Kevin Rudd: East Asia’s Strategic and Economic Future: American Perspectives and Chinese Responses
Author：Kevin Rudd Date：2014-11-02
This is an address to the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University by Kevin Rudd, Oct 8, 2014.
It's good to be back in China.
It's good to be back in Shanghai where nearly thirty years ago I once served as Acting Australian Consul-General in the days when there were only a handful of countries with consular missions in China's commercial capital.
It is good to be back at Fudan University, a celebrated member of China's Ivy League, where I sent my own son Nicholas to study Chinese just a decade ago.
All these years later, I am now affiliated with the American Ivy League having taken up a position as Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School.
My policy research project at the Belfer Center is "Alternative Futures for US China Relations -2014 to 2023."
I undertook this project because of President Xi Jinping's advocacy of the concept of "A New Type of Great Power Relationship" as a means of avoiding long-term conflict between an emerging great power and an established great power.
I wanted to explore what such a concept could mean for the future of the US-China relationship, given that this relationship will shape much of the future of the Asian hemisphere we all share.
I have also become increasingly concerned at the increasingly negative trajectory of the relationship over much of the last twelve months.
Which is why I have decided to dedicate much of my time this year to
analyzing China's and America's national capabilities and intentions for the decade ahead.
And to think about whether there is sufficient commonality of Chinese and American values and interests to craft a common narrative for a shared future.
Or whether such commonality simply does not exist.
In which case both the relationship's and the region's future is more likely to be shaped by events and by reactions to those events.
And in an environment increasingly charged with strategic competition, crisis and possible conflict.
Within this framework, last week in Washington I delivered an address launching the Zbignew Bryzinski Institute at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
比格涅夫.布热津斯基地缘战略研究所成立仪式上发表了演讲。 I entitled the address “East Asia's Strategic and Economic Future: Chinese Perspectives and American Responses".
Its purpose was to describe to the best extent I was able the world and the
region as seen through Chinese eyes.
Of course I cannot pretend to be objective on these matters.
I am not Chinese.
毕竟我非老中。I am a westerner, although one who has dedicated a large part of his life to the study of China.
纵然我一生致力研究中国，我仍乃西方老陆。 And the country of which I was until recently Prime Minister remains of course a long-standing ally of the United States.
而且不久前我任总理的澳大利亚，至今仍与美国保持长期同盟关系。 Nonetheless I believe it is important for our friends in Washington to understand something of the reality that is seen through the prism of the
perceptions and priorities of the Chinese leadership，rather than simply taking as a given a world seen only though American eyes.即便如此，我仍坚信，对于美国的朋友而言，透彻地通过现实来理解中
国领导层对世界的认知以及优先考虑的事项，而非单纯地只以美方视角的固化定式想当然，是非常重要的。 Today in Shanghai, I propose to do the reverse.今天，在上海，我将反其道而行之。 To describe China as currently seen from America.试图从美国的角度来阐释中国。
And to do so as frankly as possible.
并希冀以最大限度来开诚布公。 Once again I am obviously not an American.然我也非老美。 I therefore speak with no authority.我的发言并不代表任何官方立场。 I simply seek to describe my observations of the deep views of the US foreign
policy elite, without necessarily seeking to defend them.
我仅希望深入阐明我所观察到的美国外交政策精英阶层的看法，并无意为他们的立场辩护。 And I do all this with a view to helping provide something of a third-party
reality check on how each side actually views the aspirations and the policies
of the other.我所秉持的理念是能够为中美双方提供相对客观现实的第三方观察，并就双方对彼此的愿景和政策实际上持有什么样的态度进行阐述。
Because I also believe it is impossible to craft any common narrative for the future unless it is firmly based on the realpolitik of current perceptions of one another.
And perceptions, of course, ultimately shape policy.
China, among other states, invariably bridles against the repeated assertion of the universality of American values, an assertion that runs fundamentally against the Chinese belief that each country has its own values.
And it is a matter of political sovereignty for that country to choose whatever political system best reflects those values, irrespective of whether they happen to conform with one's own.
