

Crisis Management in the Current Sino-Japanese Relations^{*}

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Starting from September 2012, the relations between China and Japan have kept deteriorating due to the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. It has become increasingly difficult for both sides to solve this problem through diplomatic channels. On December 26, 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine exacerbated the bilateral relations between China and Japan, and the sparkle of rapprochement fizzled out.¹ The territorial dispute, which is intertwined with the more complicated and emotional historical issues, plus the shift of the balance of power and the exacerbation of the security dilemma, have endangered the future of Sino-Japanese relations. Though it is still far for both governments to talk about a war against the other, no one can rule out the possibility of an incident on the Diaoyu Islands that might escalate into a military confrontation between China and Japan. Considering the complexity and uniqueness of Sino-Japanese relations, once armed conflict breaks out, the crisis would escalate rapidly and eventually goes out of control. Hence, how to manage the Sino-Japanese relations from the perspective of crisis management is an urgent challenge faced by decision-makers of both countries.

* This article is originally written in Chinese and translated by Zhao Hanyu.

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I. WHY IS CRISIS MANAGEMENT CRUCIAL
FOR DEALING WITH THE CURRENT CHINA-JAPANESE RELATIONS?

Since Shinzo Abe came to power in late 2012, Japan's security policy has been undergoing rapid transformation, as seen in such evidences as pushing forth the agenda of revising the constitutional interpretation of the right of collective self-defense,² establishing the National Security Council, enacting for the first time the National Security Strategy of Japan, promulgating the new National Defense Program Guideline and Medium-Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) ahead of schedule, increasing the defense budget for the first time in the past decade, deploying special forces to strengthen the defense of contested islands, and conducting joint military exercise (simulating combats to regain the islands) with its American ally. All moves are likely targeted at China.

On the part of China, it has begun to integrate coastal defense forces in recent years. The China Coast Guard (CCG) was established, and new fleets particularly designed for "seizing islands" have been tested. With the first aircraft carrier battle group being formed and successful launch of nuclear submarine-based and land-based strategic missiles, China has obtained a strong Anti Access/Area Denial capability in its coastal waters. In addition, the People's Liberation Army has frequently conducted integrated military exercises and the Chinese Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced the establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea. All moves not only demonstrate Chinese determination to safeguard its sovereign territory and maritime interest, but also indicate the possibility of solving the territorial dispute by force.

As Sino-Japanese relations have encapsulated multiple complicated factors, including geopolitics, balance of power, security dilemma, historical animosity, nationalist sentiment, and domestic politics, the increasing tension between

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the two countries can hardly be relieved in the short term. The improvement of the bilateral relations will be a lasting gradual process. During the process, the crisis escalation of the Diaoyu Islands dispute would be the most probable one to exacerbate the relations that can be imagined. If an armed conflict breaks out and develops into a full-scale confrontation between China and Japan, the whole blueprint for China's Reform and Opening-up and regional peace and security in East Asia will be jeopardized. Though the possibility of aggression from one side cannot be ruled out, the military conflict seems more likely to be inadvertent, resulting from an accidental clash between Chinese and Japanese public service vessels or aircrafts during their patrols of law enforcement and sovereignty.

On the issue of the Diaoyu Islands, the Abe administration continually denies the existence of a territorial dispute. After the Japanese government purchased three of the contested islets from a private owner in September 2012, the China Coast Guard began regularizing patrols within the 12-nautical-mile territorial waters of the islands in order to challenge the Japanese stance and proclaim China's sovereign rights over the territory.³ Standoffs on the sea occurred frequently, as Japan Coast Guard (JCG)'s vessels intercepted Chinese ships in the name of law enforcement and their Chinese counterparts persisted in regular patrols around the islands with the same rationale. Hence, the risk of collisions and the subsequent damages or even casualties should not be excluded.

