Summary of Survey Report on Mutual Perceptions between China and the United States

Author:IISS, PKU Date:2020-03-09

Recently, under the direction and sponsorship of the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), the Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS) conducted a study titled “2019 Survey on How Chinese View the United States.” This public opinion poll was designed and executed by the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University and drew insights from Zhou Wenzhong, former Chinese ambassador to the United States (U.S.), Zhu Yinghuang, former editor-in-chief of China Daily, and Wang Jisi, president of IISS. Several U.S. experts on China–U.S. relations were involved in designing the questionnaires that were handed out between June 10 and July 6, 2019. 

Two parallel studies titled “Survey on How U.S. Public View China” and “Survey on How Washington Experts View China” were sponsored by the CUSEF and conducted by Prime Group, a U.S.-based public opinion agency, during June 10–20, 2019. During this period, 2401 questionnaires completed by the U.S. public and 200 by Washington experts were adopted. Surveys conducted by Prime Group in 2015, on the same subject, can be retrieved from Prime Group and IISS for a comparative study. 

Similar to the U.S. surveys, the Chinese study divided the respondents into the two following groups: the public and Beijing experts. The former (hereinafter “the Chinese public”) refers to residents of 40 cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, who completed 3,216 questionnaires. The latter refers to workers of Beijing-based Communist Party committees and government agencies, university research institutes, enterprises, and public institutions, along with managerial staff conducting cooperation and exchange programs of trade, culture, technology, and education with the U.S. In total, 200 questionnaires were completed and valid.

This summary highlights the surveys conducted by Chinese and U.S. researchers, compares the perceptions of individuals in China and the U.S. of each other and bilateral relations, and explores the background of and reasons behind those perceptions. Based on the findings, this summary offers ideas into how individuals in China have forged closer ties with their counterparts in the U.S.

I Mutual Perceptions 

1. How the Chinese view the United States 

Major findings 

The questionnaire attempts to reveal how the Chinese perceive the United States. According to the results, the public and Beijing experts seem to be divided on this subject: 21% of the Chinese public has a favorable opinion of the U.S., and 32% of experts feel the same. Regarding the opinions of President Donald J. Trump, the difference is greater: 17% of the public has a positive opinion, and 5% of experts hold the same view. 

Regarding U.S. leaders, the share of the Chinese public who have a favorable impression decreases by 19%, in stark contrast to the declining share of experts (84%). 

This trend is also palpable in descriptive terms. When asked what words and phrases they would choose to describe the U.S. and Americans, the Chinese public and experts are more likely to use the following expressions in the order of frequency: “strong in military,” “aggressive,” “arrogant,” and “creative.” However, expressions such as “peace-loving,” “abiding by international rules,” or “friendly toward China” were rarely used. More specifically, 95.7% of teachers and researchers and 80.6% of respondents working in enterprises and public institutions describe the U.S. as a strong military power. The shares of the two groups that acknowledge the U.S. as “creative” are 90% and 63.3%, respectively.

Although majority of the experts and public hold strong critical views regarding the U.S. policy on China and have become particularly sensitive to U.S. interference in China’s internal affairs, 77% of Beijing elites and 56.7% of Chinese city-dwellers describe U.S. cultural influence in China as positive. 

Differences in attitudes exist between the public and the experts and within each group. For example, within the expert group, there are remarkable differences between people working in Party committees and government agencies as a subgroup, and teachers, researchers, and employees of public institutions as another. Respondents describing the U.S. as aggressive account for 90% of the former subgroup, compared with 79.7% of the latter. For the description of “tolerant,” the figures are 6% and 33.3%, respectively. When asked whether “the U.S. is China’s friend,” 13% of teachers and researchers and 4% of the managerial staff in enterprises and public institutions replied in the affirmative. Notably, 8.6% of teachers and researchers agree that the U.S. is “peace-loving,” compared with the 4% working in Party committees and government agencies; 54.3% of teachers and researchers perceive the U.S. in generally positive terms, and only 16% of people working in Party committees and government agencies feel the same.


Generally, experts are presented with more opportunities than the ordinary Chinese public for meeting with foreigners and traveling abroad; therefore, they are less likely to be swayed by domestic media. Additionally, the share of the respondents holding negative perceptions regarding the U.S. is smaller for experts than for the Chinese public. This finding suggests that if ordinary Chinese had more opportunities to learn about the U.S., they might improve their understanding of the U.S.  It is noticeable that the opinion of the public and experts in China of President Trump is worse than their opinion of the U.S. overall. 

