it is highly probable that the U.S. will take advantage of the regional issue to implement an indirect containment strategy, with containing China as its core objective. This strategy has taken shape since the *Cheonan* Incident.

First, the U.S. is trying to squeeze the strategic room for the development of China, Russia and other Northeast Asian countries. In effect, the U.S. is taking advantage of the situation in Korean Peninsula to maintain a certain level of tension in the region, thereby largely blocking the efforts made by China and Russia to develop a cooperative mechanism around the Sea of Japan. This has, in effect, significantly squeezed the development room for China and other countries and helped to consolidate the U.S. military alliances in the region.

Second, the United States will not allow the formation of a Northeast Asian regional integration without American participation, because from American perspective, such scenario would put China in a leading position, which is intolerable. Out of the strategic consideration, the United States actually works to nip the regional integration efforts in the bud. In a different light, American view on the formation of Northeast Asian Community is also ambivalent. Just as the Japanese scholar Takashi Inoguchi pointed out, "the East Asian Community may not work well if the U.S. is included, but excluding the U.S. will probably postpone the building of the community or weaken its influence." His opinion reflects the tremendous American influence in East Asia and the fact that East Asian regional integration cannot go far without getting the United States in the club.<sup>5</sup> On the whole, from American perspective, the most effective way to contain China and Russia is to prevent the development of a powerful joint force in Northeast Asia.

Third, the U.S. is working hard to isolate any force that has the potential to challenge its dominant position in Northeast Asia. This is a strategy that the U.S. often takes to deal with potential threats so as to maintain its regional dominance. NATO's eastward expansion to isolate Russia is a case in point. In East Asia, the U.S. is taking every opportunity to isolate China in much the same way. To a certain extent, this strategy works as it is supported by certain East Asian countries that fear China's rise.

### **B. China's strategic goals in Northeast Asia**

FOR CHINA, how to formulate a systemic regional strategy and set the relevant goals is a question that demands further discussion. In my article, "On China's Regional Strategy in Northeast Asia," I defined China's regional strategic goal as "to build a high-level and substantial cooperative system among countries in the region,"<sup>6</sup> and in other relevant papers, I summarized China's strategy in Northeast Asia as one designed to enlarge strategic room for China's development, enhance its competitiveness, optimize the geopolitical environment to promote regional interaction, and maximize the overall effect of these policies. My conclusions are based on an overall assessment of the current problems China is facing in the region.

First, how should China enlarge room for its further development? Since the reform and opening-up drive in 1978, China has, for the most part, based its development on the extensive exchanges between its coastal areas and the outside world. However, this model begins to witness an increasing number of structural limitations. Now, the Chinese government is paying more attention to China's western region, which, in essence, is an issue that relates to the country's room for development. Compared with the coastal areas, China's vast border areas are not sufficiently opened up, which has prevented the takeoff of the local economy. Moreover, interaction between inland and border regions has not been developed sufficiently thus far, yet the economies of the country's major cities are not resilient enough without adequate support from other areas. Take the northeastern areas for example, the fact that China's Northeastern provinces lag behind in terms of

economic development is a clear indication of the lack of sufficient room for development, thereby resulting in insufficient opening up in the region.

In terms of foreign trade dependence, the national average in 2010 was 50.24%, while the rates of trade dependence for the three northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin were 29.89%, 16.87%, and 13.34%, respectively. The degree of opening up in the three northeastern provinces is far below the national average. Therefore, the only way for the three provinces to revitalize their economies is to expand their development space.

The issue of development space is inextricably linked to the degree to which an area has opened up. Looking at China's current model of development, its vast border areas, coastal areas aside, need to open up further, so as to expand their capacity for development. From the perspectives of operability and importance, Northeast Asia should be considered the first target for such expansion.

Second, how can China enhance its regional competitiveness? Currently, the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement are considered two of the most successful regional cooperation organizations in the world. For China, building up regional competitiveness is a very urgent task, vital for China to realize its next round of economic growth.