The same also occurs between military jets from both sides. Aircrafts are of higher speed and thus more difficult to control, thus increasing the possibility of accidents. Although Chinese and Japanese military planes have not yet encountered each other over the islands, in the airspace over the East China Sea, especially the overlapping part of the ADIZs of China and Japan, military planes from the two countries have encountered each other several times. Both countries blamed each other for provocation, causing attention from the international community. According to the Chinese media report, on May 24 2014, an OP-3C aircraft and a YS-11EB aircraft of Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF)'s broke into China's ADIZ over the East China Sea to gather information on the Sino-Russian

joint maritime military exercise. Chinese military planes made a scramble against them in order to ensure the safety of aircrafts and fleets in the exercise.⁴ However, the Japanese side reported: Chinese Su-27 fighters flew “abnormally close” to aircrafts of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) over the high seas; and the Chinese aircraft approached about 50 meters away from the MSDF’s OP-3C aircraft, and it came as close as about 30 meters to the ASDF’s YS-11EB aircraft. Japan’s Defense Minister Onodera revealed his concern that “this is dangerous behavior as one small mistake could have led to an accident.”⁵

Less than one month later, a similar situation occurred again. According to the Chinese Ministry of Defense, on June 11 when the Chinese Air Force carried out regular surveillance in the ADIZ over the East China Sea, from 10:17 to 10:28 a.m. a Chinese Tu-154, flying normally near the coastal area of China, was approached by two Japanese F-15 fighters. At one point, they came as close as about 30 meters to the Chinese aircraft. The same morning, one YS-11EB and one OP-3C of the JSDF conducted reconnaissance missions in China’s ADIZ and two Chinese J-11 fighters scrambled to identify Japanese aircrafts and kept a distance of more than 150 meters to them. The Chinese MOD spokesman claimed that the operation by Chinese pilots was professional, rule-based and with restraint, but the Japanese behavior was dangerous and obviously provocative.⁶ The MOD also publicized video materials to reveal the reconnaissance by Japanese military planes and to demonstrate that the Japanese accusation was not legitimate.⁷ However, their Japanese counterpart claimed that Chinese Su-27 fighters flew abnormally close to the MSDF and ASDF aircrafts over the high seas where Japan’s ADIZ overlaps with that of China. Chinese fighters approached 30m and 45m away from the ASDF and MSDF aircrafts.⁸ Meanwhile, the Japanese government denied that Japanese fighters had flown abnormally close to the Chinese Tu-154, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga requested the Chinese government to remove the video from the MOD website. As it stands, tension between China and Japan on the encounters over the East China Sea is nearly approaching a flashpoint.

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It is hard to imagine that either Beijing or Tokyo would deliberately fight a war over the Diaoyu Islands. Nevertheless, given the dynamics of the Sino-Japanese relations, the international situation and the domestic politics in both countries, if confrontation occurs out of a certain incident, the war-threatening crisis would escalate rapidly, for neither side wants to be perceived as a coward in the conflict. Both will try to make the adversary pay a heavier cost through

crisis escalation. Otherwise, the government in each country will face a backlash from its own people, which may even undermine political stability of those in power.

Based on the observation above, it can be concluded that the Diaoyu Islands dispute has plunged the Sino-Japanese relations to a crisis state. The international crisis discussed in the studies of international relations generally includes three factors: (1) Policy-makers perceive that the action or threatened action of another international actor side seriously impairs concrete national interests, the country's bargaining reputation of the former, or their own ability to remain in power; (2) Policy-makers perceive that any actions on their part designed to counter this threat will raise a significant prospect of war; (3) Policy-makers perceive themselves to be acting under time constraints.⁹ All the three factors are there now in the Sino-Japanese relations. First, both Beijing and Tokyo regard the territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands a core national interest and would not make any concession. Second, there is a possibility of armed conflict or even war in the process of the stand-off and confrontation. And third, decision-makers in both China and Japan need to react to contingencies under time pressure.