The difference in negativity occurs because the Chinese public and experts blame the unexpected turns in China–U.S. relations on U.S. decision-makers. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the Beijing experts who are better informed than the Chinese public are more negative about U.S. leadership (84%; Figure).

Along with criticism, the two groups also hold positive views of the U.S., showing their ambivalence toward the country. This ambivalence reflects the difficulties of China–U.S. relations and the complexity in their current relationship where China and the U.S. are interdependent while pursuing competing strategic interests.

2. How Americans View China

Major findings 

Prime Group’s surveys reveal the perception of the U.S. public and Washington experts toward China. Among the U.S. public, 21% like China compared with 9% of the experts. The same percentage (i.e., 21%) of the public in both countries holds a favorable opinion of the other country. However, in comparison to Beijing experts’ positive perception of the U.S. (32%), Washington experts have a much less positive perception of China (9%).

Notably, despite the headwinds in China–U.S. relations in recent years, the attitude of the U.S. public toward China observed in the 2019 survey has not changed compared with a 2015 survey. Prime Group’s surveys suggest that millennials and Gen Z (31%) tend to perceive China more positively than their last generation.

By contrast, in 2015, 16% of Washington experts had a positive opinion of China, and in 2019, only 9% said the same. In 2015, 61% of Washington experts had a negative impression of China, and in 2019, that number increased to 76%. This shift is the obvious result of souring China–U.S. relations. For the U.S. public, 12% support President Trump, while 22%Washington experts like him. 

When asked to choose words to describe what distinguishes China and Chinese people, the U.S. public prefers the following words in order of frequency: “strong in military,” “aggressive,” “industrious,” and “creative.” Less than 20% of them choose “friendly toward America,” “peace-loving,” “abiding by international rules,” “tolerant,” “honest,” and “responsible for ecological environment” to describe China and the Chinese. Washington experts are more prone to using negative words. Surprisingly, 82% describe China as “aggressive,” 3% perceive China as “responsible for the ecological environment,” 2% use the word “tolerant,” 1% report “abiding by the international rules,” and 1% use the word “honest.” 


The following two aspects merit greater attention. First, a much greater proportion of the U.S. public likes China compared with experts in Washington, suggesting that the public is not easily susceptible to the slander of China from the major sources of news in the U.S. media and U.S. think tanks. Second, a far greater proportion of the U.S. public support President Trump compared with Washington experts, many of whom dislike the president. As demonstrated later, this difference is critical to understanding Americans’ attitudes toward policies on China under the Trump administration.

This situation can be explained from another perspective. A prevailing opinion in China is that the U.S. prejudices against and misunderstandings about China are the result of casual observation and the lack of knowledge about China. In reality, however, increased communication and understanding between the two countries do not automatically generate more favorable opinions. Intimate knowledge may increase doubt and provoke negative reactions, and this is especially true for pundits of politics and international relations. 

II Perceptions of Bilateral Relations

1. How Chinese View China–U.S. Relations

Major findings 

When asked about the current situation regarding China–U.S. relations, 56% of the Chinese public have a negative perception and 14% express optimism. The share of Beijing experts who view the relationship negatively is as high as 72% and only 3% think the opposite is true. 

When asked what they think China’s major concerns are about China–U.S. relations and the U.S., 77% of the Chinese public and 90% of the experts mention trade frictions; 65% of the Chinese public and 56.5% of the experts refer to cybersecurity. For U.S. policy on North Korea, U.S.–Europe relations, polarization in U.S. politics and gun control, immigration policy under the Trump administration, and the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the proportions of the two groups are 22% and 24.5%, 22% and 21.5%, 23% and 21%, 15% and 27%, and 18% and 11%, respectively.

For familiar topics related to China–U.S. relations and U.S. politics, 79% of the public and 91% of the experts report that they are fully aware of the trade frictions; more than 60% of the two groups state that they are informed of the bilateral meetings between the U.S. and North Korean leaders, controversies over gun control in the U.S., cybersecurity discussions between China and the U.S., and polarization in U.S. politics; and 51% of the experts remark that they know many or some facts about the U.S. position on North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

When asked which country is more responsible for trade frictions, 80% of the public and 75% of the experts think that the U.S. is at fault, 3% of the two groups report that China is culpable, and 13% of the former group and 14% of the latter observe that the two countries are equally responsible.