This view is reflected in the most basic doctrinal statements of Chinese foreign policy, the most important of which is the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence."
These include principles of "mutual respect" and "noninterference in the domestic affairs of another country."
It is therefore impossible to understand American attitudes to China, the region and the world without understanding the long-standing centrality of liberal democratic values of opportunity, freedom and democracy to the American political tradition.
Critically, these values have been seen from the beginning of the American republic as not just American values, but values for all of humankind.
They were grounded in the sentiments of 150 years of settlement from the early seventeenth century.
这些价值扎根于自 17世纪初开始的长达 150年的殖民地时期的情操之中。
Generations of dissenters travelled to America in pursuit of political and religious freedoms they did not enjoy in a Europe wracked by the wars of religion and the princely autocracies that fought them.
These freedoms were finally and formally secured by the definitive political act that was the American revolution.
They have constituted the central narrative of American politics and the American nation in the 240 years since.
They have also become the animating force of the American identity.
In the American tradition, these freedoms are seen as the "city on the hill."在美国传统中，这些自由被视作是“岭上之都”的神谕。 They constitute what the Americans see as the moral basis of what would
later be called "American exceptionalism."这些自由也构成了被美国人民视为“美国例外主义”的道德基准。 For the nineteenth century this would, in the American perception, become
the magnetic force that would attract tens of millions of migrants from the
Old World to this "city on the hill" in the new.在美国的理解看来，19世纪，对“岭上之都”的向往像一块磁铁一样吸引了数以千万计的移民离开了旧世界的故乡，踏上了前往新世界的旅程。
These freedoms also became a galvanizing force in the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery.这些自由也成为了美国南北战争和废奴运动中激励人心的力量。
In other words, democratic freedoms were for America itself, not for political or military export to the rest of the world, other than as the exemplar state.
It was not until the twentieth century that a reluctant America would be drawn into foreign entanglements and European wars, but not so much as the defence of a political ideal but rather the defence of its national interests in its freedom of navigation.
Woodrow Wilson's attempts to entrench American ideals in a liberal internationalist order for the world in a League of Nations were shunned by an isolationist American congress.
And then a generation later, again a reluctant America finally committed to another global war, again because its interests were attacked in the Pacific while Hitler declared war from across the Atlantic.
It was only during the course of the Second World War that the defence of American values were finally elevated to a global cause in the American mind in a global war against German and Japanese fascism.
The American people bought war bonds to finance the American war effort in defence of Roosevelt's "four freedoms:" freedom of speech," freedom of worship," freedom from want" and "freedom from fear."
The United States, emerging from a deep tradition of isolationism that had by and large dominated American politics since the Revolution then sought to construct a post-war order which incorporated these values.
那时开始，美利坚合众国从自美国革命以来便在美国政坛扎根的孤立主义传统中走了出来，进而在建立战后世界秩序的努力中整合了上述美国价值。And through a combination of the United Nations, international law and American power, saw its mission as the global articulation and defence of these liberal democratic values as central to its core mission.
This mission became immediately animated by the challenge of Soviet communism and American conclusions about the rise of communist China.
With the Sino-Soviet split, the abandonment of a global ideological mission on the part of the Communist Party of China, and a decade later the collapse of the Soviet Union, many in America prematurely concluded "the end of history" and the final triumph of a liberal democratic capitalist model.
In fact it was not the end of history.
Militant Islamism had a different view of history.
The return of Russian nationalism as a counter-force to European liberalism represents a different response again.
As does China's advocacy of its own "China Model" or the "Beijing Consensus."
Nonetheless America's sense of its own liberal democratic exceptionalism continues as a strong, unifying narrative of America's role in the world today.
America's critics will legitimately point to the copious examples of American hypocrisy from the Monroe Doctrine to the Middle East where democratically elected governments were often removed by force if they were seen as incompatible with American interests.