Based on his rich experience and sharp acumen, Richard Bush, Director of Center for East Asian Policy Studies of the Brookings Institution and former Chairman of the Board of the American

Institute in Taiwan, diagnosed the security issues of Sino-Japanese relations in his book, *The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations*, published in 2010. He carefully describes the scenario in which China and Japan have a clash over the Diaoyu Islands and highlights the difficulty of crisis management for both countries. Bush's analyses deserve our attention and a large space for citation here.¹⁰

Richard Bush argues that, as each country strongly believes the islands to be its sacred, sovereign territory, "a clash between East Asia's most robust navy and air force (Japan's) and those of a China in revival is not impossible." In this scenario, China's Marine Surveillance Force (MSF)¹¹ would challenge the perimeters that the JCG maintains around the Diaoyu Islands. Because the JCG's rules of engagement are ambiguous, a JCG ship would then ram an MSF vessel to prevent the intrusion. Surface ships of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the MSDF would then hurry to the area and take up positions. Planes of Japan's ASDF and the Chinese Air Force would soon hover overhead. Submarines would lurk below. Ships of the two navies would maneuver for position. And although fairly tight rules of engagement regulate the units of each military, they may not be exactly appropriate for this situation, leaving local commanders a modest opportunity for independent action in the heat of the moment.¹²

Richard Bush continues, "Chinese strategic culture, with its emphasis on preemption and preserving initiative, could come into play. Perhaps the captain of a PLAN ship sees fit to fire at an MSDF vessel. The MSDF vessel returns fire, because its commander believes that doing so is the proper response and does not wish to be overruled by cautious civilian bureaucrats in Tokyo. Planes of two air forces get involved."¹³ Bernard Cole from the US Army War College predicted several years ago that the MSDF's "significantly more advanced naval capabilities would, if employed, almost certainly cause the destruction of PLAN units, with significant loss of life."¹⁴

At some point, commanders in the field would have to inform their headquarters in each capital about the incident. Based on the experience of the US-China jet collision in 2001, Bush argues that in

the Diaoyu/Senkaku scenario, civilian and military decision-makers in Tokyo and Beijing would not receive a completely accurate picture. He incisively points out,

“They would have to respond in a fog of uncertainty, giving free rein to a variety of psychological and organizational factors that would affect the handling of information. The military services would have a monopoly on information, impeding the voicing of contrarian views. The preexisting beliefs of each side about the other would distort their views of the reports from the field. Each side also would likely be subject to ‘attribution error’— the tendency to judge one’s own actions in the best possible light and those of the adversary in the worst. Groupthink, the temptation to shade reports so that they are consistent with what are assumed to be the leaders’ views, and a tendency to withhold contrarian views in a tense situation would be at play.”¹⁵

According to Richard Bush, decision-makers, working with distorted information, then must try to prevent the clash from escalating into a full-blown crisis without appearing to back down. To be clear, civilian leaders in neither China nor Japan would desire a wider conflict. Neither would want to see a serious deterioration in bilateral relations. Each country gains much from economic cooperation with the other. If the two leading countries of East Asia could not coexist, the leaders of each would conclude that they had failed. Yet even if objective interests would dictate a mutual retreat from the brink, leaders may see some outcomes, especially the appearance of capitulation, as worse than a growing conflict. And engineering a retreat from the brink would require great skill. It needs the interface between senior military officers and civilian officials, which China and Japan both have problems in this regard. The structure and process of decision-making in Japan and China also play an important role, and the matter of domestic politics, nationalist sentiments and other intersecting factors have to be taken into account. Therefore, handling the complex system properly would be highly challenging.¹⁶

As it stands, the Sino-Japanese relations are in a real crisis. And the uniqueness of the bilateral relations and each country's own problems make the task of crisis management very difficult. Hence, crisis management has become more significant for both China and Japan.