Regarding which country has benefited more from the increase in the two-way trade, 31% of the public and 22% of the experts report that it is China, 18% of the former group and 16% of the latter report that the opposite is true, and 34% of the public and 38 % of the experts believe that the benefits are equally shared.

Nearly half the Chinese public (40%) and experts (43%) report that U.S. economic growth is good for China; approximately one quarter of the public (24%) and very few experts (8%) consider U.S. economic growth harmful, and 49% of the experts take the middle ground; 67% of the former group and 72% of the latter group perceive that common interests between the two countries will strengthen bilateral cooperation; and 28% of the public and 17% of the experts state that competition will lead to conflict.

The vast majority of the Chinese public (87%) and experts (84%) appreciate how the Chinese government has managed China–U.S. relations since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Only 9% of the former group and 7% of the latter say that they disagree or somewhat disagree. Only 20% of the public and 5% of the experts have confidence in U.S. leaders’ efforts to manage relations with China, and those showing no confidence account for 52% of the public and 63% of the experts, respectively.


The vast majority of the Chinese public and Beijing experts largely share their perspectives and stances on China–U.S. relations with the Chinese government and China’s main media outlets, which are mostly state owned. Most of the respondents believe that China and the U.S. are connected by common interests rather than divided by differences and that smooth progress in bilateral economic and trade relations augur well for both countries. They also believe that the U.S. is to blame for provoking the trade war, that China cannot trust U.S. leaders, and that the Chinese government’s policy on the U.S. serves China’s interests well. 

This survey reveals that the Chinese public tends to be more optimistic regarding China–U.S. relations than the experts and place more trust than the latter in the Trump administration regarding its capability to manage U.S. relations with China. The subtle difference is caused probably by the various sources accessed by the two groups. Before June 2019, the main Chinese media outlets were reluctant to promote a negative message about the U.S. because the Chinese government wanted to convey the following: “America only shifts its policy on China for the time being.” To this end, these media outlets were cautious about directly criticizing U.S. leaders. Chinese experts, by contrast, can engage with U.S. citizens and tune in to the U.S. media, gaining insider knowledge on the latest developments of China–U.S. relations. That knowledge increases their pessimism. The same is true for Washington experts with a more unfavorable opinion of China compared with their non-expert U.S. counterparts, as mentioned previously. 

It should be reminded that when this survey was conducted, in June and July 2019, China–U.S. trade frictions were not as severe as they are today; issues related to Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and human rights had not been strongly promulgated by Washington; and China–U.S. “tech decoupling” had not been hyped. Therefore, this survey did not include these topics in the questionnaire. If the authors had another opportunity to design the questionnaire and conduct the survey today, they might have observed different reactions from the respondents, which would have been even more critical of the United States.

2. How Americans View China–U.S. Relations 

Major findings 

Regarding the current situation of China–U.S. relations, only15% of the U.S. public and 2% of Washington experts report it as positive. The share of the experts with a positive attitude decreases by 30 percentage points in the 2019 survey compared with the survey conducted in 2015. Additionally, 35% of the public and 42% of the experts provide no definitive answer.

When asked about their major concerns with regard to bilateral relations and China, 53% of the public and 69% of the experts rate the trade frictions as their biggest concern, and 41% of the former group and 58% of the latter believe that cybersecurity merits the greatest attention. Additionally, 34% of the public and 35% of the experts are of the opinion that environmental pollution in China generates more problems than the other concerns, and 17% of the public and 42% of the experts say that intellectual property protection is the most concerning issue. Topics that received less attention include China’s border disputes with neighboring countries, Xinjiang, internet censorship, Taiwan, and official corruption. Half the public are wary that China might exercise influence on U.S. politics. It is worth noticing that the younger generation believes that environmental pollution in China is the second-biggest concern following trade frictions.

Regarding the familiarity of topics, 57% of the public are most familiar with the issue of trade frictions, followed by environmental pollution in China (49%), internet censorship (47%), cybersecurity disputes between the U.S. and China (44%), and tensions over the Taiwan Strait (37%).

