

# Absorbing the Pivot: Nurturing Sino-Australian Relations

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AUSTRALIA HAS long aspired to play a meaningful role in Asian security politics. In 1995, then Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans proclaimed, “Australia is actively working to create conditions for ‘partnership and engagement,’ based on mutual dependency, reliance and trust with our neighbors in the region. We certainly do not want to repeat the mistakes of the past when Australia for the most part saw its regional neighbors in terms of threat rather than opportunity.”<sup>1</sup> Evans spearheaded what subsequently became known as Australia’s “middle power diplomacy.” More than a decade later, this approach to Australia’s international relations was characterized by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd as (1) working with regional neighbors to strengthen Asia-Pacific order-building; (2) acting in conjunction with other members of the United Nations to meet various pan-global challenges; and (3) remaining a close politico-security partner of the United States on the assumption that “the U.S. continues to be an overwhelming force for good in the world.”<sup>2</sup> Australia’s current Labor government continues to pursue this three-pronged strategy.

To some observers, the first two components of this policy posture appear to contradict directly with the third. A Chinese

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Defense Ministry spokesman, Geng Yansheng, criticized President Barack Obama's announcement made during his November 2011 visit to Australia that the United States would step up military collaboration with its long-time Australian ally. Geng insisted that "any consolidation or expansion of a military alliance that was forged in history is of the Cold-War model."<sup>3</sup> Writing in the *People's Daily*, Chinese analyst Wu Jianmin reiterated this line of thought, concluding that peace, development and cooperation are the predominant trends of the time and would overwhelm those intent on precipitating a new Cold War between China and the United States.<sup>4</sup> The Chinese position is that regional security would be better realized by all concerned states if they engaged in "harmonious world" style diplomacy, embracing a multifaceted combination of diplomatic and economic strategies for eventually realizing common security and equality in international relations.<sup>5</sup> At least some Australian observers concur. Respected defense analyst Hugh White has labeled what he terms the "Obama Doctrine" as a modern-day alliance containment strategy directed toward the People's Republic of China (PRC). In a departure from the harmonious world approach, however, he advocates the U.S. and China gradually forging a regional power-sharing arrangement with other major Asia-Pacific states.<sup>6</sup> Any such arrangement could be pursued bilaterally but would have problems winning regional approval by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and others who prefer using regional security institutions such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) to negotiate multilateral order-building norms and arrangements.

Adopting either "harmonious world" or "power-sharing" approaches for shaping future Asia-Pacific security politics would require a sufficient convergence of the Chinese and American geopolitical outlooks to underpin their implementation—an unlikely prospect over the short-term. There are sufficient common interests shared by the PRC and the U.S., however, to encourage their effective cooperation in such areas as nuclear non-proliferation, international trade and finance, and non-traditional security issues such as counter-terrorism, disaster relief, and pandemic control.

In this context, Australia considers its alliance with the U.S. not as a contradiction of its overall middle power diplomacy but as a

supplement to it and discounts the idea that its alliance relations with Washington constitute support for an anti-China containment strategy. In a recent interview, Australia's Ambassador to the United States, Kim Beazley, underscored this point. He noted that U.S. military power contributes to securing Asia-Pacific and global maritime commerce which, in turn, underwrites regional and international growth and development. Beazley further observed that an American regional strategic presence provides a type of insurance for guaranteeing "[any] bilateral and multilateral resolution of boundary issues and the development of protocols for managing good conduct in the region ... it has nothing to do with containment."

Australia and the United States both understand and accept China's ascension to great power status, and neither Canberra nor Washington "feel entitled to block that, nor [do they have] an interest in doing so." Both do expect China to play an increasingly central role in underwriting law and practices which have been shaped by "common negotiation across the globe."<sup>7</sup> This outlook conforms to Australia's overall middle power ethos—incorporating a judicious combination of one's own and one's security partners' material assets to support regional and global norms and to ensure conflict prevention in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. As China's military capabilities grow over time, Australian policy-makers fully anticipate that Beijing will employ them in ways to enhance order-building and cooperative security as well as to safeguard China's sovereign interests.