II. IS CRISIS MANAGEMENT POSSIBLE FOR CHINA AND JAPAN?

The prerequisite for managing the crises between China and Japan is that decision-makers in both countries must fully see the importance of Sino-Japanese relations and the value of the other country in ensuring one's own core national interests by drawing on the basic experience and lessons over the two-millennium history of Sino-Japanese interactions which features "peaceful co-existence benefitting both, and confrontation hurting two sides." With regard to the territorial dispute concerning the Diaoyu Islands, leaders in both China and Japan need to reach a basic consensus that the issue of Diaoyu Islands cannot be resolved by force. Any armed conflict or war at the worst over the islands between the two neighbors would not be in the long-term interest of both sides, but would only bring disaster to the people of both countries. Therefore, they should make every effort to avoid it.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has emphasized the importance of Sino-Japanese relations on several occasions. On January 25, 2013 when meeting with Natsuo Yamaguchi, head of the Komei Party in Japan, he said that, in the new era, leaders of China and Japan should learn from leaders of the older generation of both countries to show their obligations to the state, their political insights and responsibilities to history, and overcome difficulties to press forward with the development of Sino-Japanese relations.¹⁷ On June 5, 2014, in his visit to Japan, Tang Jiaxuan, the former State Councilor and President of the China-Japan Friendship

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Association, also stressed the critical role of crisis management in handling the current relations between China and Japan. When answering a question about how the two countries should deal with the Diaoyu Islands issue, Tang replied, “Currently, the most urgent task is to build a sort of [crisis] management mechanism, and based on that mechanism we can further discuss about how to face the reality and how to find solutions to existing problems.”¹⁸ On May 9, 2014, Cheng Yonghua, Chinese Ambassador to Japan, attended the Ninth Japan-China Dialogue (*rizhong kenhuahui*) and gave a speech entitled “China-Japan Relations: Difficulty and Solution”. In the speech, Ambassador Cheng put forward four specific suggestions: First, to tackle the major political obstacles, including historical issues and the Diaoyu Islands dispute, which is the only way to improve the relations between the two countries; second, to do a good job in crisis management to prevent a clash, which is the bottom line to be held in relations between the two countries; third, to maintain and promote cooperation, which is the necessary guarantee to maintain the relations between the two countries; and fourth, to avoid misperception and miscalculation and establish a positive policy tone, which is the fundamental requirement for the relations between the two countries to get back to the right tract.¹⁹

The Japanese side seems to be more enthusiastic in crisis management. Prime Minister Abe, although right-winged politically, has taken quite a number of steps to press forward with the revision of Japan’s security policy, lifting the ban on the right to collective self-defense and stubbornly denying the existence of territorial dispute between Japan and China. On several occasions, however, he acknowledged that the relationship with China was one of the most important bilateral relationships for Japan besides acknowledging the importance of building a crisis management mechanism. Some influential members of the Abe cabinet, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera, all emphasized that Japan and China should establish and improve a mechanism for crisis management as soon as possible. Hence, the decision-makers of both China and Japan are basically in agreement on the importance of Sino-Japanese relations and the necessity of risk

control. This has prepared the basic condition for crisis management in the two countries.

Moreover, marine law enforcement agencies, the military and other policy implementation departments in both countries seem also to have acquired a basic consensus regarding the necessity to strengthen crisis management and avoid inadvertent clash at the current state of Sino-Japanese relations. For the strong policy nature and operability of crisis management, it is required that officials executing the policy at all levels must be clear-minded, strictly abide by discipline, and be effective in communication and able to cope with the situation flexibly. “To act on just grounds, to one’s advantage and with restraint” (*youli, youli, youjie*) is a golden rule prevailing among the Chinese. However, it is one thing to talk about it, but quite another to apply it in practice. To our relief, policy implementation personnel in both China and Japan have been rather cautious so far. In April 22-23, 2014, senior naval officers from 21 countries in the Asia-Pacific attended the West Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) in Qingdao, China. During the meeting, Admiral Wu Shengli, the Chinese Navy Commander, stated that anything could occur in the East China Sea, including a clash between China and Japan, but the critical thing is to prevent both navies from armed conflict.²⁰ Katsutoshi Kawano, the Chief of Staff of the Japan MSDF, also suggested that China and Japan should establish an instant communication mechanism in case of any contingencies.²¹