伪善 ——往往是一旦局势与美国国家利益相悖，民选政府依然可被以非民主的方式强行更替 ——诸如此类的例证与美国价值无疑是相悖的。
Just as it is equally legitimate to argue that for much of its 150 year history as a global superpower, the US has been the most benign superpower in history, compared with every other superpower or great power since the Persian Empire 2500 years ago.
By and large, with the exception of Teddy Roosevelt's taste for adventurism, America never sought a colonial empire, despite its undisputed power to have obtained one.
In fact, against this measure, the only comparable great power in history to the United States was China, which also, at varying times in its long history, also had the capacity to establish a vast overseas colonial empire, but chose not to.
Of course both have been involved in extensive border wars in their history.
But neither sought to subjugate distant foreign lands for the purposes of national self-aggrandizement or economic exploitation.但两国都没有为了寻求国家扩张或经济掠夺而去吞并外国领土。 This commonality in the American and Chinese experience is little discussed.这一中美历史中展现出的共同性很少被讨论。 It should be.这是十分值得关注的。 But we cannot ignore the core difference that the United States today, by
reason of its historical circumstances since European settlement, continues to exhibit not just a set of liberal democratic ideals for itself, but also for the world at large.
的历史原因，美国在今天仍持续对内对外宣扬着自由民主的理念。 Although the vigor with which these ideals may be prosecuted abroad will always vary, depending on the continuing tussle between the contending
forces of isolationism and retrenchment on the one hand, and the moral
purpose and responsibilities of global leadership on the other.
The core point concerning this exceptionalist, liberal democratic tradition of American domestic politics and foreign policy cannot simply be written away through some form of polite diplomatic agreement, irrespective of how much this may be deemed by others to be desirable.
It is an elemental part of the American identity.
To seek to do so would be the equivalent of trying to purge Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism from modern Chinese political consciousness or national identity.
In both cases it is indelible.
Yet the core difference remains that Confucianism is not designed as a value for export to the world.
Whereas American liberal democracy, either by way of active evangelization, or simply by passive example, is precisely that.
The truth, therefore, is that any common narrative between a rising China and a still powerful United States, will need to intelligently negotiate these complex ideational shoals, grounded in turn in deep questions of identity.
It is a recurring, deep problem in the relationship. And it can't simply be wished away.
American Experience of China美国的中国经历
If then these are American values, what then of American historical
experiences of China that have shaped current American perceptions?如上简述美国的价值之后，我们不禁要问：什么样的历史经历（尤其与中国的交互）助构了美国如今的国家意图。
The US was signatory to the infamous unequal treaties with the China of the late Qing.
美国曾是与晚清政府签订臭名昭著不平等条约的国家之一。 The US was also party to the Eight Power Alliance which marched on Beijing in 1900 following the Boxer Rising.
Although the US did not insist on the full payment of reparations by the Qing government under the so-called Boxer Protocol.然而，美国没有依据所谓的《辛丑条约》向清政府要求全额赔偿。
Instead it contributed funds to the building of Tsinghua University, Yanjing University and the Peking Union Medical College, which has caused Chinese elites over the last century to view the Americans as imperialists of a different hue.
China also became in the American mind of the late 19th and early 20th centuries a rich field of Christian mission as American and European missionaries dedicated themselves to the "saving of millions of Chinese souls."
中国在 19世纪末和 20世纪初的美国人眼中亦被视作是基督教传教的沃土。彼时来自美国和欧洲的传教士纷纷投身于“救赎千百万中国人的灵魂”的事业中。
As the Japanese invasion of China unfolded during the 1930s, the US increasingly identified with Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Government in Nanking.
上世纪三十年代，随着日军侵华的行动日渐猖獗，美国对由蒋介石领导的南京国民政府的认同感也愈加增强。Chiang's later much publicized conversion to Christianity also helped consolidate American public support for the Nationalist cause.
Once the United States declared war on Japan in 1941, the US maintained air supplies to Chiang's wartime capital in Chongqing across "the Hump."