When asked which country should assume greater responsibility for the trade frictions, 21% of the public say the U.S., 23% say China, and 39% say both countries. The proportion of experts with similar views is 22%, 35%, and 39%, respectively. Interestingly, regarding responsibility for trade frictions, most Republican-leaning experts (63%) and very few Democratic-leaning pundits (9%) blame China, and nearly half of the Democratic-leaning experts (46%) think otherwise. 

Regarding which country is the biggest beneficiary from the booming China–U.S. trade, 18% of the public and 22% of the experts think that it is their own country, 22% of the former group and 35% of the latter choose China, and those considering that the benefits have been equally shared account for 37% and 39%, respectively.

Notably, 29% of the public believe that China’s economic growth is a boon for the U.S., 19% view it as a bane, and 51% take a neutral stand; 39% of them report that common interests shared by the two countries are a driver for cooperation, and 32% perceive that competing interests between China and the U.S. cause conflicts. 

Only 37% of the public and 27% of the experts express approval for the Trump administration’s handling of relations with China; for disapproval, the figures for the two groups are 44% and 71% (i.e., 45% strongly disapprove and 26% somewhat disapprove), respectively. A partisan chasm is also visible: 67% of Republican-leaning experts support the Trump administration, and 99% of the Democratic-leaning experts and 75% of independents vocally oppose the Trump administration’s approach to China.

Regarding the trade war that has already affected the two nations, 17% of the public and 8% of the experts perceive that it augurs well for China–U.S. trade relations, and 50% of the former group and 84% of the latter say that the dispute will cause harm.

When asked whether they have confidence in Chinese leaders’ capability to place China–U.S. relations on the right track, 15% of the public replied in the affirmative, compared with 4% of the experts; within the latter group, those expressing negative views account for 68%.


In assessing the current state of China–U.S. relations and expressing confidence in Chinese leadership, Washington experts have more negative views than the public. As aforementioned, parallel surveys conducted by the Chinese and U.S. researchers reveal a similar pattern, showing experts are more pessimistic than the public.

In this respect, the following three findings are counterintuitive. First, the majority of the U.S. public and experts do not blame China mainly for causing the trade frictions. One fifth of them believe that their country should be held accountable for this situation, and more than one third agree that the two countries should share the responsibility. This finding is in stark contrast to the observation here in this survey that the vast majority of the Chinese respondents blame the U.S. for its irresponsible behavior. One reasonable explanation may be that the trade war was indeed initiated by the United States and China was reacting to the challenge. Those Americans who believe that China or both sides should be held responsible for the trade war may contend that it was China’s behavior such as not reciprocating the opening of domestic market and insufficient protection of intellectual property rights that incurred the Trump administration’s sanctions.

Second, even more perplexing is that the U.S. public and experts oppose the Trump administration’s management of China relations, especially in the trade war. The interpretations we offer are threefold. First, President Donald Trump does not enjoy a high degree of popularity in the respondents of these surveys, and even less so among experts. It is only natural that people’s opinions will deviate from his China policy and other policies. Second, as noted above, Republican and Democratic respondents hold divergent attitudes toward Trump’s China policy. Whereas Republicans tend to support Trump’s approach, Democrats and Independents are just the opposite. Third, we are not in a position to judge, based on these surveys, whether those who are opposed to Trump’s handling of China relations think he is too tough or too soft on China. Our assumption is that they could be pulled into both directions.

The third finding that strikes us is the different foci between Chinse and American respondents in the bilateral relationship. Prime Group’s surveys suggest that the U.S. public and experts pay close attention to environmental protection in China and that younger Americans show even greater concern. By contrast, Chinese respondents rarely recognize the importance of those concerns related to global governance such as climate change and environmental pollution. Additionally, Chinese media tend to shift its audience’s attention to economic growth. This is a clear testament to the differences in perception between the Chinese and U.S. public on the so-called “post-modernization” issues.  

III Expectations and Recommendations from the Two Sides on China–U.S. Relations

1. Chinese Side 

The Chinese  surveys conducted in the summer of 2019 demonstrate that more than half of the Chinese public believes that China–U.S. relations will improve in the next 10 years, 23.1% think that it will deteriorate, and nearly one quarter expect it to remain more or less the same. Beijing experts are more pessimistic: 35% believe it will improve in the next 10 years. This proportion is smaller than that of the public. Additionally, 23.5% of the experts think that the current situation will deteriorate, and nearly 40% expect the status quo to continue. When asked whether they think the U.S. will exert influence on Chinese politics, 68% of the public express this concern.