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Three ongoing policy challenges relate particularly to how successful Australia will be in projecting its middle power diplomacy into its relations with China and in evaluating its own interests and values relative to broader regional security and international contexts. The first relates to the strategic dialogue

mechanisms China and Australia have created to manage their relationship with respect to a number of bilateral, regional and global issues. The second pertains to Australia's evolving position on multilateral security institutional development in the Asia-Pacific: quadrilateral and trilateral strategic dialogue as well as the EAS. The third concerns how Australia is reconciling its recent intensification of U.S. defense ties with its ongoing policies underwriting Sino-Australian relations. Each of these components will be discussed below.

#### FACILITATING DIALOGUE

VISIBLE PROGRESS HAS been realized by China and Australia in developing consultative ties and improving their bilateral relations since President Hu Jintao's visit to Australia in September 2007. This has accompanied the obvious intensification of China's importance to Australia across a variety of economic, diplomatic and politico-strategic sectors since President Hu and Prime Minister John Howard, during the Chinese leader's trip "Down Under," announced the creation of a strategic dialogue mechanism between their two countries. To what extent the Sino-Australian strategic dialogue enjoys the same weight in Canberra as similar Australian forums carried out with the United States and Japan may be debatable (the *China Daily* predicted in its September 7, 2007 issue that such would be the case).<sup>8</sup> There is no doubt, however, that China's growing importance to Australia has led to consultations and negotiations between the two countries to be viewed by Australian policy-makers amongst the most important in which they engage.

The China-Australia bilateral strategic dialogue process has developed in several distinct phases. In 1997, an "Australia-China Defense Strategic Dialogue" commenced, usually involving Australia's Secretary of Defense (acting on behalf of his Minister) and Chief of the Defense Force engaging in wide-ranging discussions with their Chinese counterparts, normally the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Chief of General Staff. Areas specifically earmarked for defense collaboration and coordinated within this

forum included maritime engagement, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation, senior visits, personnel exchanges and educational and professional opportunities, and peacekeeping cooperation.<sup>9</sup> In February 2008, an upgraded annual Strategic Dialogue involving the Australian and Chinese foreign ministers commenced in Canberra, with discussions touching on such sensitive issues as the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and the South Pacific island states. In an address in early 2012 marking the 40th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Australian relations, Chen Yuming, China's Ambassador to Australia, observed that "strategic dialogue mechanisms continue to develop." He described the China-Australia defense strategic consultation process as one of the "most senior and most effective defense dialogues that China has established with Western countries ... such in-depth and candid exchanges help enhance mutual understanding and trust between the two sides and reduce misjudgment."<sup>10</sup>

China and Australia have accelerated their defense and security cooperation beyond engaging in dialogue. Joint naval exercises (including a live-fire maneuver conducted off the coast of China in September 2010) have become more common and a joint disaster relief exercise (*Cooperation Spirit 2011*) was also recently conducted in Sichuan.<sup>11</sup> With more than 3,500 of its civilian and military personnel serving in various peacekeeping operations across the globe, Australia respects China's visibly growing role in United Nations peacekeeping ventures (China now contributes the largest number of forces to such operations).<sup>12</sup> Australian policy planners view joint exercises with PLA components as enhancements of regional confidence-building and transparency. For China, they widen the scope of defense diplomacy and interaction with an American ally that enjoys access to U.S. "world standard" operational procedures and provide an opportunity for China to exercise "soft power" in non-traditional security areas of military activity.<sup>13</sup> There is, of course, an inherently competitive element embedded within this type of bilateral interaction. By presenting itself to Australia as a relatively benign security partner, China may hope to counter what it sees as the image of a more aggressive United States now moving to strengthen its Asia-Pacific strategic

role via its adoption of the so-called “pivot strategy” (discussed in more detail below).