Chiang through his attendance at the Cairo Conference in 1943 also came to be seen both by the Americans and the British as a core part of the global alliance against fascism.
During the second civil war between 1945 and 49, the US provided significant material support for the KMT against what was then a numerically vastly inferior Red Army force.
在 1945-49年的第二次国共内战期间，美国为国民党提供了巨量物资用以对抗其时在人数上极不占优的红军。Although a small number of American volunteers sided with the Communist forces under Mao, the US unequivocally backed Chiang through until his flight to Taiwan in 1949.
For the next thirty years, the debate raged across the US foreign policy establishment as to who had "lost China."
US and Chinese forces engaged each other directly in the Korean War, and in the following decades indirectly in Vietnam.
In the meantime the US dug in with the defence of Taiwan at all costs, right through until Nixon's opening to Communist China in 1972, although the Taiwan factor remains alive to this day.
与此同时，直到尼克松 1972年访华之前，美国一直都在不遗余力地投身台湾防卫，尽管台湾问题直到今日仍悬而未决。From Soviet ally and ideological foe, the US view of China changed radically to de facto strategic partner in common cause against the Soviet Union in the final decades of the Cold War.
After 1989, US concerns about human rights in Communist China rose to the fore, as the Soviet threat receded and then collapsed.
From America's perspective, China during the 1990's slowly emerged from being seen as a human rights problem to being seen as a major economic opportunity.
America's support for China's prosecution of a policy of domestic economic reform and opening to the outside world during this period, culminating in US support for China's accession to the WTO in 2001, sustaining this pattern of engagement with China which placed economic cooperation at the center of the relationship.
During the last decade, the rapidly escalating growth and size of the Chinese economy began to place new strains on the relationship in critical areas of intellectual property protection, anti-dumping and accusations of currency manipulation.
In other words, the economic dynamic of the relationship, while mutually beneficial, was also beginning to generate its own tensions.
At the same time, the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a strategic threat to China, followed by China's gradual normalization of its relationship with post-Soviet Russia, underlined the absence of any new compelling strategic rationale to underpin the US-China relationship capable of replacing the anti-Soviet logic of 1972.
In America's experience, since the global financial crisis, China has further
From being seen as a responsible economic partner in the critical days of the deliberations of the G20 to avoid global financial and economic collapse.
To being seen increasingly as a global economic competitor as China's economy begins to replace the US as the largest economy in the world.
As well as a country which begins now to challenge the established patterns of the post-45 security order in Asia, in addition to broader global institutional norms (most recently reflected in the current debate on the international status of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.)
China, therefore, in America's experience over the last 150 years, has evolved
from being seen as a field of missionary endeavor, to a country which America lost to Communism, to one which they joined in common cause against the Soviet Union, to one which in turn is now seen to be challenging American uni-polar supremacy across a range of fronts, while all along representing a set of ideational norms in large part at variance with the universal claims of American liberal democratic values.
So what of current US perceptions of China?
Again I emphasize I do not speak for anybody in America.
如前所述，我的如下言论并不代表任何美国人。Just as my speech last week in Washington did not seek in any way to reflect official Chinese views.
These are simply my observations where I seek to describe the zeitgeist of the foreign policy community in both countries.
And while I am professionally trained as a diplomat, I sometimes fear that insufficient strategic candor in both directions (ie between Washington and Beijing) in the past may inhibit the ability to craft a common strategic narrative for the future.
Assuming of course that such a narrative is possible for the future given the complexities of a shared historical experience, conflicting national historiographies, different philosophical traditions, the significant gap that currently exists between the two countries values and interests, and what I fear to be a widening gap in perceptions of each other's longer-term intentionalities.
At the core of US perceptions is a deep admiration for what China has achieved over the last 35 years.
US elite opinion was by and large skeptical that China could pull off the economic transformation you have since Deng Xiaoping changed the nation's strategic course.
The fact that the market is now anchored as a core principle of Chinese economic policy for a country under Communist Party control has staggered most Americans for its sheer audacity.
The fact that hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty commands great respect.