Furthermore, current international law, regimes and norms also provide valuable reference to China and Japan on crisis management. Despite China and Japan stand off on and over the East China Sea, both have claimed that they would comply with the international law and blamed the other for violating international norms. For instance, when Chinese and Japanese military aircraft came abnormally close on May 24, 2014, the Chinese Ministry of Defense claimed, “The intrusion and dangerous behavior of Japanese military aircraft over the military exercise area severely violates international law and would easily lead to miscalculation or even unwanted incident.” By contrast, the Japanese side accused China of violating international law and infringing upon its rights.

At least, these indicate both China and Japan nominally are willing to abide by international law. Admittedly, the existing international law and norms are not yet very clear and comprehensive, they nevertheless include rules that are observed by the majority of countries in the world. For example, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), passed on the WPNS, stipulates the safety measures to be taken in case of unexpected encounters among naval warships and aircraft, including prohibiting dangerous actions such as targeting a fire-control radar at foreign warships under normal situations. The CUES, just as the INCSEA reached by the United State and the former Soviet Union in in 1972, would play a positive role in maritime confidence building by various countries, including China and Japan.

Crisis management requires not only benign intentions of both parties but also the wisdom to learn from history. In this regard, being informed of past lessons and experience on crisis management would be beneficial for us to tackle the current problems in Sino-Japanese relations.

III. CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

For countries in crises, the most fundamental objective in crisis management will be preventing conflict and war. Yet, achieving such an end depends on numerous factors, a very important one of which is the capacity and skill of the state in crisis management. The basic elements for successful crisis management are largely identical but with minor differences, limited policy objectives, restraint from using force, tight control over combat forces on the ground, reliable intelligence, effective decision-making system and internal communication, clear signaling, limited escalation, properly handling domestic political factors, etc.²²

Combining the aforementioned analytical framework with his knowledge on the features of decision-making systems in China and Japan, Richard Bush conceived a “situation of stress” faced by China and Japan and then gave general considerations to crisis management. Though we may not agree with his certain argument, he offers us a valuable analytical reference.

Compared to Western countries, China has different principles, strategies and features in the handling of international crisis. Nevertheless, it is beneficial for us to learn from results of relevant studies in the West. Only in this way can we get a general understanding about the basic ways the opponent country adopts in crisis management while reflecting on the advantages and disadvantages of our own practice.

Regarding the current Sino-Japanese crisis management, this author offers the following considerations and suggestions:

First, it is essential to enhance understanding about the significance of Sino-Japanese crisis management and seek a limited objective on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. In order to accomplish the Two Centenary Goals,²³ it is still necessary for China to concentrate on development. It can be said that China has achieved its established goal, claiming to the world that the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands belongs to China and there is territorial dispute over those islets between China and Japan. Assuming the China has no intention and has not made necessary preparations to get the Diaoyu Islands by use of force, it will be a no-win situation for both sides if an unwanted military confrontation takes place between the two countries because of an accidental event. Even a limited armed conflict will exacerbate the security dilemma between China and Japan and drive their bilateral relations to lasting low, in addition to the probability of triggering an arms race between them, which would undermine the realization of China's objective of building a moderately prosperous society. In fact, some signs of an arms race between the two countries have already been observed in recent years. In this sense, it is a most urgent task to strengthen crisis management in Sino-Japanese relations.

Second, the priority in crisis management by China and Japan is to prevent bilateral relations from further deteriorating and keep the situation stable. It should be taken for granted for China to protest against and condemn Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.

The priority for the Sino-Japanese crisis management is to prevent bilateral relations from deteriorating and to keep the situation stable.