Sino-Australian bilateral security relations have matured to the point where both the Australian and Chinese governments realize that while they both desire regional stability and prosperity they may sometimes have differences on how that common objective should be achieved. China remains skeptical about Australia’s alliance with the U.S. and critical of rationales for future Australian defense spending being directly linked, in Australian defense white papers and other official Australian policy statements, to China’s military capabilities. It resents intermittent Australian efforts to block Chinese investments in Australia on national security grounds. Australia questions Chinese diplomatic behavior toward the Korean peninsula and its military posturing in the South China Sea. It also remains wary of China’s legal system and human rights practices which successive Australian governments have viewed as being markedly different from their own. All of these factors, however, are subsumed relative to the common Chinese and Australian recognition that a generally positive Sino-Australian relationship will augment both countries’ economic and political environment and give both of them a better chance to identify and shape common norms and interests to their mutual benefit.

#### PURSUING MULTILATERAL SECURITY

BOTH CHINA and Australia have been active players in the development of Asia-Pacific security institutions. After initially preferring to deal with regional neighbors bilaterally on territorial disputes and issues relating to preventive diplomacy, China has, since the mid-1990s, become a key player in the region’s multilateral security politics. It does not currently entertain a distinct grand strategy for regional integration or community-building but has instead employed various multilateral instrumentalities to fulfill its short-term, pragmatic interests. Australia has participated in most key Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions and recently promoted a “grand vision” for regional security architecture-building—the Asia-Pacific community (APC). That initiative yielded mixed



results. Australian policy-makers claim that the APc's objectives and frameworks have been largely absorbed into the EAS; critics have pointed to the initial lack of Australian consultation with regional elites, and an implied assumption in introducing the APc that ASEAN's leadership in regional multilateral politics was inadequate and was instrumental in leading to the proposal's demise at a key December 2009 conference in Sydney.<sup>14</sup> The episode underscored Australia's determination to apply middle power diplomacy toward shaping longer-term trends in regional order-building but, as will be discussed below, was distorted by geopolitics trumping normativism.

During the mid-1990s, the United States reiterated its commitment to its Asia-Pacific bilateral alliances, and intermittently deployed naval task forces in Northeast Asia (adjacent to the Korean peninsula and Taiwan) to constrain North Korea and China in what Washington regarded to be inappropriate and dangerous strategic behavior. Under these circumstances, China began to view multilateral security diplomacy more favorably than before and as an "optimal means to diminish American military pressure."<sup>15</sup> In following this reasoning, the PRC joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), introduced its "New Security Concept," and assumed a leading role in the Six-Party Talks about the Korean Peninsula. Its propensity to become more extensively involved in multilateral security diplomacy facilitates Chinese threat reduction objectives when using its own military strength to do so appears less promising. In this context, China's overall national security interests can be enhanced while "avoiding harm" by directly confronting states hostile to it, with all the risks such confrontations entail.<sup>16</sup> This cautious and relative gains approach to regional institutions contradicts the standard liberal argument that multilateralism is inherently a process that yields absolute gains (all institutional adherents win through their mutual participation in an institution over the long-term) and that distinct rules and norms will apply to all.<sup>17</sup> China instead negotiates its national security issues multilaterally when it believes that by doing so its core national security and sovereign interests will not be compromised. This behavior is not that much different from

postures observed by successive U.S. presidential administrations in the post-Cold War era.

Australian policy-makers publicly characterize their own country's pursuit of multilateralism in Asia-Pacific as intended to facilitate "institutions which are capable of creating a culture and a practice of cooperation, as opposed to a culture and practice of conflict."<sup>18</sup> This approach is consistent with middle power-oriented philosophy and behavior. Its promotion of the APc, however, was not completely consistent with liberal-institutionalist motives. A Wikileaks cable that surfaced in December 2010 reported that in a briefing with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then Prime Minister Rudd indicated that his promotion of the APc was actually designed to prevent Chinese regional dominance and U.S. strategic marginalization from the Asia-Pacific. Rudd allegedly told Clinton that he, Rudd, was a "brutal realist on China."<sup>19</sup> Independent observers could not be blamed for concluding that, at least in this instance, Australian policy was privileging the U.S. alliance over the development of a multilateral regional security order. A more nuanced interpretation, however, would be that Rudd was juggling the traditional Australian concern of not being strategically abandoned by "its great and powerful [American] friend" with an appeal for the United States to become more committed to the region's ongoing multilateral security politics.<sup>20</sup>