But there is also an American view that China does not appreciate the fact that the US has welcomed, rather than blocked, China's full participation in the international community and the institutional arrangements of the global economy.
The US for ideological reasons could have vetoed the PRC occupying the China's seat on the UNSC and in the wider UN system.
It did not.
Despite the fact that at the time China only a few years before had been at the ideological zenith of the Cultural Revolution.
The US could have blocked Chinese accession to the WTO.美国同样可以阻碍中国加入世界贸易组织。 It did not.美国也未这样做。 Although many criticized China's market economy status at the time.尽管当时存在大量对中国市场经济状况的不满意见。 In fact, rather than blocking Chinese WTO accession, in American eyes they
did all they could to advance it, despite the difficulties of the decade in which
it was negotiated.事实上，在美国人看来，尽管在中国入世的十年谈判里显得困难重重，但美国没有意图阻碍中国入世 ——相反地，美国为中国入世竭尽全力给予帮助。
And it is an empirical fact that Chinese net exports and rapid increases in foreign direct investment have been major drivers of China's rapid economic growth.
而实证表明，中国的净出口和迅猛增加的外资投入的确是中国经济快速增长的主要驱动力。The US could also have avoided creating the G20 Summit, including China at the top table of global economic governance.
美国也可以选择不创建二十国峰会来吸纳中国成为全球经济事务的核心政策制定者之一。 It did not.美国还是没有这样做。 It welcomed China.
美国欢迎中国。 Just as all G20 members have welcomed China's constructive contribution to this process both during and following the global crisis.
性贡献。 US foreign policy elites feel that they have done everything possible to welcome China into every domain of the global order and its governance.
美国外交政策的精英阶层认为，美国已经做了所有他们能做的事情，来欢迎中国在各个方面融入全球秩序和参与其实质管理。Of course my Chinese friends respond by saying that the US in doing all the above has only been doing so for its own national interests, rather than acting altruistically for China.
Having observed some of these US decision-making processes over time, and the internally contested nature of them, I am not sure these US decisions were clinically one or the other.
Nonetheless whatever the motivation, the fact remains that these decisions were taken, decisions which over time have benefitted China, and when other decisions could have been taken.
Chinese friends then argue that a further motivation behind US policy was, and is, to use Chinese global engagement as a means of turning China into a full participant, supporter and contributor to a global order designed by the US and the West, for the benefit of the US and the West, and at a time when the PRC was not involved in any way in its formation.
Or as others have observed, gratuitously offering China the opportunity to become an honorary member of the West, as with Japan several decades before.
Of course, my good friend and Harvard Kennedy School colleague Bob Zoellick encapsulated this thesis in his "global stakeholder theory" of 2005.
While many Chinese found this to be condescending, in part because of the difficulties of translation of the concept of "stakeholder," and in part for the reasons given above, it should be borne in mind that Zoellick was also directing his remarks at a skeptical American public back in 2005 when many Americans were beginning to react badly to the loss of American jobs through what was perceived to be unfair Chinese competition and currency manipulation.
为这个理论有居高临下之意。但应该注意的是，在 2005年佐利克提出该理论的时候，正值诸多美国人认为他们失业的主因在于中国的不当竞争和操纵汇率 ——佐利克此理论的受众是对此表示怀疑和过激反应的美国公众。
In significant part, what Zoellick was doing was defending a US policy of consistent support for Chinese global economic engagement. As well as articulating a positive framework for China's greater participation in the global order.
Other Chinese friends argue that the real hidden agenda behind US policy in support of absorbing China into the current liberal internationalist, rules-based order is also to subvert Chinese values with western values over time.
This in turn takes us back to my earlier arguments concerning the values divide between the two countries and the two systems, and the need for this divergence to be addressed in any common narrative for the future.
任何共同叙事所需要付出努力的必要性。 Americans would argue that China has successfully resisted foreign attempts to "subvert" its domestic philosophical traditions for over two thousand years.