To date, China is yet to develop any cooperation mechanisms with its neighboring countries or regions. Although China has engaged in comprehensive cooperation with ASEAN, China's role in regional organizations remains unclear. If China fails to develop a significant cooperation system with South Asia, Northeast Asia, and Central Asia in the near future, this will cause huge problems to the development of the Chinese economy. In my opinion, the best option for China is to foster close relations with countries in Northeast Asia, which could boost China's competitiveness for its next round of development. The building of a new growth pole in the region will greatly stimulate China's development.

Third, China must consider how to promote regional interactions and optimize the regional strategic structure in its favor. China's reform and opening up in the early phase was based on innovating Special Economic Zones in the coastal areas to provide

impetus to the country's economy as a whole. This model still plays a significant role to this day. However, the limitation of this model is also evident: the imbalance or the gap of development among different regions. From the perspective of systemic theory, regional imbalance is a direct cause of the failure to achieve overall effects. The following hypothesis may make this clear: if engaged in comprehensive cooperation with other Northeast Asian countries, China's northeastern provinces will have great appeal to its coastal regions. This will naturally lead to further interaction between northeastern China and the coastal areas, thus adding a new incentive to the next round of the country's economic development. If this hypothesis proves to be true, Northeast Asia can be considered a prime area for China to optimize its strategic goal.

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Fourth, how to advance China's security interests in Northeast Asia. Due to limited space, I will elaborate on this issue further in other articles. Here I would like to stress two points: first, the best way to alleviate security pressure in the region is to eliminate regional flashpoints; and second, cooperation is the best way to guarantee security interests.

In my opinion, there is only one solution to the aforementioned issues, which is to construct a high-level international cooperation system in Northeast Asia. Once the target is set, the building of the system and finding the right path to achieve it will be relatively easy.

## II. REGIONAL STRATEGIES OF THE U.S. AND CHINA IN NORTHEAST ASIA IN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUE

IN TERMS of both strategic goals and structure, the regional strategic objectives of China and the U.S. are at odds with one another. As mentioned above, the U.S. is trying to constrain and isolate forces

which might pose a potential challenge to it in Northeast Asia, in an attempt to ensure its dominance in the region. However, China, which urgently needs to expand its development space in Northeast Asia and construct a regional economic system in order to gain regional competitive edge, has an entirely different strategy, which, in American view, is fundamentally incompatible with the U.S. goal. These two contradictory strategies are being implemented via the Korean Peninsula issue.

For the U.S., though not a core interest, the issue of the Korean Peninsula functions as a strategic pillar for its global strategy. From the perspective of American foreign policy making, how to effectively involve the U.S. in the East Asian regional affairs is a big concern. Actually the United States has several options to engage East Asia. Overall economic cooperation is one option. However, such an option is not completely in line with the ultimate goal of strategic dominance. Hence, to maintain its regional dominance, the United States chooses to take advantage of the security issue, i.e., the instability of the Korean Peninsula to maintain a certain level of tension in the region. In that case, the United States finds itself easy to legitimize its intervention in the Korean issue and play an irreplaceable role as well. From American perspective, this is of vital importance, for the source of instability of the Korean Peninsula helps to legitimize the dominant arm of American strategy in Northeast Asia.

To have a better understanding of the U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia, it is of necessity to note the significant changes that have occurred in the world's behavior patterns in recent years, arising from a global political awakening based on the unprecedented awareness of the importance of sovereignty. In light of this, the U.S. has to find a viable entry point for intervention in Northeast Asia and a compelling reason for such intervention. In effect, it has already found those entry points in problems left over from the Second World War, such as the military confrontation between the two Koreas, the Korean nuclear issue, and the issue of Japan. Therefore, the current problem for the U.S. is not about how to intervene, but how to continue and expand the intervention. Taking advantage of the *Cheonan* incident, the U.S. sought to fully



implement its Asia-Pacific strategy based on the reinforced U.S.-Korea alliance. Without this alliance, it would be very difficult for the U.S. to develop any strategic system in Northeast Asia. For this reason, I have referred to the Korean Peninsula issue as the American “Maginot Line”<sup>7</sup>—once breached, the U.S. regional strategy would fall apart. In other words, a stable Korean Peninsula or the ultimate settlement of the Korean issue would nullify American legitimacy of any future intervention and could even jeopardize the foundations of its regional strategy.