If this latter interpretation is correct, Australian regional security policy can be interpreted as embracing a complicated mix of power-balancing and commitment to institution-building. The following constitute at least part of Australia's multilateral security policy:

- To collaborate with Washington toward identifying a judicious balance between preserving traditional U.S.-led bilateral alliances' relevance to regional security and fostering more confidence-building and security cooperation within regional institutions as a means of spreading the costs and responsibilities for maintaining Asian-Pacific security. In this scenario, China would be encouraged to continue its quest to become an integral player or "responsible stakeholder" in regional institution-building;



- To cultivate, where appropriate, pluralateralist responses (three or four “leading states” shaping coordinated responses to various non-traditional and selected traditional security contingencies) as a means of pursuing cooperative security with long-standing partners such as Japan. These “non-state-threat-centric” issues encompass natural disasters, pandemics, terrorism and maritime security, coordinating responses with other Asia-Pacific states beyond an “alliance spokes” framework; and
- To work with China, India, Japan and the United States in ways required to strengthen regional confidence-building and to safeguard against future “shocks” destabilizing long-term stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. Such shocks could include the outbreak of renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula with ramifications for all of Northeast Asia (much of Australia’s trade is conducted with this sub-region); a global oil crisis or a military crisis in the Middle East/Persian Gulf that spills over into Asia; renewed tensions in the East China Sea; intensified tensions in the South China Sea; or the emergence of a failed state in South Asia, Northeast Asia or (less likely) Southeast Asia would utilize such threats as terrorism, nuclear weapons, or blockade of key maritime passages.

A key challenge for both Australia and China, therefore, is to cultivate multilateral security politics with the common objective of maximizing genuine community-building and minimizing regional tensions and rivalries. They must do so while still respecting each others’ different views and approaches over which multilateral institutions may take precedence at a given time and circumstance. Accordingly, Australia must accord China the prerogative to develop various institutional arrangements such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ASEAN+3, or Trilateral

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Summit (involving China, Japan and South Korea) where Australia is not a member. China, in turn, must cede to Australia the right to integrate the latter's involvement in the American bilateral alliance system with newer forms of regional collective security such as the EAS and the ARF. Where Chinese and Australian policy can dovetail is a mutual desire to steer regional alliances away from threat response strategy and more toward order-building. There is not now—nor will there be anytime soon—a single, overriding regional architecture able to mitigate the diversity of national security interests held by each Asia-Pacific state. Future distribution of regional power will be largely determined by economic trajectories, the relative coherence of diplomatic approaches to structural change and the levels of transparency that can be developed relative to states' intentions, capabilities, and expectations of others.<sup>21</sup>

#### RECONCILING THE "PIVOT"

DURING HIS November 2011 visit to Australia, President Obama announced that the United States would commence small, rotating (six month), deployments of U.S. Marines near Darwin in 2012, beginning with 250 during 2012 and building up to 2,500 by 2016. Reaction to this American initiative varied, but the key question for Australian policy-makers is to what extent their country can accommodate an upgraded American strategic presence in Australia and along the major Indo-Pacific littorals while still sustaining a viable relationship with the PRC?