对此，美方会主张，中国有成功抵御任何外来势力“颠覆”其存在两千余年的哲学传统的历史经验。 Starting with Christianity which after 400 years made limited progress.
从 400多年前基督教进入中国所取得的相当有限的进展。 Continuing with the failure of political liberalism to take root during the Nationalist period.
And most recently with another foreign import, China's rejection of Marxism as an economic theory.再到最近几十年中国摈弃马克思主义经济理论。
In other words, China has consistently proven itself to be sufficiently robust
as a civilization to evolve its own values over time, and to chart with confidence its own national future.
More fundamentally, however, our American friends would argue that the current rules-based order has overwhelmingly suited and served China's interests over the last 35 years.
It has been the global economic framework within which Chinese prosperity has been achieved.
As for the security policy dimensions of the order, including overwhelming US military power, the Americans would argue that their strong and continuing strategic presence in Asia has preserved the peace and stability of the wider region, creating the post-75 strategic environment in which all regional economies have prospered, not least China.
The alternative, the Americans would argue, could have been a rolling series of regional conflicts, in the strategic vacuum arising for US withdrawal, including over time the radical re-armament of Japan.
This brings us to US perceptions of more recent Chinese conclusions concerning whether or not the US is pursuing a policy of containment.
The Americans argue that if China has seriously concluded that is it now the object of a policy of US containment, then this represents a fundamental miscalculation.
They argue that US policies towards China across the last 35 years have been the actual antithesis of containment.
Containment against the Soviet Union during the Cold War was designed to diplomatically isolate, economically undermine and militarily confront Moscow, overtly and covertly, at every corner of the globe.
The Americans would further ask China the question that if the US is seriously containing China, then what is China currently being prevented from doing in the region and the world that it would otherwise want to do were it not for US policy?
This brings us to the related charge from my Chinese friends that the US is seeking to isolate China.
For this, Chinese commentators point to a policy of encirclement by US allies, and the strengthening of these alliances in recent years.
America would argue that every one of these alliances pre-date the rise of China by decades.
And in Australia's case by half a century.
They further argue that many of these alliances had their original rationale in providing security guarantees against the long-term re-emergence of Japan.
Then as part of a world-wide network of alliances against the Soviet Union in a period of profound ideological, political, diplomatic and military confrontation with the Soviet Union.
And following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these alliances have
performed a range of functions against multiple and changing contingencies, not least contending with the rise of militant Islamism over the last decade and a half.
As for the strengthening of these alliances in recent years, the Americans may argue that this has nothing to do with the rise of China.
I personally do not think that is the case.
It is more likely to have been the case that this strengthening was in part in response to US and regional perceptions of a more assertive Chinese policy in the South China Sea and elsewhere.
Of course our Chinese friends provide a different account of both this and the East China Sea where they see their actions as responding to the efforts of others to unilaterally change the status quo.
On the broader question of alliances however, the Americans argue that none of these arrangements have been forced on regional states, nor has their recent strengthening, but rather they have been the subject of voluntary requests arising from the internal democratic deliberations of sovereign states.
Indeed the Americans point to the example of the Philippines in the 1980's when the government requested the US to leave Subic Bay and Clarke Field, which they then did.
As for the re-balance itself, and its implications here in the region, when the US says in the future it will have 60% of its global fleet here in the Pacific, compared with 50% in the past, against a shrinking US navy, that will in all probability result in the same overall naval presence, if not smaller than what we have today.
至于美国的再平衡以及再平衡概念在亚太地区的意涵，也值得思量。其实，当美国宣称未来全球美军 60%的舰队将部署在太平洋地区时，实际上美国海军部署在亚太地区的规模如果大致仅会基本维持现今的规模（因为虽然这一数字将从 50%上升至 60%，但美国海军的整体规模正在缩减。）
The US is also puzzled by other apparent Chinese conclusions that the US in engaged in an operational strategy to diminish and divide China and ultimately "sabotage" the Chinese political system from within.
These deep questions of domestic Chinese politics require further deliberation.