Therefore, the Korean Peninsula indeed poses a problem for the U.S., but the final settlement of the issue would bring about new problems. The reasons for this partly lie in the fact that an uncontrollable situation in the Peninsula would tear apart the U.S. strategic framework in Northeast Asia, for which it would pay a high price. Moreover, complete settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue would strip the U.S. of its strategic pillar in the region, shake its alliance with Japan, and ultimately lead to the collapse of its whole regional strategic system.

All in all, the U.S. regional strategy in Northeast Asia requires a controllable and stable situation in the Korean Peninsula. Without it, the U.S. will not be able to have any entry point for its regional strategy in Northeast Asia. Thus, the ongoing confrontation between the two Koreas serves U.S. strategy.

China’s regional strategy in Northeast Asia is also closely related to the Korean Peninsula issue for two major reasons. From the strategic point of view, the Korean Peninsula is situated at a geo-economic vantage point in Northeast Asia. Presumably, the ultimate settlement of the Korean issue would lead to comprehensive economic cooperation between China’s Northeastern provinces and the Korean Peninsula. This, in turn, would encourage both Japanese and Russian economic participation, and facilitate the development of a regional cooperation system. The U.S. would inevitably face a strategic choice—whether to maintain its hegemonic status and intervene in regional affairs, or to participate in international cooperation on an equal footing. If the former were to happen, China would benefit the most. Based on these theoretical scenarios, it would be impossible for us to estimate the potential negative

impact on China were the issue not to be settled. On the contrary, if future developments on the Korean Peninsula correspond with China's strategic goals, the benefits would be tremendous. Hence, it is safe to conclude that the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula does have a great impact on China's interests.

Second, from the perspective of the grand strategic rivalries between China and the U.S., the impact of the Korean Peninsula issue on China should also not be underestimated. As analyzed above, the issue has practically become a strategic pivot for the U.S. in Northeast Asia, and the U.S. is taking advantage of this to implement its containment strategy toward China. Therefore, if the U.S. succeeded in preventing Northeast Asia from developing its regional organizations and reducing China's development space, the United States would gain an upper hand in the bilateral strategic competition; otherwise, it would lose and China would prevail. In essence, as the center of the strategic game, the Korean Peninsula plays a decisive role in the outcome of strategic competition of all parties involved in Northeast Asia.

### III. CHINA'S POLICY CHOICES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUE

BASED ON the above analysis, it is safe to conclude that the accomplishment of China's regional strategy in Northeast Asia is, to a great extent, determined by the ultimate settlement of the Korean issue. Without a clear understanding of this imperative, China would not view the settlement of the Korean issue as a high priority.

From the perspective of Sino-American strategic competition, if the United States viewed the Korean issue as the focal point in advancing its regional strategy and maintaining its regional dominance, China should also view the Korean issue as the center of its regional strategy. What the two differ is not the end but the means to handle the issue. The United States wishes to maintain a certain level of tension on the peninsula. China should take an opposite approach, that is, to pursue an ultimate settlement of the Korean issue.

In the strategic rivalries between China and the U.S., how could China, which on the defensive, prevail over the United States,

which is on the offensive? The answer is very simple. China does not have to adopt an offensive posture, prepared for a life-and-death struggle with the United States. If China could end the game through peaceful means, China would win the final victory. The most feasible approach to take is the pursuit of an ultimate settlement of the Korean issue. Since it plays a pivotal role in the U.S. Northeast Asian strategy, the removal of this pivot would de-legitimize American strategy of regional dominance and its military presence in the region. Moreover, China will also yield huge economic benefits through the construction of a cooperative regional system in Northeast Asia.

To settle the Korean Peninsula issue, China needs to address three problems: first, how to seek common ground with its neighboring countries in order to reach a more speedy resolution of the issue through international efforts; second, what the ultimate goal of its Korean Peninsula policy should be; and third, how to promote reform and opening up in North Korea and help to integrate it into the international system.