Sino-Australian bilateral relations will remain sound as long as it is in the best interests of both China and Australia to interact with each other on the merits of that relationship. U.S. policy planners recognize this and are not intent on applying excessive leverage over Australia to the extent that the United States' strategic relationship with its Antipodean ally would be viewed as marginalizing or containing the PRC. They are more inclined to support a stable and enduring Sino-Australian bilateral relationship as an important component of Asia-Pacific growth and prosperity. President Obama underscored this U.S. position during his address to the

Australian Parliament: “The notion that we fear China is mistaken. The notion that we are looking to exclude China is mistaken ... We welcome a rising, peaceful China.” The President issued a caveat to the above declarations, however, by warning that “It’s important for them [the Chinese] to play by the rules of the road and, in fact, help underwrite the rules that have allowed [them] so much remarkable economic progress.”<sup>22</sup> The U.S. move to upgrade its strategic presence in the region therefore can be interpreted as an initiative to ensure that the United States will participate as a key power in the region’s order-building and prosperity, and be perceived by regional states as assuming such a position rather than as any U.S. move to contain or marginalize other regional powers. The challenge facing Washington is that the timing of its initiative is difficult, given the United States growing national debt, high unemployment and aging infrastructure—all central campaign issues in the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign and all problems that are *not* shared with its Australian ally.

The Australian decision to support a “pivot” strategy emanates more from a broader geopolitical perspective of structural shifts in regional and international security politics than from merely focusing on a rising China. Asia is, as a respected Lowy Institute for International Policy analyst has noted, part of a “grand Indo-Pacific system” through which much of the world’s energy supplies and commerce flow. As a regional maritime second-tier power, Australia’s economic and strategic lifelines transverse this system. However, the limited size of its population (only around 23 million) combines with a comparatively low level of defense expenditures to require Australia to collaborate with such maritime powers as the United States, India, Japan and Indonesia to build an “Indo-Pacific order.” China is not necessarily excluded from this arrangement but it will need to accede to the strategic objectives and normative values that bind the other associated states to an extent that it can be accepted

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into this broader network.<sup>23</sup> The deployment of U.S. Marines at Darwin, a location which can be viewed as a crossroads between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, fits into the evolving U.S. “Air/Sea Battle Doctrine.” That doctrine emphasizes the dispersal of U.S. offshore (air and naval) forces to less strategically vulnerable positions in the region, and greater access to ports, training bases, and other installations across a wide Indo-Pacific swath, to enhance force rapid response and mobility in that theater of operations. Plans are reportedly in place to reposition some American military equipment in Australia to facilitate such a capability.<sup>24</sup>

At least some Australian analysts have warned that Australia needs to observe limits in associating with such an American strategy if the U.S. becomes too obsessed with just countering Chinese capabilities. They argue that, if such obsession materializes, the independence of Australian sovereign decision-making could be at stake.<sup>25</sup> Retaining such independence while still accessing U.S. intelligence, defense technologies, and training cooperation could prove to be extremely difficult as New Zealand discovered when it intensified its dispute with the United States over nuclear deterrence policy in the mid-1980s. No other country can or would offer Australia the security guarantees and benefits it now enjoys from sustaining the alliance. It is unlikely that China or any other country would be successful in leveraging its trade ties with Australia against this defense relationship. China is better off continuing to pursue its own bilateral relationship with the Australians, on their own merits, as long as the American alliance does not directly threaten China’s fundamental national security interests. To date, there is no evidence that any “ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) threat” against China has emerged or will do so anytime soon.

What are the actual strategic consequences of the Darwin deployment decision? Overall, it should not be read as substantially changing the region’s balance of power, notwithstanding its symbolic importance. A few thousand Marines deployed intermittently, thousands of miles from China’s borders or even from contested territories in the Sea of Japan or South China Sea, will do little to threaten China directly. At the most, as Rory

Medcalf has observed, such a contingent might play a minor supplementary role in conducting a blockade of oil supplies traversing through the Indian Ocean to China during a future Sino-American crisis.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, Australia has little to fear in terms of an immediate threat environment (none of the ASEAN members would or could invade that country) and thus has little real interest in allowing the U.S. to project significant military power from Australian shores. Accordingly, any U.S. operations conducted from Australia would be inherently low-key. Reports that U.S. submarines would eventually be deployed at HMAS Stirling naval base near Rockingham, and that U.S. long-range bombers would increasingly use the Delamare weapons range, often underplay that such visits have long been common in ANZUS alliance operations.