In fact, Abe's choice has turned out to a faulty step strategically that has greatly disappointed the international society. But, his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine only shows that he himself is a right-winger rather than indicating that militarism has been reviving in Japan. We cannot give up all efforts to improve Sino-Japanese relations simply because of the conduct of Abe and let the bilateral relations between the two countries continuously drift towards whatever direction it will. Rather, we should utilize the positive power of China's rise to influence Japan and make it go on along the track of peaceful development. If the dreadful situation goes beyond control and even escalate in a spiral way, difficulties in crisis management will keep increasing, thus the "military logic" may eventually overwhelm the "logic of solving the crisis through the diplomatic channel". If such a result comes, it will be tragedy for both countries.

Third, at present one of the focuses in efforts made by China and Japan is to ameliorate the crisis management system and study on forming a set of operational code for official vessels of both countries on contested waters, so as to reduce the risk of armed conflict resulting from incidents or misunderstanding. As China and Japan have been contending for administrative rights over the contested waters around the Diaoyu Islands, it is difficult for the regulations and relevant legal precedents in international law to provide us with ready solutions. But from the perspectives of crisis management and practical operation, there are some cases that are worth to refer to. For instance, the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, also known as the Incidents at Sea Agreement, signed by the governments of the United States and the former Soviet Union in 1972, the first international agreement on maritime military security cooperation, had substantially reduced the number of maritime incidents between the US and the Soviet Union, and enabled both navies to communicate through channels built by the agreement to avoid escalation in crisis conditions. This example demonstrates that, for the purpose of self-security and prevention of incidents, even among superpowers in rivalry, security cooperation and crisis management was highly necessary as well as feasible. It calls for our careful study how to apply the American and Soviet experience in the Cold War

to the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute — through engagement, negotiation, communication and enacting necessary rules to reduce the risk of armed conflict between the two countries' naval forces, or to maintain the conflict on a lower level once it erupts.

Fourth, truly successful crisis management is to find out the root causes of the crisis before working out a medium or long-term preventive policy to treat both the symptoms and root causes. To some extent, the difficulty in the current Sino-Japanese relations is a question of psychological adaptation to the changing balance of power between the two countries as well as one of mutual understanding and trust. To truly achieve rapprochement between China and Japan and maintain long-term stability in the bilateral relations, it is necessary to take practical steps to improve mutual understanding between Chinese and Japanese peoples, encourage empathy, strengthen confidence building and press forward for substantial progress in China-Japan Strategic Relationship with Mutual Benefit, all of which call for efforts from the government and the public. For instance, the China-Japan Maritime Security Dialogue, jointly sponsored by the School of International Studies of Peking University and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation is a good try in crisis management. In the four rounds of discussions already held, scholars proposed many constructive and insightful suggestions, such as measures to be taken in a crisis situation, establishment of a stable channel for communication between maritime law enforcing agencies of both countries, and feasible ways of establishing contact and operational code for such law-enforcing official vessels.²⁴

Fifth, it is essential, in the process of crisis management, to avoid by all means making any policy and guiding action with a mentality of zero-sum game, humiliating the other side and forcing it to completely give up. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, President J. F. Kennedy adopted the hard-line policy of blockage to force the Soviets to move

It is essential that each side stops viewing a crisis as a zero-sum game and resists the temptation to inflict a damaging, humiliating defeat on its opponent.

missiles out from Cuba while paying sufficient attention to leaving some leeway for Khrushchev to save face by making concession on a number of issues. The result of the crisis would have been totally different not for Kennedy's deft handling. An example on the opposite was the July Crisis of 1914, a prelude to World War I. On the occasion, all major countries involved held fast to their stands without making any concession. Though not any of the great powers wished to fight till the last moment, Europe was drawn into a four-year bloody war, causing a great many deaths and forsaking Europe's status as the center of the world. The Sino-Japanese relations have now developed to a stage that accommodates no zero-sum game. In the process of the crisis management, there will certainly be struggle, bargaining or even certain coercive measures. Yet, inflicting a damaging, humiliating defeat on the opponent runs counter to the fundamental logic of crisis management which aims for avoiding conflict and war.