They also return us to the core question as to whether the US ultimately accepts the legitimacy of the Chinese political system given the radically different values system on which it is constructed, and continued Chinese objections to the universalist claims of US and western values systems over all others.
But the baseline US response, still dis-believed by many in Beijing, is that the development of China's future political arrangements are a matter for the Chinese people themselves.
There is one final set of American perceptions I wish to address today concerning China's long-term aspirations.
And that relates to the simple question of what China will seek to do in the region and the world once it has realized its dream of national wealth and power.
Put simply, a widely-held American view is that China's declared policy of its "peaceful rise" is temporary, in order to convince Americans and others that there is nothing to worry about. Whereas the reality, according to this view, is that once Chinese power, economically and then militarily, begins to achieve parity or pass that of the United States, China will begin rapidly to push the United States out of Asia, expand its sphere of influence in the region, and in time begin challenging some of the fundamentals of the current rules-based order.
Proponents of this view argue that this strategy is consistent with millennia of Chinese strategic thinking, such as Sun Tze's "Art of War," that the best way to prevail is to become sufficiently powerful so that armed conflict is rendered redundant, and one's objectives can be achieved by peaceful means. It is also seen as consistent with Deng Xiaoping's long-standing dictum of "hide your strength and bide your time."
For these reasons, it is argued, China wishes to avoid the possibility of armed conflict with the US for the foreseeable future because China fears, legitimately, that it would lose. Similarly with Japan where the argument is also that premature conflict could also result in China losing, or at least not winning. In either case, such an outcome would be deeply domestically delegitimizing for the Chinese government and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.
This long-term American view that China's operational strategy is simply to buy time until it can alter the overall "correlation of forces" against the US and its allies has a growing constituency. And its effect is to encourage a deeply "hawkish" view on China's future, and importantly on how to respond to China in the interim "before it is all too late." This view may in turn also be reflected in increasing concern from a number of regional states requesting a strengthening strategic partnership with the US to offset this longer-term Chinese contingency.
这个关于中国“买时间”的战略运作，在美国长期存在且得到了越来越多的支持。其影响在于强化鹰派视角 ——要在“一切为时已晚之前”应对中国崛起。这一点也反映在近期美国与亚太地区盟国关系的强化上，尤其反映在亚太国家为避免长期来看可能与中国发生的意外，而主动要求与美国强化盟国关系上。Of course China has many responses to this particular American view. They are grounded in China's historical behavior of not extending its power beyond its borders. They point to China's long-term domestic pre-occupations. Also to the well-defined contours of its current policy settings which are set in deeply held views of the China's leadership on a multi-polar, rather than hegemonic world. Nonetheless dealing with this emerging American view of China's long-term intentions will be a critical factor in developing any common narrative for the relationship's future.
These remarks have primarily concentrated on China as seen through a range of American eyes.
上述评议主要集中在美国是如何看待中国的这个主题上。I recently concluded my remarks at the CSIS in Washington DC on Chinese strategic perceptions of the US by saying that the fact that these Chinese perceptions exist does not by definition make them accurate.
What is important, however, is that these perceptions do exist, and to some extent they shape Chinese policy behavior.
Similarly with my address today here in Shanghai.
What I have sought to do is describe a range of US strategic perceptions concerning China's rise. Again that does not necessarily mean these perceptions are correct.
Nonetheless, they do exist, and they too contribute to the shaping of US policy.
然而，这些战略意图是存在的，同样地，他们也影响了美国的政策制定。And the more powerful China becomes, the sharper these differences in perceptions are likely to become.
随着中国的强盛，这些不同与分歧会与日俱增。 So let me now conclude in identical terms to those I used to conclude my remarks in Washington.
讲。 In foreign policy, the beginning of wisdom is to understand what the other party thinks and believes and why.