The first topic is based on the hypothesis that common interests are conducive to bringing about some degree of cooperation. Admittedly, I emphasize the incompatibility in the strategic directions of China and the United States, but this does not necessarily mean that the two have no common interests on the Korean Peninsula issue. Neither China nor the U.S. would like to see the situation spiral out of control. This is common ground for China, the U.S. and other countries in the region. This is why China should strengthen cooperation with its neighboring countries on this common ground, especially to reach a considerable degree of consensus on issues such as crisis management and weapons of massive destruction, by seeking a more effective basis for cooperation.

The second question concerns the fundamental goal of China's policy regarding the Korean Peninsula issue. Should China set its goal on the ultimate unification of the two Koreas or simply on the maintenance of stability of a divided Korean Peninsula? This is a significant issue worthy of close scrutiny. At present, there is still no consensus in the Chinese academic circle. Some scholars

worry that the unification of the Korean Peninsula would result in the northward expansion of U.S. influence, and have thus argued that “North Korea is a strategic buffer zone for China” and “the unification of the peninsula would not be favorable for China,” among other views. They favor, in essence, a stable situation of neither unification nor turbulence. These assertions, in effect, have stemmed from theoretical misunderstandings. I give more detailed analysis of this issue in my article entitled, “The Measures, Perspectives and Approaches on the Settlement of the Korean Peninsula Issue.”<sup>8</sup> Here, I would like to stress two points: first, the theoretical misunderstandings on the Korean Peninsula issue result

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from a lack of confidence; and second, China should adhere to a fair and just policy on the issue of unification. The issue of unification will also affect China directly. If our policy “results in misunderstandings among the Korean people that we are hindering the unification of the Korean Peninsula, China will pay a high price,”<sup>9</sup> that is to

say, setting aside morality and justice on this issue will result in a series of negative consequences for China. The best starting point for Chinese strategic policy is peaceful unification on the Korean Peninsula.

The third problem is concerning how to promote a process of reform and opening up in North Korea. A stable, peaceful and prosperous Korean peninsula will help to foster a favorable strategic regional environment for China to implement its Northeast Asia strategy. It also benefits the long-term development and prosperity of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula as a whole. North Korea’s initiation of a reform and opening up drive is also conducive to engendering a soft landing for the ultimate settlement of the conundrum on the Korean Peninsula. However, two hurdles need to be addressed to facilitate North Korea’s reform and opening up. One is its domestic political environment, and the other is the international environment it is confronted with.

With regard to North Korea’s domestic political environment, in spite of the domestic economic difficulties, the North Korean

government has, in principle, rejected the idea of reform and opening up, arguing that reform and opening up means embarking on a capitalist road. Judging from this, some scholars argue that if North Korea does not view it an imperative to initiate the reform and opening up, other countries can do nothing about it. I disagree. Confronted with the formidable domestic crisis, it is simply not sensible to argue that the North Korean government does not wish to get the country out of trouble through reform and opening up. Its reluctance to reform and open up lies more in its immature domestic conditions. To my knowledge, the North Korean government launched pivotal reforms in some rural areas in the mid-1980s with allegedly positive results. However, the process was interrupted by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and other major international incidents in the late 1980s. A further example is, in the early 1990s, the DPRK government set out to establish special economic zones in Rason and Sinuiju. Although this policy bore no significant fruit, it nevertheless indicated the government's willingness to open up. Furthermore, since the start of the famine in the 1990s, North Korea has witnessed the development of a market economy and other positive changes, known as the "arduous march." In contrast to China's reform, which started from the top, the reform in North Korea is to transform the social structure from the bottom up, which was fully reflected in the July 1 Economic Management Improvement Measures ("July 1 Measures" for short). Such changes will lay a solid foundation for future social reforms in North Korea.

With the positive changes in the North Korean government and society, it is highly probable for North Korea to embrace reform and opening up and integrate itself into the international system. China can do a lot to facilitate such a process. For instance, China can encourage its northeastern border area to strengthen its economic cooperation with North Korea to invigorate North Korea's economic system and pump new vitality into its market economy. China can also help North Korea to build special economic zones, which would play a guiding role for the whole economy. The case of Shenzhen in China is a typical example of how the rise of one city can bring about huge social benefits.