Sixth, it is necessary for China, in its crisis management system, to further strengthen the capacity of communication and coordination. The establishment of the National Security Commission, approved at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, is of great significance in improving China's capability of information processing and crisis management. The management of the crisis between China and Japan involves a couple of government departments, such as those of foreign affairs, national defense, maritime affairs, overseas publicity, and economic relations and trade; and it is essential to ensure coordination among different departments, strengthen inter-department communication, avoid each going its own way, competing and even undermining one another's work. In this sense, without a system and mechanism featuring strong leadership, sound coordination and management, the political will of the top decision-maker alone will not be sufficient to ensure effective crisis management. The challenges in this regard are even more severe and difficult.

Last but not least, it is necessary for us to carefully study both domestic and foreign existing literature on crisis management as well as the crisis management policies and practice of other countries, so as to enhance our capability and skill in managing

crisis. It is necessary to systemically research in and analyze the history of crisis management during the Cold War, especially the interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union in this regard,²⁵ crisis management in China's foreign relations,²⁶ and the situation of crisis management in Japan. A comprehensive understanding should be acquired of the development of domestic and overseas studies on crisis management and relevant countries' practice in this aspect, and master necessary crisis management skills. This is of great guiding significance for academic research, crisis simulation and for policy-makers to correctly understand and properly respond a crisis when it occurs. Only by continuous study to improve the capability of crisis management of relevant personnel can our national interests be better protected.

1 On December 20, 2013, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua and Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida held a meeting and both agreed at the meeting to keep the channel of communication open for the sake of developing China-Japan Strategic Relationship of Mutual Benefit. This is a rare signal of rapprochement amidst antagonism between China and Japan in recent years. Available at: <http://japan.people.com.cn/n/2013/1222/c35469-23912082.html>, January 2, 2014.

2 On July 1, 2014, in a reinterpretation of the Constitution, the Japanese Cabinet approved new rules that would allow the country to exercise the right to collective self-defense, which may indicate a fundamental change in the "exclusive defense" policy Japan has long implemented in the post-war period.

3 According to Japanese statistics, from the date when Japanese government "purchased" the islands to December 29, 2013 when China Coast Guard's vessels patrolled on waters around the Diaoyu Islands, Chinese official vessels had continuously entered the 12-nautical-mile waters around the islands on 74 days. The most recent one publicized by the CCG was on June 30, 2014 when CCG's No. 2146 and No. 2102 formation patrolled within territorial waters of the islands. See the website of China's State Oceanic Administration, available at: http://www.soa.gov.cn/xw/hyyw_90/201406/t20140630_33000.html, July 1, 2014. In an article published on the website of Washington Post, American scholars M. Taylor Fravel and Alastair Iain Johnston scrutinized the frequency of Chinese

patrols within the territorial waters of the Diaoyu Islands. See M. Taylor Fravel and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Chinese Signaling in the East China Sea?" Washington Post, April 12, 2014, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/12/chinese-signaling-in-the-east-china-sea/>, May 5, 2014.

4 "Guofangbu yaoqiu rifang tingzhi dui zhong'e haishang lianhe yanxi zhencha ganrao (Ministry of Defense Requests Japan to Stop Reconnaissance of China-Russia Joint Military Exercise)," available at: http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2014-05/25/content_4511503.htm, June 23, 2014.

5 Ministry of Defense of Japan, "Extra Press Conference by the Defense Minister Onodera (10:34-10:43 A.M. May 25, 2014)," available at: <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2014/05/140525.html>, June 30, 2014.