More than half of the Chinese public (54%) believe that China should maintain communication and cooperation with the U.S., and 40% propose that U.S. global influence should be contained. Among the experts, 59% acknowledge that communication and cooperation are necessary, 25% believe that U.S. global influence should be limited, and 16% are not sure, which suggests that Beijing experts prefer cooperation to the curbing of U.S. influence, compared with the public.

The overwhelming majority of the public (69%) and the experts (76%) believe that promoting or maintaining cooperation between China and the U.S. in education and technology benefits both sides. Only 19% of the former group and 5% of the latter hold an opposing view.

The public provides three main reasons to increase shared interests and enhance cooperation: (1) cooperation is always a better option than confrontation; (2) cooperation can act as a consistent incentive for China to modernize its economic system; and (3) cooperation can set an example for the world that two potential competitors can avoid rivalry.

The majority of the Chinese public and experts believe that the most worthwhile steps that the U.S. has taken or can take are as follows: (1) cooperate with China in the areas of politics, economy, environment, and culture; (2) boost investment in science and technology; and (3) make significant contributions to growing and stabilizing the world economy. 

2. U.S. Side

When asked about their expectations of China–U.S. relations, 29% of the U.S. public and 32% of the experts believe that bilateral relations will improve in the next 10 years, and 43% of the former group and 32% of the latter think that it will deteriorate.

Additionally, 34% of the public and 37% of the experts hope that educational and technological exchanges between the two countries will increase or stay the same, and 29% of both groups suspect that China gains more in these exchanges and therefore should try to reduce them; 39% of the public and 36% of the experts believe that the two countries should enhance international exchanges and cooperation; and 32% of the public and 29% of the experts propose that efforts should be made to curb China’s influence overseas.

Despite having a negative view of bilateral relations, the U.S. public and experts rank the following opinions and recommendations in the order of their priority and importance: (1) the U.S. and China should cooperate on climate change, artificial intelligence, counter-terrorism, and preventing North Korea from expanding its nuclear weapons capabilities to expand converging interests; (2) as the world’s largest and second-largest economies, the two countries will gain much more benefits from promoting cooperation than promoting conflicts; and (3) despite the differences in political systems, history, and culture, the two countries benefit from cooperation, and lose in confrontations. The majority of the public and experts believe that China–U.S. cooperation in the areas of economics, politics, and culture can reduce the likelihood of military conflict.

When asked about the type of actions that China has taken or can take to deliver positive outcomes, the U.S. public ranks the following items in the order of their importance: (1) cooperate with the U.S. and other countries to prevent North Korea from expanding its nuclear weapons program; (2) lift a significant number of people out of poverty to create a large consumer market that will buy more goods and services from the U.S.; (3) invest in technology to empower innovation to promote well-being worldwide; (4) cooperate with the U.S. in the areas of politics, the economy, the environment, and culture; (5) take steps to create a fairer environment, and level the playing field for U.S. businesses; and (6) join the Paris Agreement and launch campaigns to reduce pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Washington experts have a similar list of priorities. The only difference is their proposed inclusion of “advancing political reform and expanding personal freedoms.” 

3. Interpretations of the Expectations and Recommendations from Both Sides

By contrast, the Chinese public is more optimistic about China–U.S. relations over the next 10 years, compared with the Beijing experts, U.S. public, and Washington experts. A possible explanation is that the Chinese public place more faith in China’s power growth prospects, while the other three groups believe that bilateral relations will inevitably deteriorate in the short term. This comparison suggests that regardless of President Trump’s re-election prospects in 2020, China–U.S. relations will encounter more friction. 

The Chinese public and experts are more enthusiastic about promoting cooperation with the U.S. in various areas, education and technology in particular, in sharp contrast with the attitudes of the U.S. public and experts. This contrast can be explained from two perspectives: first, the Chinese are unperturbed by the barriers established by the U.S. in recent years and hope to further engage with their U.S. counterparts; and second, Americans are pessimistic about the benefits of exchanges and cooperation. This should serve as a sobering reminder for China that it must be keenly aware of the danger of decoupling China and the U.S. in areas of economy and technology.

The questionnaires designed by Chinese and U.S. researchers include suggestions for the other country to take action for promoting cooperation. The difference the surveys show is that Chinese respondents focus more on illuminating and overarching principles, while U.S. respondents propose rather specific ideas to tackle concerns such as the nuclear arms of North Korea, environmental protection, and climate change. 