Regarding the international environment, North Korea is currently under tremendous international pressure. Under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, comprehensive economic sanctions have been imposed on North Korea, aggravating the country's economic crisis. The UN's demands that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program are justified, as this issue concerns the safety of mankind and poses challenges to the whole world. If North Korea does not give in, there is no effective counter-measure to resolve this issue. The U.S., South Korea and Japan are strengthening sanctions as well as their military alliances to pressure the North, but, objectively speaking, such measures can be counterproductive. A North Korea under great international pressure might think it indispensable to maintain its nuclear deterrence to guarantee its national security. Therefore, imposing sanctions might not be the only measure to settle the nuclear issue. From China's perspective, the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea will definitely pose a threat to peace and stability in Northeast Asia and to China's security as well. Considering this, China stands firmly against the North's nuclear program. However, China believes in adopting more flexible policies to achieve the same goal. Personally, I tend to agree with the "approaching North Korea basket program" proposed by some scholars, who suggest that China needs to construct economic ties with North Korea within the permitted limits under Resolution 1874. Only through strengthening economic ties to integrate North Korea into the international community can North Korea have a better understanding of the huge economic benefits of giving up its nuclear program. In addition, the Six-Party Talks and other international mechanisms need to offer different policy options to North Korea. The Six-Party Talks should broaden their agenda to include the promises of concrete benefits to North Korea if it abandons nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, the Korean Peninsula issue occupies an extremely important position in the ongoing strategic maneuvering between China and the U.S.. For China, there is only one path to victory without resorting to force: settling the Korean Peninsula issue. Here, I would like to make one point clear: I am not suggesting a

showdown between China and the U.S., but an effort to pressure the U.S. to abandon its hegemonic behavior and peacefully accept China's rise, so that the two powers can work together to build a harmonious world that ensures peace and development. There is no reason to turn a cold shoulder to the U.S. if it welcomes emerging powers peacefully and is willing to construct a new system to govern the world together. Finally, I would like to stress that the Korean Peninsula issue has become a key topic for gauging China's diplomatic wisdom, from the perspectives of China's development interests and its strategic maneuvering with the U.S.. China has no time to lose. We are left with only one policy choice, and that is to take the initiative.

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<sup>1</sup> Peng Guangqian, "Meiguo zhanglue dongyi bushi junshixiu (The U.S.'s Eastward Strategic Shift Is Not Merely a Military Show)," *Huanqiu Shibao* (Global Times), February 9, 2012.

<sup>2</sup> Qin Yaqing, Ed., *Daguo guanxi yu zhongguo waijiao* (Relations among Major Countries and China's Diplomacy), p. 306, Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe (World Affairs Press), 2011.

<sup>3</sup> Lee Wenyep, *Study on the Evolution of Policies of China and the U.S. in the Korean Peninsula*, Xianggang Shehui Kexue Chubanshe (Hong Kong Social Sciences Press), October 2003, First Edition, p. 284.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* p. 286.

<sup>5</sup> Quote from Sun Cheng, "Dongya yitihua, zou natiao lu (East Asian Integration: Which Way to Go)," *Huanqiu Shibao* (Global Times), May 10, 2004.

<sup>6</sup> Jin Qiangyi, "Lun zhongguo de dongbeiya quyu zhanlue (On China's Regional Strategy in Northeast Asia)," *Yanbian Daxue Xuebao* (Yanbian University Journal), February 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Jin Qiangyi, "Meiri dongbeiya quyu zhanlue yu chaoxian bandao wenti (Regional Strategies of the U.S. and Japan in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula Issue)," *Dangdai Yatai* (Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), Issue 9, 2004.

<sup>8</sup> Jin Qiangyi, *Jiejue chaoxian bandao wenti de fangfa, shijiao ji luojing xuanze* (The Measures, Perspectives and Approaches on the Settlement of the Korean Peninsula Issue), *Dongbeiya Luntan* (Northeast Asia Forum), Issue 2, 2012.

<sup>9</sup> Xue Haipei, *Zhongguo bixu yao zhichi chaoxian bandao tongyi* (China Must Support the Unification of the Korean Peninsula), Phoenix TV, 08:20 a.m., December 1, 2011, news.ifeng.com.