#### CONCLUSION

IN HIS classic study on the role of perception in shaping the views of international relations decision-makers, Robert Jervis warns that without taking steps to increase the degree to which “disciplined intelligence” can prevail over “unfounded images,” the pursuit of solid policy alternatives is likely to occur.<sup>27</sup> Resorting to worst case analysis without substantive evidence to justify it has led to tragic conflicts in the past and is a contemporary danger that Asia-Pacific policy elites must clearly avoid. China must work diligently to avoid reaching premature conclusions about why Australia is collaborating with the United States in facilitating the Obama Doctrine’s implementation. Australia, in turn, must exert substantial energy to convince Beijing that its own strategic interests will not be unduly compromised by greater ANZUS collaboration as the United States winds down its military presence in Afghanistan and the Middle East. The U.S. will need to be more convincing than it has been to date in conveying the message that it is not containing China but is inviting Chinese partnership in shaping a new Asia-Pacific security order. China, in turn, will need to apply Jervis’s advice on avoiding misperception by becoming more amenable to considering policy alternatives on how to manage regional crises on the Korean peninsula, in the South China Sea, and elsewhere.

The future of Asia-Pacific stability is at an important historical crossroads. The challenge for all three countries under review here is to sustain and expand existing dialogues and find new ones for communicating their interests and concerns to each other. It may well be that the three sets of bilateral ties (Sino-Australian, Sino-American, and Australian-American) are now sufficiently mature to warrant consideration of the creation of a trilateral security dialogue to discuss such mutual concerns as energy and resource access, nuclear non-proliferation, and disaster relief. Such a dialogue might help underwrite the effectiveness of those multilateral institutions in which all three countries are participants. However future dialogues unfold between them, all three countries need to assign to the development of mutually agreeable and beneficial security relations the emphasis needed to avoid unacceptable and dangerous security dilemmas in the Asia-Pacific.

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<sup>1</sup> Senator the Hon Gareth Evans, "Australia, China and the Region," address to the Chinese Association of Victoria and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Victoria, Melbourne, August 24, 1995, [www.dfat.gov.au/archive/speeches\\_old/minfor/geccc.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/archive/speeches_old/minfor/geccc.html) (accessed 21 April 2012).

<sup>2</sup> Kevin Rudd, remarks reprinted as "Middle Power Diplomacy: Advancing Australia's Interests," *webdiary*, March 26, 2008, [webdiary.com.au/cms/?q=node/2318](http://webdiary.com.au/cms/?q=node/2318) (accessed 21 April 2012).

<sup>3</sup> "China Rebukes U.S.-Australian Alliance," CNC World, December 1, 2011, [www.cncworld.tv/news/v\\_show/20250\\_China\\_rebukes\\_U.S.-Australian\\_alliance.shtml](http://www.cncworld.tv/news/v_show/20250_China_rebukes_U.S.-Australian_alliance.shtml) (accessed April 21, 2011).

<sup>4</sup> Wu Jianmin, "Will Obama Doctrine Lead to New Cold War?" *People's Daily Online*, December 18, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Tsai Tung-Chieh, Hung Ming-Te and Tony Tai-Ting Liu, "China's Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: Harmonious Worldview and Its Impact on Good Neighbor Diplomacy," *Journal of Con-*



*temporary Eastern Asia*, 10(1) 2011, pp. 25–42.

<sup>6</sup> Hugh White, “The Obama Doctrine,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 25, 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Beazley’s interview appears in Eddie Walsh, “How Australia Sees America,” *The Diplomat*, April 14, 2012, [the-diplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2012/04/14/how-australia-sees-america/](http://the-diplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2012/04/14/how-australia-sees-america/) (accessed April 22, 2012).

<sup>8</sup> As cited by Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Myanmar Challenges China’s Success,” *Comparative Connections*, October 2007, [csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/0703qchina\\_southeastasia.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/0703qchina_southeastasia.pdf) (accessed April 22, 2012).