IV Conclusions 

In our opinion, the 2019 Survey on China–U.S. Relations under the auspices of the CUSEF has been conducted at the appropriate time; it provides valuable information for government agencies, think tanks, and scholars interested in bilateral relations and diplomacy between the two countries. Based on the analysis and interpretations of the survey data, we have reached the following conclusions:

First, the two sides of respondents are deeply divided on the major issues of bilateral relations. Mutual strategic distrust has increased, and favorable impressions are decreasing. Compared with Chinese, Americans’ views are more negative regarding the current state and future developments of bilateral relations, a sign that the China–U.S. relationship is unlikely to improve in the short term. 

Second, when asked what they think China–U.S. relations will be like in the next 10 years, 1.75 times as many of the Chinese public seems optimistic about the future compared with the U.S. public. Additionally, the shares of the U.S. public and experts who are pessimistic are far greater in comparison to their counterparts in China. This finding reflects a trend that although the pessimism among Americans about China is increasing, the Chinese continue to have relatively high expectations for the U.S. This trend may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, as the Chinese people recognize the importance of China–U.S. relations and the need to be consistent in shaping U.S.-related policies, they will fully support the Chinese government’s management of relations with the U.S. in an appropriate manner. On the other hand, in the case of insufficient preparedness for the possibility of the deterioration in bilateral relations and its negative consequences, they may not remain cool-headed and then may misjudge the situation when a major crisis comes.

Third, Americans are strongly critical of the Trump administration’s trade war against China but will be happy to seek opportunities presented by China’s economic growth and improvement in the environment for investment. Therefore, what concerns Americans most is cybersecurity, intellectual property protection, and market access. They do not pay great attention to geopolitical concerns such as China–Russia military cooperation, the South China Sea disputes, Taiwan, and human rights, and other topics that spark considerable debates among Chinese citizens. This finding suggests that the priorities of Americans differ from those of their government and congress. What Americans are concerned with is whether the U.S. can benefit from their cooperation with China. In this sense, trade and economic cooperation can still be the ballast of China–U.S. relations. China should develop a better understanding of how to exploit the potentials that will fulfill the needs of the U.S. public and business communities.

Fourth, the U.S. hopes that China will assist the international community in its effort to solve the problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, improve the ecological environment, and participate in climate change governance. We suggest that China should enhance communication with the U.S. regarding North Korea and attempt to create greater synergy in policy-making on this issue. When telling Chinese stories to U.S. audiences, China should provide a comprehensive description wherein China not only has achieved economic progress but also is endeavoring to build an ecological civilization. Simultaneously, China should seriously devote their energy to tackling climate change with other countries for playing a leadership role in global governance.    

Fifth, because young and middle-aged Americans have a more favorable impression of China than the previous generation and hold greater expectations for China to promote environmental protection, climate change amelioration, and technological progress, China should be acutely aware of this and enhance communication with these two groups.

Sixth, public opinion polls conducted in the U.S. demonstrate a partisan chasm in their view of President Trump’s policies on China and China–U.S. trade frictions. Republicans tend to blame China for trade frictions and demand that the president harden his attitude toward China. Notably, given the fact that the Trump administration has severely damaged U.S.-China ties over the last three years, Chinese observers should remind themselves that U.S. political polarization may create ripple effects, and that the 2020 U.S. presidential election may result in negative externalities for China–U.S. relations. 

Seventh, although the Chinese and U.S. respondents have significantly varying views and perspectives, both are convinced that the two countries are not locked into a zero-sum game and that cooperation benefits the two sides while confrontation hurts both. They express a strong desire for the two countries to enhance cooperation and eschew conflicts. To fulfill their expectations, China must maintain strategic perseverance and never lose patience and confidence.

*This summary is a collaborative effort, written by Wang Jisi and assisted by the input and analysis of Sun Yilin, Lu Ningbo, Guo Chu, Li Fangqi, Jiao Jian, and Xu Bei. 

Copyright@2014 Institute of International and Strategic Studies Peking University. All Rights Reserved.

IISS, School of International Studies, PekingUniversity, Haidian District, Beijing 100871, China


Mobile Site

Copyright@2014 Institute of International and Strategic Studies Peking University. All Rights Reserved.