6 "Guofangbu xinwen fayanren Geng Yansheng jiu rifang chaozuo zhongri junji 'yichangjiejin' fabiao tanhua (MOD Spokesman Responds to the Near-miss between Chinese and Japanese Military Planes)," available at: http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/node_46261.htm, June 30, 2014.

7 Available at: http://www.mod.gov.cn/video/2014-06/12/content_4515887.htm, June 30, 2014.

8 Ministry of Defense of Japan, "Extra Press Conference by the Defense Minister Onodera (05:54-06:03 P.M. June 11, 2014)," available at: <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2014/06/140611.html>, June 30, 2014.

9 See Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, Baltimore, MA: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp.7-12.

10 Richard Bush, *The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, pp.224-231.

11 Currently it is the China Coast Guard.

12 Richard Bush, *The Perils of Proximity*, pp.224-225.

13 *Ibid*, p.225.

14 Bernard D. Cole, "Right-Sizing the Navy: How Much Naval Force Will Beijing Deploy?" in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell eds., *Right-Sizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military*, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, pp.543-544.

15 Richard Bush, *The Perils of Proximity*, pp.225-226.

16 *Ibid*, pp.226-228.

17 "Xijiping huijian riben gongmingdang dangshou shankounajingnan (Xi Jinping Meets the Leader of Japan Komei Party Natsuo Yamaguchi)," available at: <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/01-25/4521528.shtml>, June 25, 2014.

18 "Tang Jiaxuan: Diaoyudao wenti yanxia zui xuyao jianli yizhong guankong jizhi (A Crisis Management Mechanism Is Necessary for the Issue of Diaoyu Islands, Said Tang Jiaxuan)," available at: http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140605/40608350_0.shtml, June 25, 2014.

19 "Zhuri dashi Cheng Yonghua zai 'rizhongkenhuahui' shang fabiao yanjiang (Chinese Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua Gives a Speech on the Japan-China Dialogue)," available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zwbdt/602255/gzhd_602266/t1154781.shtml, June 25, 2014.

20 "Guofangbu queren wushengli ti zhongri 'caqiang er bu zouhuo shuofa (MOD Confirms Wu Shengli's remark on crisis management between China and Japan)," available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/yzyd/mil/20140424/c_1110398838.htm, June 29, 2014. For previous attempts to build maritime crisis management system between China and Japan, please refer to Zhang Wei and Liang Wei, "Study on China-Japan Maritime Security Issues and Crisis Management," in Wen Jingrong ed., *China-Japan Maritime Security and Crisis Management*, Maritime Research Center of the China Foundation for International Studies, 2014, pp.12-37.

21 Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-04/24/c_126426697_2.htm, June 29, 2014.

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22 Alexander L. George, "Findings and Recommendations," in Alexander L. George ed., *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991, pp.553-560.

23 The Two Centenary Goals were put forth by the CPC at its 18th National Congress for building socialism with Chinese characteristics. The two goals are to complete the building a moderately prosperous society in all respects by the centenary of the CPC (founded in 1921), and to build China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by the centenary of the PRC (founded in 1949).

24 For the arguments of Chinese scholars in the Dialogue, please see Wen Jinrong, "Remarks on the Confidence-Building Measures and Crisis Management," in the China-Japan Maritime Security Dialogue (2nd Round), sponsored by School of International Studies, Peking University and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Beijing, October 20, 2013. For the final proposal, see *Report on the Japan-China Maritime Navigation Safety Dialogue* by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University, and School of International Studies, Peking University, October 2014.

25 In this field, Professor Alexander L. George of Stanford University made remarkable contribution to the Western scholarship. See Alexander L. George ed., *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991; Alexander George et al. eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988; Alexander L. George ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Other representative studies include: Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wikenfeld, *A Study of Crisis*, Michigan University Press, 1997; Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War*; and Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

26 For relevant studies in China, the most systematic and important one is the "Project on China-U.S. Security Crisis Management," sponsored by the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. See Michael D. Swaine and Tuosheng Zhang eds., *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.