智慧的外交始于理解彼此的意图和其背后的原因。 And this is just as important for our Chinese friends as for the United States.这对中国是如此，对美国也是如此。 Nonetheless, I am not some sort of foreign policy utopian, believing there is a
mystical center-point at which both these world-views will one day
I am too much of a realist for that.对此，我还是秉持现实主义的态度。
Although at the same time I am sufficient of a liberal internationalist not to allow hyper-realism to overwhelm the possibilities of evolving a common approach for both the US and China, at least on some common challenges.
As I have written for most of this year that I have been at the Belfer Center at Harvard, I believe what is useful for the two Presidents to develop a common narrative for the future that allows sufficient space for real differences to be acknowledged.
At present, each side has a narrative, usually private rather than public, about the other.
In stead I argue for a public narrative that contains an overall conceptual framework, a mechanism for managing differences, as well as a longer-term goal of substantive positive improvement in the areas of fundamental disagreement.
而我所倡导的是,中美共同构建一个包含全面指导框架、具体分歧管控、以及长远积极发展的宏大叙事。One possible framework might be called "constructive realism", or even
"constructive realism for a common future".可以称其为“建设性的现实主义”,或者说以“建设性的现实主义”构建一个中美共同的未来。
What do I mean by that?
First, the realist part.
Both the Chinese and the Americans come from a deeply realist approach to
And within that frame, there are defined areas where a lack of common
values and or common interests will deny any ready resolution.
在这样的背景框架下,缺乏共同价值和共同利益会导致任何解决方案的不可能。 Areas such as the outstanding territorial disputes in East Asia.譬如东亚的领土争端。
These cannot be solved for the foreseeable future.They can only be acknowledged and managed so that conflict does not erupt, thereby destroying the relationship altogether.
Second, the constructive part.
Namely those areas of the relationship (bilateral, regional or multilateral) where China and the US, because of overlapping values and interests, can cooperate to build new "public goods" together.
In areas such as the bilateral investment treaty, new approaches to regional architecture in the Asia Pacific that help construct some basic confidence and security building measures over time in a region where there are none, climate change, cyber security, the Korean Peninsular and in time militant Islamism.
Third, the future part.
第三,未来的部分。Which if strategic trust is built incrementally over time by achieving success in part two above (ie the "Constructive" part) to deploy the political and diplomatic capital from these successes to tackling the thus far "too difficult to solve" issues in part one above (ie the "Realist" part).
It is important to have a long-term ambition for the relationship beyond an exercise in temporary utilitarianism.
Otherwise, we are simply postponing the inevitability of crisis, conflict or even war.
Of itself, such a long-term ambition can also become transformative.
Of course, such a concept of constructive realism, with or without a common future, would provide a framework for gradual progress, and ideally less regress, over time.
建设性现实主义,无论是否导向一个共同的未来,都可以随着长期的互动,逐步减少逆行的可能,并渐进改良互相之间的关系。The good news is that these concepts may well translate reasonably into Chinese.
Realism is as sound a word in Chinese as it is in English. Constructive is an overwhelmingly positive phrase in Chinese.
And it is difficult, but not impossible, to reject the idea of a long-term common future in either language, albeit through a process of gradual transformation.
Finally Deng Xiaoping even has a phrase that while traditionally used to describe the arduous task of Chinese domestic economic reform, may well be more broadly applicable.
Deng said that to cross the river, it is important to feel the stones step by step with your feet.
那就是：“摸着石头过河。”So too might we be able to breach the widening gap between China and the United States over time.
It requires a realistic understanding of the values, perceptions and interests of the other.
It requires an equal amount of creative diplomatic imagination about what can be done constructively together.
It also requires the political will to dream of a different future other than that which history has shown us, often horrifically, from the past.
Perhaps this what Xi Jinping had in mind when he floated the idea of “A New Type of Great Power Relationship.”
President Xi has talked much about the China Dream. American dream is also embedded within the American culture.
Maybe it's time for us all to start dreaming more broadly of a common dream for all our futures.
Copyright@2014 Institute of International and Strategic Studies Peking University. All Rights Reserved.
IISS, School of International Studies, PekingUniversity, Haidian District, Beijing 100871, China