<sup>9</sup> For a general overview of such discussions, see Australian Department of Defence, “13th Annual Australia-China Defence Strategic Dialogue Nantong, China,” Media Release, December 17, 2010, [www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=11232](http://www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=11232) (accessed April 22, 2012).

<sup>10</sup> His Excellency Ambassador Chen Yuming, “Mutual Benefit Comes Only with Mutual Respect and Mutual Trust—Inspiration from 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Australia,” Speech at the Defense and Security Luncheon Hosted by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 22, 2012, [www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t908164.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t908164.htm) (accessed April 23, 2012).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*; Australian Minister of Defence, “Address to the Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,” Curtin University, Perth, November 10, 2011, [www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/11/10/minister-for-defence-address-to-the-australian-member-committee-of-the-council-for-security-cooperation-in-the-asia-pacific/](http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/11/10/minister-for-defence-address-to-the-australian-member-committee-of-the-council-for-security-cooperation-in-the-asia-pacific/) (accessed April 23, 2012).

<sup>12</sup> Australian Centre on China and the World (ACCW), Australian National University, Canberra and China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, *Australia and China: A Joint Report on the Bilateral Relationship* (Canberra and Beijing: ACCW and CICIR, February 2012), p. 34.

<sup>13</sup> Wilson Chau, “Defence Cooperation: What Does Beijing Want?” *Lowy Interpreter*, December 20, 2011, [www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/12/20/Defence-cooperation-what-does-Beijing-want.aspx](http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/12/20/Defence-cooperation-what-does-Beijing-want.aspx) (accessed April 23, 2012); and Wilson Chau, “Explaining China’s Interpretation in Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises,” *Security Challenges*, 7(3) 2011, pp. 51–69.

<sup>14</sup> Rowan Callick, “Dysfunctional Diplomacy,” *The Australian*, January 15, 2010.

<sup>15</sup> Taek Goo Kang, “Assessing China’s Approach to Regional Multilateral Security Cooperation,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 64(4) 2010, pp. 407–408. A comprehensive background on the development of Chinese policies toward multilateralism is Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne (eds), *China Turns to Multilateralism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

<sup>16</sup> Kang, “Assessing China’s Approach,” pp. 414–15.

<sup>17</sup> John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

<sup>18</sup> The Hon Kevin Rudd MP, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Transcript of Interview with Linda Mottram, ABC Radio Canberra,” October 28, 2010, [www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2010/kr\\_tr\\_101028\\_abc\\_radio\\_canberra.html](http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2010/kr_tr_101028_abc_radio_canberra.html) (accessed April 25, 2012).

<sup>19</sup> Daniel Flitton, “Rudd the Butt of Wikileaks Expose,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 6, 2010.

<sup>20</sup> The classical study of Australian apprehensions re alliance abandonment is Alan Renouf’s *The Frightened Country* (Melbourne: Macmillan 1979).

<sup>21</sup> Malcolm Cook, Raoul Heinrichs, Rory Medcalf and Andrew Shearer, *Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures* (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy/MacArthur Foundation, 2010), pp. 77–79.

<sup>22</sup> “Obama Boosts U.S. Military in Australia, Reassures China,” *Reuters*, November 16, 2011, [www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-usa-australia-idUSTRE7AF0F220111116](http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-usa-australia-idUSTRE7AF0F220111116) (accessed April 26, 2012).

<sup>23</sup> Rory Medcalf, "Our Chance to Align With the U.S. Pivot Point," *The Australian*, November 15, 2011.

<sup>24</sup> Rory Medcalf, "Obama in Australia: Balancing not Containment," *Foreign Policy*, December 16, 2011, [www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/obama-in-australia-balancing-not-containment/](http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/obama-in-australia-balancing-not-containment/) (accessed April 26, 2012).

<sup>25</sup> See, for example, Peter Leahy, "Australia Can't Get Too Close to the U.S.," *The Australian*, April 12, 2012.

<sup>26</sup> Medcalf, "Obama in Australia."

<sup>27</sup> Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 10.